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perhaps unprecedented governing model of "one country, two systems."
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Resolution, enacted in 1973. It also details the history of the Presidential
War Power from the Articles of Confederation to the present day, tracing
its conflict with Congress and the judiciary through the Federalist Papers,
the Vietnam War, and I.N.S. v. Chadha. The focus of the article is the
Constitutionality of the War Power and the War Powers Resolution as ex-
amined through the original intent of the Founding Fathers, particularly in
the construction of the terms declaration of war and make war. The article
then examines the constitutional division of the war-related powers of the
Congress, the President, the Commander-in-Chief, Foreign Policy, and case
law from the inception of the Constitution. The article concludes by exami-
ning the effect of the War Powers Resolution on U.S. Foreign policy and
analysing its implications for the future given the Resolution's mandate for
Congress for unconstitutional infringement on the Chief Executive's war
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This article examines the claim of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to
be an army of national liberation. The author assesses the legitimacy of this
claim against the norms and principles of public international law. The
I.R.A. itself asserts not only a moral right to use violence but also a legal
right, expressly invoking recognized principles of international law to vali-
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A Common Law Court in a Marxist
Country: The Case For Judicial Review in
the Hong Kong SAR
MICHAEL C. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Participants from Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China
(PRC) have embarked on a Basic Law drafting process aimed at produc-
ing a constitution or Basic Law for the future capitalist Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region (SAR) in Marxist China. This Basic Law is
required by the Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong agreed to
between the PRC and the United Kingdom in late 1984.' The Joint Dec-
laration stipulates many of the basic policies of the future Basic Law and
articulates an initial framework for China's policy of "one country, two
systems", under which Hong Kong is to enjoy "a high degree of auton-
omy."2 With the first draft of the Basic Law now completed, some atten-
tion to the appropriate process for its implementation is timely. This is-
sue has emerged as one of the central issues in the ongoing Basic Law
discussion. For a comparative constitutional lawyer, examination of this
issue in the unique Hong Kong SAR context affords a rich opportunity
for applied comparative constitutional law.
The economic and political stakes in the Hong Kong endeavor are
enormous. Hong Kong's nearly six million people certainly have the most
immediate interest in the success of the endeavor. The intensity of the
debate over the Basic Law in Hong Kong reflects this concern. The stakes
for China in the success of its Hong Kong policy are also considerable.
Hong Kong is ranked third or fourth among the world's leading financial
centers and could well become China's leading financial center in the next
century. Hong Kong's container port is also among the world's largest and
a considerable portion of China's trade passes through Hong Kong and
China has a considerable investment there. Hong Kong's collapse would
at a minimum be a major financial blow to China. Yet one suspects the
stakes are much larger than the mere loss of the Hong Kong investment.
* Lecturer in Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.D., University of California,
Hastings College of Law; LL.M., Yale Law School. Research funded by a grant from the
Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies. A special thanks to collegues at the Chinese Law
Programme at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, especially Jean Xiong, whose service
to myself and the program is greatly appreciated.
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, (hereinafter "Joint Declaration"). Reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984).
2. Id. para. 3(2).
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Continued confidence in China's economic policies may also hinge on
China's demonstrated commitment to the "one country, two systems"
policy. China faces a fragile question of confidence both in Hong Kong
and at home. Taiwan's future leaders are no doubt watching this process
as well, as they contemplate China's overtures towards unification.
With so much at stake, concern over continued economic and politi-
cal stability in Hong Kong has become a central issue in the Basic Law
drafting discussions. Hong Kong's calls for democracy, direct elections
and universal franchise have been met with Chinese resistance to party
politics and claims to go slow in democratic reform.' While generally ac-
knowledging the Joint Declaration's commitment to democracy, human
rights, and liberal capitalism, the Chinese have appeared cautious on po-
litical reforms in Hong Kong, fearing resultant instability. With so much
at stake, China's reluctance to relinquish too much control appears un-
derstandable, and yet this reluctance threatens to produce the very insta-
bility and lack of confidence they seek to avoid. With a stable and
healthy Hong Kong as the objective, the problem for China may be one of
nurturing the baby without holding it to close.
With reference to implementing the Basic Law, discussions on the
appropriate process for its interpretation and application have begun to
take shape. Proposals have ranged from vesting the primary power to in-
terpret the Basic Law in the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC), to vesting such power exclusively in the Hong
Kong courts.4 For a constitutional lawyer, a comparative look at the con-
cept of constitutional judicial review appears relevant to this discussion.
Constitutional judicial review refers to vesting in appropriate courts the
power to determine whether legislation conforms to the imperatives of
the constitution or basic law. This includes the power to interpret the
Basic Law in order to determine its requirements.5
3. See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-27.
5. While Hong Kong's current colonial government is constituted under certain Letters
Patent and Royal Instructions, these documents contain no bill of rights component, and
Hong Kong has had no experience with constitutional judicial review of legislation. Histori-
cally, a more important conceptual limitation on the legislature may have been the enor-
mous powers of the colonial governor. It should be stressed .. iat, while Hong Kong courts
have not historically asserted any power to throw out legislation for offending the Letters
Patent and Royal Instructions, such courts have, in contexts other than review of legislation,
asserted a power to construe the meaning of the constitutional documents and have a lim-
ited experience with other forms of review of legislation. See infra note 96. Constitutional
judicial review, while being a new addition within the more elaborate future constitutional
framework, would thus be consistent with the existing Hong Kong experience. With these
important distinctions it is generally true that by legal training and practice, Hong Kong
has largely (with limited exception) shared the British unwritten constitutional tradition of
legislative supremacy. While Annex 1, Article II of the Joint Declaration calls for continu-
ance of Hong Kong's current laws, it appears that the implementation of a written basic law
with a bill of rights component will inherently cause fundamental change for which there
will be no adequate recourse to the present system. See generally, Chen, The Basic Idea of
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This essay will examine the contextual imperatives of the Hong Kong
Basic Law debate and the various proposals put forth with respect to in-
terpreting and applying the future Hong Kong SAR Basic Law. A starting
point for this examination is the imperatives evident in the Joint Declara-
tion, as well as those reflected in the aspirations and perspectives of the
participants in the Basic Law drafting process. This will be followed by a
comparative examination of the concept of constitutional judicial review,
both from a theoretical and a structural perspective. With the aim of
highlighting relevant features of this comparative constitutional experi-
ence, a proposed model for Hong Kong will then be offered.
It is hoped that this analysis will make a contribution, not only to the
ongoing Hong Kong Basic Law debate, but more generally, to compara-
tive analysis of constitutional implementation. Improved analysis may as-
sist us in judging the reliability of such efforts at constitutionalism. Judg-
ments of such nature will certainly be made by the world community at
large with respect to the reliability of the final product in Hong Kong.
A. The Basic Law in Context
An examination of the process for implementing the Basic Law
should begin with the Joint Declaration, by considering its imperatives
with respect to constitutional judicial review, or more generally, with re-
spect to interpreting and applying the Basic Law. While such examina-
tion does not provide a clear answer, it does perhaps suggest an appropri-
ate direction. One might well conclude that some form of constitutional
judicial review in the Hong Kong SAR courts may better conform to the
spirit of the Joint Declaration than would the vesting of such review
power largely in the Standing Committee of the NPC. The requirements
of "a high degree of autonomy" and the policy of "one country, two sys-
tems" alone suggest this much. Yet the language of the Joint Declaration
offers more. This language begins by informing us in Paragraph 3 (12)
that the basic policies articulated in the Joint Declaration, and the elabo-
ration of them in Annex I, will be stipulated into the Basic Law. These
policies include the requirement that a large number of enumerated
rights be "protected by law" and afford Hong Kong an "independent ju-
dicial power including that of final adjudication."6
Annex I to the Joint Declaration affords further elaboration of these
policies. Annex I, Article II provides that laws previously in force shall be
maintained "save for those that contravene the Basic Law," that the leg-
islature may enact laws "in accordance with the provisions of the Basic
Law," and that "laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance
with the Basic Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid." Does
this latter expression suggest that common law courts, charged with up-
holding the law, should treat enacted laws that are not in accordance with
the Basic Law, Wide Angle Magazine, May 16, 1986, at 44-48.
6. Joint Declaration, paras. 3(3) and 3(5).
1987
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the Basic Law as invalid? Article II expressly provides for the mainte-
nance of the common law. Does this include the traditional role of com-
mon law courts in affording interpretation and otherwise giving life to
statutory and Constitutional language?
. Several provisions further specify judicial independence, and Annex
I, Article III requires that the judicial power be exercised "independently
and free from interference." This clearly suggests the inappropriateness
of the courts having to consult another entity on Basic Law issues. Fi-
nally, Annex I, Article XIII provides: "Every person shall have the right
to challenge the actions of the executive in the courts." Does this include
the challenge of executive actions under statutes that violate the Basic
Law?
Those who favor vesting in the Standing Committee of the NPC the
power to review all Hong Kong legislation for conformity to the Basic
Law find support in the reporting requirement of the Joint Declaration
and in Article 67 of the PRC Constitution. Annex I, Article II of the Joint
Declaration provides: "The legislature may on its own authority enact
laws in accordance with provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures,
and report them to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for the record." Query whether such reporting "for the record"
implies a power of review or "veto". Article 67 of the PRC Constitution
affords the Standing Committee the power to interpret PRC legislation
which is argued to include the Basic Law. Article 31 of the PRC constitu-
tion, however, permits the creation of special systems in SARs and would
therefore appear to permit delegation of this interpretation power either
in the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law. If such delegation has not
clearly been accomplished in the Joint Declaration, then perhaps it
should be in the Basic Law. While the Joint Declaration is ambiguous on
this point, both its spirit and language appear to favor some form of con-
stitutional judicial review. Any product of the Basic Law drafting process
should be judged for conformity to such policies as indicated by the Joint
Declaration.
B. Hong Kong Perspectives
In drafting the Basic Law, the PRC government is employing a very
elaborate system, embodying both a Basic Law Drafting Committee and a
Basic Law Consultative Committee, in a process designed to consult with
a large cross-section of the Hong Kong community. Both Hong Kong and
mainland participants are included on these committees. Their numbers
include both lawyers and laymen. Recommendations for inclusions in the
Basic Law have come from many sectors of the Hong Kong community.
In selecting committee members, efforts were made to include representa-
tives from these various sectors in conformity with the emerging Hong
Kong tradition of functional constituencies. The electoral process for the
future SAR has proven a particularly contentious issue. Competing elec-
toral models pit direct elections and universal franchise for selecting the
future governor against forms of indirect election employing an electoral
VOL. 16:1
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college.' Some four proposals have been short-listed for selecting the fu-
ture legislature.' Some have even expressed fears that unless a consensus
is reached on the proper political model, China may simply have to dic-
tate the model.'
Any proposals specifically addressing the question of interpretation
or implementation of the future Basic Law might better be considered in
light of more general aspirations of the participants. It may be safe to
conclude, from our contemporary look at this new generation of founding
fathers, that there are certain shared aspirations for Hong Kong's future.
These especially include a strong frequently emphasized commitment to
economic and political stability. This motivation tends to animate much
of the discussion from all perspectives. Shared aspirations also include
agreement to maintain a capitalist economy" and to carry on a system of
law and government that best facilities Hong Kong's capitalist dynamic.
Sustaining a significant degree of political autonomy for Hong Kong is
commonly recognized as an important ingredient of this process." The
importance of this latter ingredient is emphasized when one considers the
reality of having a Marxist developing country take sovereignty over what
is in effect a country with a developed capitalist economy.
Yet there are certain fundamental differences in the perspectives
that come to the Basic Law drafting table. The elites of Hong Kong have
been schooled for well over a century in a conception of governance which
sees the government as a somewhat passive umpire, or even a facilitator
of private endeavor.'" This system appears to carry with it a Western,
7. The two leading proposals for selection of the future SAR chief executive, pit rival
groups within the Basic Law Consultative Committee against each other. Draft Basic Law,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (for solicita-
tion of opinions) (April, 1988) [hereinafter Draft Basic Law]. The so called group of 80,
largely representing conservative business interest, favors selection by an electoral college of
600 representatives elected from eleven functional sectors of the community. Twenty mem-
bers of this group would constitute a nominating committee to propose three candidates.
This model is felt to reduce the need for party politics. While this group is smaller than the
rival group of 190, it appears to have better relations with Beijing. The rival group of 190
favors universal franchise with direct election of the chief executive. See Lueng, New
Formula to Elect Chief Executive, South China Morning Post, Nov. 5, 1986 at 2, col. 2;
Leung, 130 Groups Join Political Reform Lobby, South China Morning Post, Feb. 5, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.
8. These models differ with reference to the proportion of legislators to be elected by
functional constituencies and by territorial constituencies with various indirect and direct
election components. See Yeung, Political System Gains Form, South China Morning Post,
Nov. 17, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
9. See Leung, Political Conflict 'Must End', South China Morning Post, Nov. 16, 1986,
at 2; Leung, Basic Law team 'Kept in the Dark', South China Morning Post, Feb. 5, 1987,
at 1. At this writing, with the Basic Law nearly final, the relevant electoral provisions are
still worded in the alternative and may remain so when a final draft is presented to the
community for pubic comment.
10. Joint Declaration, Annex I, Article VI.
11. Joint Declaration, para. 3(2).
12. Here, reference is had to fundamental notions of civil liberty and natural rights as
1987
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almost Lockean, conception of natural rights. It is the mission of govern-
ment to uphold these rights upon which the system depends. When gov-
ernment fails to fulfill this mission, there is a tendency to seek resort to
legal process, or, in particular, the courts.13 While it is difficult to gauge
the importance of passive-government and a rights process to Hong
Kong's success, it appears that Hong Kong does take rights seriously and
that this may have something to do with historic confidence in its eco-
nomic and political institutions.
While PRC participants express an equal commitment to Hong
Kong's stability and continued success, they may come to the table with a
different conception of rights and the rule of law. These differences are in
some respects fundamental and diverge radically from rights and law con-
ceptions under the style of liberal capitalism the Joint Declaration ap-
pears to envision. This is not intended to criticize China's remarkable
achievements in developing laws, but instead to point out a fundamental
divergence in values concerning rights and the rule of law between main-
land China and Hong Kong. While China has in recent years had remark-
able achievement in the drafting of new laws, this achievement has yet to
be matched with an equal commitment to legal process. In the constitu-
tional area, this has meant that many constitutional values have yet to
enjoy consistent application.
This approach to constitutionalism in general, and rights in particu-
lar, has been traced to a policy conception of rights as gifts from the state
rather than as a limitation on the state. 4 This is further evident in the
well as private ownership under a capitalist economy. Under English administration Hong
Kong has been a beneficiary of English common law and political concepts. The value sys-
tem this entails has numerous Western intellectual sources but perhaps is best traceable to
Western enlightened thinkers such as John Locke who might view government as keeping a
trust and interpreting the values naturally held by the people. For discussion of Locke's
theories (as well as enlightened thought generally) and reference to other sources, see D.
GERMINO, MACHIAVELLI TO MARX, MODERN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 116 et. seq. (1972).
While it is difficult to measure precisely the influence of Western political, legal and eco-
nomic thought on Hong Kong's current political and economic institutions, the current pub-
lic discourse seems to suggest a strong influence. Furthermore, the existence of such com-
mon basic values in Hong Kong, as might be expected, has not produced a monolithic Hong
Kong position on the numerous issues in the Basic Law process. As might be expected in a
liberal pluralist society, sharp divisions have emerged among the Hong Kong participants.
See generally, Yeung, Debate on Conflicting Political Systems, South China Morning Post,
Nov. 5, 1986, at 1; Leung, New Formula to Elect Chief Executive, South China Morning
Post, Nov. 5, 1986, at 2, col. 2. One should further note that the government in Hong Kong
does not always achieve adherence to such values although it may have such aspirations. For
example, numerous complaints concerning police practices would tend to bear this out.
13. For indications of the vigor of resorting to courts for review of administrative pro-
cess in Hong Kong, see generally D. J. Clarke, B. Lai and A. Luk, Hong Kong Administra-
tive Law: Cases and Materials (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (available at University of
Hong Kong, Department of Political Science).
14. R. R. EDWARDS, L. HENKIN, A. J. NATHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA,
44, 125 et. seq. (1986).
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association of constitutional duties with rights. 5 In the area of free
speech, for example, as evident in the recent campaign against "bourgeois
liberalism," this could mean a predominant emphasis on the duty not to
"infringe upon the interest of the state."16 This contrasts with the liberal
conception of free speech as a limit on government aimed at enriching the
public debate. Owen Fiss has traced this different conception of free
speech to even deeper value differences:
The truth is, however, a little deeper and a little darker. It is not that
China sees one elite (eg. bourgeois capitalist) as more of a threat to
free speech than another, but rather that it is informed by a different
set of commitments altogether. Private elites are curbed as a by-prod-
uct of socialism, rather than from a commitment to free and open de-
bate. True, China sees itself as a democracy, but it appears to have a
top-down, as opposed to a bottom-up conception. The emphasis is
upon leading the masses, not enriching debate. The true path has
been found."
Whether one accepts this account or not, it is evident that basic
value differences between China and Hong Kong are dramatic. Even if
one assumes a serious effort at liberal thinking in Beijing, one could rea-
sonably be concerned about the fragile fabric of confidence in Hong Kong
with a Basic Law rights foundation dependent primarily on mainland in-
terpretation. Acknowledging this difference is merely to take seriously the
notion of "one country, two systems."
C. The Current Debate on Basic Law Implementation
The various specific proposals for interpreting and applying the Basic
Law seem to be products of both the shared objectives and the divergent
values. In a report presented to the full Basic Law Drafting Committee in
December of 1986, the Drafting Committee subgroup on local/central
Government relations proposed that the power to interpret the Basic Law
be assigned to the Standing Committee of the NPC. 18 News accounts of
15. CHINA CONST. ch. 2, concerning the fundamental rights and duties of citizens. It is
noteworthy that the Basic Law drafters have already entitled one of the proposed chapters
of the future Basic Law "The Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Hong Kong
Inhabitants".
16. Id., Art. 51
17. 0. M. Fiss, Two Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492, 501 (1986).
18. "Preliminary Provisions on the Relationship Between the Central Government
and the Hong Kong SAR and the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Hong Kong Citizens";
Ming Bao Daily, Nov. 30, 1986. This proposal has essentially been adopted as proposed in
the nearly completed first draft of the Basic Law submitted in December of 1987 to the
Sixth Plenary Session of the Basic Law Drafting Committee by the subgroup on local/cen-
tral Government relations, as follows:
Chapter 9. Interpretation and Amendment of the Basic Law of the HKSAR.
Article 169: The power of interpretation of the Basic Law shall be vested in the NCP
Standing Committee.
If the NPC Standing Committee has given an interpretaion of a provision of this Law,
the courts of the HKSAR shall in applying such provision follow the interpretation of the
1987
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this proposal suggest that this review, or "veto" power, would be exer-
cised at the time Hong Kong legislation is reported to the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC "for the record." 9 This proposal appears to have a
strong Beijing imprint on it.20 The mainland co-convenor of the subgroup,
Mr. Shao Tienren, reportedly stated: "The NPC's Standing Committee
will be vested with the final power to review future laws of Hong Kong,
but in practice, the NPC will be unlikely to exercise the power fre-
quently. ' . One suspects that actual exercise of such power would be un-
necessary when indications of disapproval might dissuade the future leg-
islature from passing "unconstitutional laws." It is noteworthy that
another subgroup of the drafting committee concerned with political
structure has recommended a political system based on separation of
powers with "checks and balances." '2 It is difficult to square such propo-
NPC Standing Committee. However, judgments previously given shall not be affected.
The courts in the HKSAR may, in adjudicating cases before them, interpret provisions
of the Basic Law. If a case involves the interpretation of the Basic Law concerning defense,
foreign affairs, and other affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central Government,
the courts of the HKSAR shall ask the NPC Standing Committee to give an interpretation
of the relevant provision before giving their final judgment on the case.
The NPC Standing Committee shall consult the HKSAR Basic Law Committee before
giving an interpretation of this law. See, Collection of Documents of the Sixth Plenary
Session of the Drafting Committee, Dec. 87.
19. See Id. Article 16: The HKSAR shall be vested with legislative power.
Laws enacted by the HKSAR legislative shall be reported to the NPC Standing Com-
mittee for the record, and such reporting shall not affect the coming into operation of the
laws.
If the NPC Standing Committee, after consulting the HKSAR Basic Committee, con-
siders that any law of the HKSAR is not in accordance with the law or legal procedures, it
may return the relevant law for reconsideration or revoke it, but it shall not amend it. Any
law which is returned for reconsideration or revoked by the NPC Standing Committee shall
immediately cease to have force, but this cessation shall not have retrospective effect.
20. It should he noted that the PRC does not employ constitutional judicial review,
instead it employs legislative implementation of its national constitution, i.e. constitutional
rights and principles take on life when enacted into legislation by the NPC or its Standing
Committee. CHINA CONST.; See generally supra note 14. Chen, The question on the inter-
pretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law, Wide Angle Magazine, Mar. 16, 1985, at 24-27.
21. Yeung, supra note 19. In more recent statements, Mr. Shao Tien-ren has reiterated
this position. Before Review of the Hong Kong Laws, the Standing Committee of the NPC
will Consult with Hong Kong People, Ming Bao, Feb. 17, 1987, at 2. In the same comments
Mr. Shao notes that Hong Kong courts currently have the power to interpret Hong Kong's
constitutional documents subject to power in London to overrule them. Whether this is a
veiled suggestion that Beijing may be willing to accept nominal assignment of the power of
constitutional review in the Standing Committee with practical exercise of such power in
the Hong Kong courts is not clear. The issue could well be ambiguously resolved in the
current debate leaving it to the future judiciary and Standing Committee to work the issue
out through some process of mutual tolerance.
22. Separation of powers with checks and balances usually suggest some form of consti-
tutional judicial review as a means for the courts to perform their role of checking the other
two branches of government. This can be distinguished from a French style functional sepa-
ration of powers. See M. CAPPE. ETrl, JUDIciAL REvIEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 35
(1971); J. Cummins, Constitutional Protection of Civil Liberties in France, 33 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 721, 722-24 (1985); Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitu-
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sal with a constitutionally impotent court.
The proposal of the subgroup on local/central Government relations
appears not to have been thoroughly considered, and has met with strong
disapproval from leading Hong Kong drafters.23 The subgroup had also
included a recommendation that Hong Kong courts could "interpret" the
provisions of the Basic Law "within the scope of the autonomy power."24
The leading Hong Kong drafters objected to such limitation because it
does not appear clearly whether the word "interpretation", as employed
by both sides, is intended to include the power to hold legislation uncon-
stitutional, i.e., constitutional judicial review. The subgroup's discussions
suggests restriction of the latter power to the Standing Committee. As
developed in the following sections of this essay, the subgroup's recom-
mendations appear theoretically and structurally problematic.
In noting their objection, the leading Hong Kong drafters have sug-
gested that the Hong Kong courts should have full power to "interpret"
the entire Basic Law. They suggested that this was consistent with com-
mon law practices and would insure greater public confidence in the Basic
Law. The subgroup was advised to consider the matter further and make
further recommendations in 1987."5 More recently, Martin Lee, perhaps
the most outspoken advocate for the people of Hong Kong, and a leading
figure among the Hong Kong drafters who have objected to the above
sub-group proposal, has advanced a proposal of his own. Mr. Lee would
have Hong Kong's highest court of appeal, upon any request from the
Standing Committee, determine in an advisory capacity whether SAR
legislation was unconstitutional. 6 Mr. Lee feels that if the Standing Com-
tionnel and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM. J. CoMp. L. 45, 46-50 (1986); Neuborne, Judi-
cial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N. Y. U. L. REv.
363 (1982). The political structure subgroup appears to have recognized this tension be-
tween its proposals and those of the other subgroup in its meetings in February of 1987,
when it endeavored to address the duties of the future judiciary. Leung, Basic Law Compro-
mise Sought, South China Morning Post, Feb. 17, 1987. These meetings have pushed to the
forefront certain tensions between those advocating the power of constitutional review in
the Hong Kong courts and those advocating Standing Committee review. Compromise posi-
tions that are more politically than theoretically or practically informed have been ad-
vanced. It appears possible that this issue could remain with us under an ambiguous provi-
sion even in the implementation stage. The question of direct elections has tended to
overshadow this and other important issues resulting in very little study of the interpreta-
tion issue. The final solution to this question should be worked out in the final draft of the
Basic Law but could well be fashioned by the future judiciary with Standing Committee
acquiescence. The current essay points out some theoretical and structural aspects of the
issue for consideration over the long term dialogue in this area.
23. See generally supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. M. Lee, The Significance of a Written Constitution for Hong Kong, paper presented
at A Conference on the American Constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law: Some Com-
parative Observations, Sponsored by United States Information Service and the Depart-
ment of Law, Hong Kong University on Jan. 16, 1987 (Anticipated publication of proceed-
ings after revisions and editing by Hong Kong University Press, R. Stevens, ed.).
26. Perhaps an important weakness of this proposal is its complexity and its tendency
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mittee was not satisfied with such a determination, it could then refer the
matter for resolution to a special committee under the Standing Commit-
tee consisting of legal experts largely from Hong Kong. As with other
drafters, Mr. Lee appears to separate constitutional judicial review from
interpretation of the Basic Law - the latter for which local courts would
have full capacity. The basis for this latter distinction is difficult to ap-
preciate. Query whether the proposed advisory opinion with committee
referral offends the Joint Declaration requirement of finality in local
courts. These various proposals for implementing the Basic Law raise
more questions then they answer but make a valuable contribution to this
debate. While it appears that these proposals fail to fully appreciate the
theory of judicial review in a constitutional democracy and create unnec-
essary structural tangles, they do represent a beginning dialogue with ref-
erence to the important question of implementation of the Basic Law.27
Although attempts are being made at preliminary resolution of this
issue, it appears that until this important issue is more thoroughly con-
sidered, any such resolution will be subject to question until the final
drafting stage. If the American experience is any guide, the judiciary will
add its own imprint after 1997. In the final analysis, any proposals, and
the final product, should be judged both theoretically and structurally in
terms of the imperatives of the Joint Declaration and the objectives of
the participants. After examining theoretical and structural perspectives
on constitutional judicial review, an alternative model for discussion will
be offered. It is hoped that this alternative model will serve to highlight
the theoretical and structural features that should be carefully examined
with reference to any final product of this important Basic Law drafting
process.
II. A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Beginning with a commitment to republican government and a con-
cept of fundamental rights, Western constitutional theorists have engaged
in a centuries old debate on the legitimacy of constitutional judicial re-
view. Constitutional judicial review engages the courts in the process of
deciding whether laws produced through majoritarian processes conform
to the more fundamental principles of law enunciated in the constitution
or basic law. This includes interpreting the basic law to ascertain its im-
peratives. Under a system of constitutional judicial review, depending on
the type of constitutional review system employed, the court may refuse
to give effect to, or invalidate, the statutory law in question. For now this
discussion will focus on the American style of judicial review common in
many (but not all) common law countries. Discussion of alterative sys-
to entangle the courts of Hong Kong in the national political process. The character of this
entanglement may be very difficult for the people of Hong Kong to appreciate and may
further erode their confidence. See also, Davis, Matters Not Being Considered With Re-
spect to the Power of Interpretation Under the Basic Law, Ming Bao, Jan. 19-22, 1987.
27. See generally supra note 18.
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tems for judicial review will follow in the next section. This section will
instead introduce certain legitimacy issues raised by constitutional theo-
rists concerning judicial review. By understanding these issues one might
better focus on the merits of constitutional judicial review, as well as its
possible relationship to the autonomous functioning of a liberal capitalist
constitutional democracy. This may better inform our judgment with re-
spect to interpreting and applying the Basic Law of Hong Kong.
The United States currently has the world's oldest continuously op-
erating system of constitutional judicial review. This system traces its
roots to British common law legal traditions and the colonial experience."'
The American system of constitutional review can be more directly traced
to the famous opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison."9 In that opinion, which overturned certain features of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,0 Chief Justice Marshall seized for the court the power
to declare acts of Congress to be in violation of the American Constitu-
tion. Even though constitutional judicial review was not mentioned in the
American Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall, using a syllogistic style of
analysis, found such a power to be inherent in the American system of
separation of powers with checks and balances. He argued that if the
Constitution was the supreme law of the land and the court was charged
with upholding it, then it followed that any law passed by current majori-
ties in Congress would be unconstitutional and of no effect if it failed to
comply with the requirements of the Constitution. The court was charged
with upholding the will of the people expressed in the Constitution. In
Alexander Hamilton's words, in Federalist Papers No. 78: "Where the will
of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of
the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed
by the latter rather than the former."'
The Marshall syllogism sounds convincing enough on its face, but it
fails to address two important problems. First, it fails to adequately ad-
dress how one might confidently discern the will of the people expressed
in the constitution, or, more explicitly the problem of construction of the
constitution. Secondly, it failed to adequately address the problem of the
legitimacy of non-elected justices thwarting the will of the democratically
elected branches of government, i.e., it failed to adequately address the
counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent in this process. Debate has now
raged over these issues for two centuries. This debate, with the spread of
judicial review, has now been flung to the far reaches of the world. 2 This
28. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 36-41 (1971).
29. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 80 (1803).
30. The court declared the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 delegating the manda-
mus power to the United States Supreme Court in original jurisdiction to be unconstitu-
tional, seizing the important power of judicial review for itself while giving a victory to the
president in that particular case.
31. See generally, A. M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16 et. seq. (2d ed.1986).
32. See e.g., Cappelletti, supra note 22; Zamudio, A Global Survey of Governmental
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debate has revealed, in various permutations, the interconnectedness of
these issues. More importantly, it has revealed a great deal about the con-
stitutional law-making process that should not be ignored by a polity
about to embark on this process. A brief look at recent discussions of
these issues will serve to illuminate the useful function of constitutional
judicial review in a capitalist liberal democracy.
The historical debate has focused on whether a judge, in exercising
judicial review, should be bound by the "original intent" of the constitu-
tional framers, or whether this constitutional mission requires reference
beyond the constitutional document to other higher values or principles
or perhaps just policy.38 If one elects the latter avenue, as does a majority
of current theorists, the question becomes where to look, and what con-
strains judicial decision. This all bears obvious relationship to what has
been described as the counter-majoritarian difficulty,34 a concern that in-
creases to the extent that judges are given free rein. For reference, and
inconformity with general conceptual practice, the original intent theory
will be styled "interpretivism", while the theories calling for reference be-
yond the constitution and its legislative history will be called "non-inter-
pretivism."35 It should be noted that some schools of thought have at-
tempted to undermine the enterprise of constitutional theory,3  e.g.,
Institutions to Protect Civil and Political Rights, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 17 (1983);
Barav, The Judicial Power of the European Economic Community, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 461
(1980); Spiliotopoulos, Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in Greece, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 463
(1983); Ratner, Constitutions, Majoritarianism, and Judicial Review: The Function of a
Bill of Rights in Israel and the United States, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L. 373 (1978); Gyandoh,
Interaction of the Judicial and Legislative Processes in Ghana Since Independence, 56
TEMP. L. Q. 351 (1983); Bolz, Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of Restraint, 4 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 88 (1980); Keith, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand? Judicial
Review Versus Democracy, 11 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 307 (1985).
33. For articulation and further reference concerning original intent or the interpre-
tivist position see e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). For the more expansive views, see e.g., BICKEL supra note
31; J. H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); J. H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS, A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDER-
ATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); M. J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY
MAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual
Rights Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587
(1985); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV., 193
(1952).
34. See BICKEL supra note 31. This difficulty refers to the undemocratic character of
non-elected judges in effect invalidating the acts of the elected branches of government and
resultant legitimacy problems. See also, Ely, supra note 33, at 105 et. seq.
35. See, Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van
Alstyne, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1435 (1984); Grey, Do we have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
36. See, e.g. Van Alstyne, Interpreting this Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions
of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209(1983) (from the right);
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitu-
tional Theory, 89 YALE L. J. 1037 (1980) (from the left).
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critical theorists, while others have tended to dissolve this conflict by
shifting the focus to the nature of interpretation, often drawing parallels
from literature or scripture.8 Space does not permit giving all these theo-
ries the attention they deserve.
The mission will instead be a more selective one of trying to draw
some lessons from the constitutional law-making process that may be of
some use in our current, very unique comparative context. This examina-
tion reveals a certain elaborative process of dialogue that is fundamental
to constitutional human rights development in a system with a written
constitution. In most cultural and societal contexts, where rights are
taken seriously, judicial review is becoming an important component of
this process. Only through understanding this process, particularly in the
common law context, can Hong Kong make a rational decision concerning
this component.
The interpretivist position, articulated perhaps with greatest elabora-
tion by Raoul Berger, admonishes the judiciary to be mindful of its lim-
ited role, delineated in Marshall's syllogism, of applying the written con-
stitution.8" This interpretation process can appropriately be informed by
legislative history, but not otherwise by reference to sources external to
the constitution and its original intent. The founding fathers, it is urged,
did not intend government by judiciary. Much of modern constitutional
law would tend to violate this viewpoint, as it engages in a much more
elaborate shaping of fundamental values and even policy.89 Interpretivists
suffer wide ranging criticism. They also suffer their own counter-
majoritarian difficulty; one of having founding fathers ruling subsequent
generations from the grave. Marshall himself admonished us that a con-
stitution was not intended to "partake of the prolixity of a code", that it
was a living document.'0 Some would say that the constitution is an out-
line of principles to which the polity is committed."1 Elaboration of these
principles is a continuous contextual process. Other critiques of interpre-
tivism proceed from a different notion of law in general, and constitu-
37. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing at-
tempts at this approach which he labels "rejectionist"); Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 177 (1985).
38. Berger, supra note 33, at 115 et. seq.
39. Most civil law jurisdictions have openly acknowledged the essential political nature
of constitutional judicial review in their creation of separate constitutional courts. These
courts have in some cases made dramatic constitutional decisions. See generally, Mezey,
Civil Law and Common Law Traditions: Judicial Review and Legislative Supremacy in
West Germany and Canada, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 689 (1983) (discussing abortion cases);
Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657 (1980). These cases are matched in America by
decisions such as the leading American abortion decision. Roe. V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1972).
40. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
41. See Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court in a Modern World, 4 VAND. L. REv. 427, 428
(1951); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAMv. L. R. 1
(1959).
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tional law in particular. This notion is process-focused and sees the con-
stitutive process as part of a complex dialogue within and between the
political branches, the people, and the courts. 42 Other critics would sim-
ply admonish interpretivists that a century of constitutional elaboration
has proven them wrong.48
Non-interpretivists, on the other hand, represents several complex
positions. Much current debate ranges between these various positions.
Perhaps not enough has been done to achieve a synthesis of their in-
sights. Such a synthesis may be the only reasonable way for a compara-
tivist to make use of this elaboration. Because they cannot claim legiti-
macy solely from the articulations of the founding event, the non-
interpretivists have been more troubled with the counter-majoritarium
feature of coitstitutional judicial review and have sought various means of
dissolving this problem. In spite of its difficulties, non-interpretivism has
managed greater conformity with constitutional reality and has more
clearly taken the much more satisfying step of recognizing that a consti-
tution is something more than an ordinary statute. It has also pushed
American constitutionalism beyond the rather acute interpretivist style
counter-majoritarian difficulty; the problem of a handful of eighteenth
century colonist ruling the present from their grave."
In a broad sense, non-interpretivism, especially as elaborated in what
might be considered its best articulation by Alexander Bickel, would have
the court look beyond the written constitutional document to certain ba-
sic values or principles about which that document only provides an out-
line.4 5 It is in the nature of a living constitution that these principles are
not fixed, but evolving. Growth and elaboration of such a principle is a
task to which the judiciary is peculiarly suited by virtue of temperament
and process. Bickel elaborates two levels of law-making: laws that address
immediate or expedient needs, and laws that elaborate our collective
deeply felt values and are developed incrementally.4" These latter laws
42. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 117 et. seq.
43. See Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases:
Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, Conkle, supra note 33, at 659 (citing
congressional acquiesence).
44. Some seek to avoid this problem by citing the ability of constitutional amendment,
but in a society such as the United States where this has rarely occurred, the most signifi-
cant instance requiring a civil war, this position is subject to attack. See generally Berger,
supra note 33.
45. See BICKEL supra note 31, at 23. Bickel notes in defense of the courts role:
The search must be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making of
policy, yet which differs from the legislative and executive functions; which is peculiarly
suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the
courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be accepted in a society that gener-
ally shares Judge Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effec-
tive when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other
departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and the burden of their
responsibility.
46. Here he refers to what he describes as a "Lincolnian tension". He is speaking of
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are best developed with the aid of the reflective, contextually focused ju-
dicial process and not in the give and take of policy focused legislative
expediency.
Bickel does not stop there but goes on to elaborate a judicial process
for value development. This process does not envision a judiciary in isola-
tion, but a judiciary engaged in a complex dialogue with the elected
branches and the polity at large.4 In this process the court has three op-
tions: first, it can overturn the legislation in question; second, it can up-
hold and legitimate it; or third, it can do neither.48 In choosing the third
option, the court employs certain techniques or doctrines of avoidance
that contribute to the dialogue with the other branches of government,
and permits the court to inform itself and wait for the appropriate time
for further elaboration of principle. These avoidance doctrines, or "pas-
sive virtues", are instruments of dialogue for law-making on the higher
plane of principle. These instruments include such doctrines as standing,
mootness, ripeness and the delegation doctrine, and tools such as legisla-
tive interpretation and vagueness, to name just a few. What Bickel
presents is a very complex notion of process, or dialogue, that may be
fundamental to the Anglo-American concept of rights, with or without
constitutional judicial review. With the spread of judicial review, this no-
tion may be gaining favor elsewhere.
Dean Harry Wellington has provided further elaboration of Bickel's
dialogue-based development of principled law or rights by focusing on the
question of finality in constitutional opinions.4" Bickel might suggest that
a constitutional opinion is not really final until the people say it is. While
courts will frequently employ passive virtues to avoid the premature elab-
oration of principles, as they have done in death penalty cases, they may
ultimately elaborate a principle, and then, if appropriate, seek to back
out somewhat. Wellington sees this as having occurred in American abor-
tion cases after the court initially issued a rather liberal opinion in Roe v.
Wade.50 It had worked up to this point with passive virtues in several
Lincoln's commitment to the principle of equality tempered by willingness to compromise to
expediency when political process so demands. In such a process principle can be compro-
mised but not surrendered. This commitment to principle may be counter-majoritarian and
so some willingness to compromise is also a concession to democracy. See Id. at 65, "Our
Democratic system of government exists in this Lincolnian tension between principle and
expediency, and within it judicial review must play its role". Id. at 68. An important point
for Bickel is that the court is not engaged in an unrelenting search for principle but takes
account of the competing needs of expediency in its principle development. Id. at 200. This
permits judicial participation in a wider dialogue.
47. Id. at 117 et. seq.
48. He stresses the importance of the courts educational function. "But in withholding
constitutional judgment the Court does not necessarily forsake an educational function, nor
does it abandon principle. It seeks merely to elicit the correct answers to certain prudential
questions that, in such society as Lincoln conceived, lie in the path of ultimate issues of
principle". Id. at 70.
49. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L. J. 486 (1982).
50. Id. at 517-519. Dean Guido Calabresi has developed an excellent analysis of the
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contraception cases. After Roe v. Wade, the court then backed up a little,
permitting certain limitations on funding, etc., for abortions.
The Bickel/Wellington reasoning acknowledges the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, but, under Bickel, is less concerned with it, given
the Court's incremental elaboration of principles in a process informed by
dialogue with the people and the democratic branches of government.
Wellington elaborates further, noting there are many counter-
majoritarian features in any constitutional democracy, and that any sys-
tem of law based entirely on, and immediately responsive to, majoritarian
expediency would be unstable.5 1 He notes that fascism under Hitler was
initially such a system. Bureaucracy is a common, frequently counter-
majoritarian instrument, as are legislative seniority systems, etc. Delay
and reformulation of majoritarian preferences may be necessary to pru-
dent government action and stability. This notion of stability is a particu-
lar concern in Hong Kong. By providing structure for development and
elaboration of higher norms, constitutional judicial review is a valued sta-
bilizing force. Structuring democracy in order to stabilize it seems emi-
nently preferable to destroying democracy in an alleged search for stabil-
ity; the latter being the direction Basic Law discussions in Hong Kong
often take.
As noted above, Wellington would focus more attention on finality
than on the counter-majoritarian problem. With the aid of Bickel's pas-
sive virtues and principled decision, this latter problem is also largely
overcome. This concern with finality stems from the fact that a constitu-
tional decision, unlike a common law decision, cannot be overturned by
the legislative branch. But in the case of a properly informed process of
principled decision, the court will itself back up when necessary. He feels
less secure about policy based decisions as less susceptible to being
proven wrong.
52
A constellation of other theories are located around this non-inter-
pretivist core. Herbert Wechsler, before Bickel, noted a role for courts in
developing "neutral principles." ' Wechsler's neutral principles are very
limited reasoned principles that are to be elaborated very conservatively,
generally giving way to legislative choice. Wechsler, in Bickel's view, did
not appreciate the broader role of the Court with reference to the dia-
logue concerning policy expediency and principle." Wechsler would not
dialogue process between courts and the legislative branch in his book focused on updating
statutes. See, G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
51. Wellington, supra note 49, at 488-492. "The instability fostered by a government
that instantly gratified majorities would slow or halt the growth of reasonable expectations."
Id. at 492. "[A] governmental structure that fails to unite a nation's present with its past
necessarily fails to preserve values to which its citizens may attach considerable weight." Id.
at 494. "To the contrary, wherever our system creates a danger of majority willfulness, some
tempering devise is interposed." Id. at 498.
52. Id. at 504 et. seq.
53. Wechsler, supra note 41.
54. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 68-69.
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be with the Court on much modern civil rights law.
John Ely, on the other hand, takes issue with Bickel's views concern-
ing the court's superior ability to articulate fundamental values." Absent
such superiority, Bickel's views are thought to encounter considerable
counter-majoritarian difficulty and legitimacy problems. Borrowing from
a footnote in the Carolene Products" case, Ely sees the mission of judi-
cial review as participation reinforcement and the related function of pro-
tection of minority rights."7 While acknowledging participation reinforce-
ment is also a value, he feels this is the primary value of participatory
democracy." Ely sees participation reinforcement as not only what the
court should do, but as what it in fact does. Ely urges that he has gotten
around the counter-majoritarian difficulty by confining the judiciary to, in
effect, unclogging the majoritarian process." This is the one mission
elected officials are not good at because their self interest gets in the way.
Other theories, such as Michael Perry's recent effort, would give
greater leeway to judicial policy making, letting judges internally reach
the right result based on policy concerns.6s In addition to counter-
majoritarian difficulty, this runs into problems with the lack of external
constraint. Finally, some recent efforts have focused on the process of in-
terpretation itself, carrying the debate to the rather lofty reaches of scrip-
ture interpretation." These scholars examine the contextual element in
any effort at understanding a constitutional text, and thereby seek to dis-
solve the interpretivism/non-interpretivism dichotomy, bringing in
through another door - contextualism - many features that would meet
with traditional interpretivist disapproval.
At a minimum, these various schools of thought elaborate many con-
cerns with legitimacy and accountability when a non-democratic institu-
tion is employed in a system fundamentally committed to democracy.
These concerns are described by such terms as counter-majoritarianism
finality, and constraint. Yet the use of constitutional judicial review as an
instrument of constitutionalism would not be experiencing such a dra-
55. Ely, supra note 33, at 63.
56. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). In a case that was
otherwise insignificant, the court hinted a change in direction:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular reli-
gious. . . or national. . . or racial minorities...; whether prejudice against discrete and in-
sular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
57. Ely, supra note 33, at 73 et. seq.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id. at 88, 102.
60. Perry, supra note 33.
61. See generally supra note 37.
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matic increase if the value achieved was not generally considered suffi-
cient to override these concerns. Outside of certain limited cultural and
legal contexts, in modern pluralistic democracies, constitutional judicial
review, while not by itself sufficient, 2 may well be practically necessary to
a meaningful commitment to rights. I believe its usefulness relates to the
principle elaborating dialogue it brings to the process of constitutional
rights development.
This dialogue, or communication-based concept of constitutional the-
ory, is less iron-fisted than public debate would have us believe of written
constitutions. If anything reflects a failure of constitutional theory, it is
the purest strain theories often advance. There is a tendency to demand
too much of a theory. Contradiction is not tolerated. Law, outside of the
most constricted strains of legal positivism, lacks such iron-fisted will. It
appears instead to be a communications process, or a dialogue between
relevant actors, that takes shape in legal principles. In constitutional law,
if this dialogue produces values, these are the values of an ongoing discus-
sion. This dialogue in the United States, informed by a written constitu-
tion, extends the full scope of American history. Any theory of constitu-
tional law should seek to understand the tensions and images this process
produces. This is especially true for a comparativist who seeks to benefit
from this experience.
Many current constitutional theories give us a picture of part of the
dynamic; like photos from different angles. Bickel's passive virtues are
fundamental ingredients. Neutral principles are also relevant, though
Wechsler may have confined them too narrowly. Representation rein-
forcement or participation models likewise capture, perhaps, the most
fundamental constitutional value under a democratic constitution, but
fail to explain all the results. Perry's policy analysis likewise presents an
ever present feature of modern constitutional cases, but this has severe
legitimacy problems. Yet many, but not all, modern theories place some
value on the process of developing fundamental values, perhaps best ex-
plained as a dialogue within a democratic political system; a dialogue to a
large extent directed by the judiciary incrementally with the instrument
of constitutional judicial review. Bickel especially contributed to this
foundational understanding.
Constitutional judicial review, as an ingredient in this dialogue, has
certain characteristics that may lend order to the process of principle de-
velopment within a constitutional democracy. I believe this feature is in
part honoring the commitment of liberal democracy to passive govern-
ment, a commitment that other branches of government can often ill af-
ford in modern society. In a system of government strongly influenced by
62. The widespread use and abuse of emergency powers to cut off judicial review illus-
trates both the strength and weakness of this instrument, e.g. earlier in the Philippines,
India, and Taiwan. This likewise reveals dependence on the polity and political branches.
Yet, where properly employed, its popularity suggests its value as a stabilizing force of im-
portance to a polity committed to constitutional implementation.
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Lockean liberalism and republicanism, the judiciary, more than any other
branch, honors liberal government's commitment to uphold certain prin-
ciples and rights which said government is charged to honor. The com-
mitment to the rule of law, rights, democracy and capitalism, evident in
the Sino-British Joint Declaration, seems to envision such a local govern-
ment for the Hong Kong SAR.
In honoring its commitment, the judiciary engages in a process of
developing principles through a discourse with the democratically elected
branches of government. John Ely tells us this discourse includes a par-
ticularly strong commitment to democratic participatory process. Yet
there are other commitments to principles. But these principles, largely
described in the broad outline of constitutions or basic laws, often lack
contextual coherency. It is with an eye to principled roots and through a
dialogue with the political process that the court performs its unique role
of ferreting out these values. This ferreting out, as many scripturalists
suggest, is contextual, but at the same time textual. The text is only the
foundation, but strongly anchors the dialogue process. In this process,
Bickel's passive virtues are valuable tools for communication. In this in-
herently conservative enterprise, these instruments permit the reflection
necessary. The counter-majoritarian difficulty may sometimes be less a
difficulty and more a virtue as the public dialogue is anchored to our ba-
sic values, those values that perhaps the majority, on reflection, cares
most about. Such a stabilizing force may not be at all unattractive to
Hong Kong.
It seems apparent that, whatever theory or theories are employed,
constitutional judicial review has come to play an increasing role in the
constitutional conversation in a growing number of national and interna-
tional legal systems. The growth of this instrument seems to reflect a
growing belief in its ability to improve that conversation. If this is so,
then the empirical evidence may well suggest that this instrument gives
substance to the notion of rights in constitutional democracies. Meta level
analysis aside, one may assert that with limited exception," constitu-
tional judicial review may well be essential in the present intellectual con-
text to meaningful and stable rights development. Again, with limited ex-
63. The United Kingdom has succeeded in implementing a system of rights without a
written constitution or constitutional judicial review of legislation. Hong Kong has histori-
cally benefited from this tradition. It is difficult to determine whether the culturally bound
traditions of the United Kingdom can continue to flourish in foreign cultures without Brit-
ish participation. Most former British colonies employ constitutional judicial review. One
which does not, New Zealand, appears to be moving in that direction through the drafting of
a bill of rights. See supra note 32. Britain may itself be moving in that direction, with its
participation in the European Community. The problem becomes even more acute when one
considers a former British overseas territory which will no longer be under British influence,
but will instead be under another national government that has a very different approach to
rights. This other approach may not be conducive to continued confidence in Hong Kong's
stability, at least in the short run. The Joint Declaration appears to acknowledge this
difficulty.
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ception, the absence of constitutional judicial review has often revealed
the opposite pattern. 4
For Hong Kong, this might suggest that constitutional judicial review
offers a stabilizing, less politicized tool to effectuate the principles of the
Joint Declaration and yet afford Hong Kong a stable environment for de-
mocracy. Such democracy may indeed depend on it. The competing
claims of the Hong Kong SAR political arrangement can best be ad-
dressed through proper structuring of this instrument. By transferring a
significant portion of the basic value, or rights development process, to a
more neutral, less politicized forum, I believe constitutional judicial re-
view may serve to reduce the occasion for disagreement over fundamental
values by the Marxist and capitalist participants in this unique political
endeavor.
III. A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
If one accepts the view that constitutional judicial review has come to
serve as a stabilizing force and as a central force for the evolution of basic
values or higher law in a liberal capitalist democracy, then it becomes
apparent that this instrument is not really the mechanical devise that the
Marshall syllogism may suggest. Constitutional judicial review may be
said to play a critical role in a dialogue that is central to the evolution of
values in a democratic system, a dialogue which seeks to illicit with re-
gard to what values the people can be heard to say, in Bruce Arkerman's
words, "we really mean it." 5
Yet we would be remiss in our search for understanding of the con-
cept if we confined this search to the meta level or to certain Anglo-
American roots. In the context of China and Hong Kong, we have the
coming together of at least two legal systems -civil law and common law -
with certain fundamental elements of a third - socialist lay." Added to
this are unique Chinese historical roots. This section will briefly examine
some of the leading structural elements of various systems of constitu-
tional review extant in the world today. While any exhaustive examina-
64. See Cappelletti, The Mighty Problem of Judicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409, 439 (1980): "As for the alleged 'shift away'
from democracy, an elementary awareness of historical developments should suffice to con-
vince us that, at least in modern systems of government, precisely the opposite is true. All
totalitarian regimes of our century have shown themselves to be antagonistic towards judi-
cial review of governmental, particularly legislative action."
65. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013,
1041 (1984).
66. On constitutional implementation of rights in socialist countries, see generally,
supra note 14; Osakwe, Soviet Human Rights Law under the USSR Constitution of 1977:
Theories, Realities and Trends, 56 TuL. L. REv. 249 (1981); Hazard, The Common Core of
Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 297 (1982); Markovits, Pursuing
One's Rights under Socialism, 38 STAN. L. REV. 689 (1986); Comment, Cuba's 1976 Socialist
Constitution and the Fidelista Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TuL. L.
REV. 1223 (1981); Eliasoph, Free Speech in China, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 287 (1981).
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tion of the unique qualities of the numerous systems available cannot be
taken up here, a limited look at the more common structural features
may aid our understanding. The next section will then close this essay
with some preliminary assessment of the applicability of this concept of
constitutional review to the Hong Kong SAR.
A glance over the various legal systems in the world presents a wide
array of options employed for constitutional implementation. Prominent
examples include, but are not limited to the following:
1. The French Constitutional Court.
This body is not considered a court at all, but instead, a political
entity that issues abstract opinions regarding legislation before it is
promulgated. It is particularly attentive to allocation of constitutional
power within the system. The French constitutional court system is sup-
plemented by administrative courts which review executive acts, as well
as courts of general jurisdiction."'
2. The Austrian Constitutional Court.
This court decides the constitutionality of statutes only when the
statute is in effect sued by the executive or the highest ordinary courts. It
has exclusive competence over constitutional issues. This was the proto-
type of constitutional judicial review in continental Europe. A decision
from this court is prospective and may abrogate the statute from the
books.6s
3. The German Constitutional Court.
This court combines elements of the Austrian and American system
with the largest number of cases coming to it by way of referral from
other courts. Other courts can hold statutes constitutional but not uncon-
stitutional. The German constitutional court also receives abstract cases
through certain references from other branches of government."
4. The American System of Judicial Review.
Extends to all courts in the land, with binding decisions coming from
the Supreme Court at the top. Courts are empowered to act only in con-
crete cases or controversies. There are limited exceptions permitting ab-
stract advisory opinions from certain state courts on state constitutional
and legislative issues."'
5. Legislative Interpretation.
67. See generally, supra note 22; see also Cappelletti, supra note 64, at 412-21. Cappel-
letti notes that even France, a country historically most resistant to the concept of judicial
review, has somewhat incrementally conceded to this instrument on several fronts, such as
review of French executive legislation by the administrative courts, review of non-promul-
gated laws by the constitutional court, and review of laws under European Economic Com-
munity law by the ordinary courts.
68. See Capelletti, supra note 22, at 71-74.
69. See id. at 75-76; Kommers, supra note 39; Mezey, supra note 39.
70. See supra note 29; see generally, supra note 33.
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Under this system, employed in the Peoples Republic of China, the
constitution is interpreted and enforced through legislative acts by the
National People's Congress or its Standing Committee. Courts are then to
apply such legislation. Courts do not have the power of judicial review
over legislation. This system often means that some rights provisions do
not receive vigorous attention, depending on current policy concerns. 1
6. "Implied" Judicial Control With Parliamentary Supremacy.
In a system such as the one employed in the United Kingdom,
through tradition and practice, independent courts achieve a measure of
judicial control over constitutional implementation through rules of inter-
pretation, application of "unwritten principles" and careful control of ad-
ministrative acts. This system, in some respects, may be said to rely heav-
ily on Bickel's passive virtues in constitutional dialogue. Yet the courts do
not possess the power of constitutional judicial review in this system of
parliamentary supremacy. The introduction of European Community law
may tend to undermine some aspects of this latter feature.7"
7. Separate Administrative Courts.
In the French Conseil d'Etat a separate court system reviews admin-
istrative acts, delegating statutes (through interpretation) and regulations
or executive legislation for conformity to the "general principles of law"
reflected in the constitution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
This includes party initiated review of all executive acts, decrees and or-
dinances but does not directly permit constitutional judicial review of
parliamentary acts. While the Conseil d'Etat cannot directly overrule a
statute, it may sometimes interpret away statutory provisions of ques-
tionable constitutionality.3
8. Constitutional Consultation or Advisory Opinions.
This approach is concurrently employed by some American state su-
preme courts and in certain countries such as Canada.74
While this list is not exhaustive and totally fails to reveal the com-
plexity and functioning of these various systems (a task well beyond the
time and space constraints of the current essay), it does reveal a diversity
of models and further reveals in the several models employing constitu-
tional judicial review that such a concept is by no means monolithic.
71. CHINA CONST.; See generally, supra note 14; Chen, supra note 20. Recent political
debate and policy in China has tended to pay greater attention to political and economic
rights. See e.g., Resolution of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, South China Morning Post, September 29, 1986, at 22-23.
Some in China have recognized a relationship between political reform and economic suc-
cess. As illustrated in the current campaign against "bourgeois liberalism", China has yet to
develop a coherent and comprehensive process for implementation of constitutional rights,
leaving China's rights record somewhat spotted.
72. See Cappelletti, supra note 22, at 36-41; H. STREET & R. BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DE SMITH 75-119 (5th ed.1985).
73. See supra notes 22 and 67.
74. See Cappelletti, supra note 22, at 70. This approach supplements judicial review.
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These differences in approach often flow from fundamental historical
conceptual differences.
Mauro Cappelletti has noted that, based on historical roots, systems
of constitutional judicial review can sometimes be divided into two main
types. These include the American model and the Austrian model, the
latter being developed under the influence of Hans Kelsen. 5 In order to
make better sense out of these divergent approaches, Cappelletti em-
ployed a set of more general concepts. These concepts can be said to op-
erate on at least two different planes as follows:
1. A system may be characterized as centralized or de-centralized.76
The decentralized system is typified by the American approach in
which all courts of the land have the power of constitutional review. This
system is employed in many common law countries including Canada,
Australia and India. It also exists in civil law countries such as Japan and
Greece and has existed in the Philippines."
A centralized system is typified by Austria and involves a separate
constitutional court, often but not always possessing exclusive jurisdiction
to decide the constitutionality of legislation. Within the large number of
civil law countries that employ this system there is considerable diver-
gence in detail. These countries prominently include Austria, Italy, Ger-
many, Cyprus, Turkey and Yugoslavia, the latter being the only commu-
nist nation I know of that possesses such a system. 8 Other communist
countries have considered this approach.7 9 Under such a system, constitu-
tional issues are referred to the constitutional court. The German system
is mixed in that ordinary courts can determine constitutionality but not
unconstitutionality of legislation. 0 Cappelletti and others trace this de-
velopment to separation of powers notions that focus on separation of
functions.8 " Constitutional judicial review is considered a political func-
tion best assigned to a separate quasi-political court and not ordinary
courts. These courts must decide the issue and cannot easily escape
through employment of avoidance techniques or "passive virtues."82
These constitutional courts will formally declare statutes invalid (with
the exception of France), while courts in decentralized common law sys-
tems do not do so, relying instead on stare decisis effect.8 3 A civil law
system without stare decisis, and with more than one court system, would
have difficulty employing a decentralized system because of conflicts.
75. Id. at 45 et. seq.
76. Id. at 46-53.
77. See Spiliotopoulos, supra note 32; Bolz, supra note 32.
78. See Cappelletti, supra note 22 at 50-51.
79. Id.; see also supra note 66.
80. See supra note 69.
81. Cappelletti, supra note 64, at 413; Cappelletti, supra note 22, at 54.
82. Cappelletti, supra note 22, at 81.
83. Id. at 85.
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Greece has done this by employing a separate court at the top to resolve
the constitutional conflicts.8 " Finally, ordinary judges in civil law coun-
tries may not be suited by training and practice for value oriented quasi-
political constitutional judicial review decisions.
2. A system may be characterized by review "incidenter" or review
"principaliter."I"
Review incidenter, characteristic of the American system, indicates
that the court exercises constitutional judicial review when constitutional-
ity issues are raised in ordinary cases by parties. Constitutional jurisdic-
tion is merely incidental to the case. Incidenter review is having an in-
creasing impact. It is routinely employed in common law systems with
constitutional review, e.g., United States, Canada, India, Australia. It is
likewise employed in Japan, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Greece.86 As
noted below, many continental systems with roots in review principaliter
have also begun to concurrently employ incidenter review. Cappelletti
notes that the mere fact that the legislative body in Canada, India and
many American states can request advisory opinions does not defeat their
characterization as systems primarily based on review incidenter, as this
advisory feature is merely "constitutional consultation" and not constitu-
tional judicial review at all.8'
Review principaliter is characteristic of the original Austrian model
of Hans Kelsen." This system emphasizes presentation of constitutional
issues in constitutional courts as the principal issue, via initiation by gov-
ernment authorities. This is done on an ad hoc basis and not incidental to
a case or controversy. This tends to emphasize abstract resolution of con-
stitutional issues. Even the Austrian prototype was modified in 1929 to
permit initiation of action by the highest courts incidental to a case de-
termination, thus incorporating incidenter features while retaining the
principaliter foundation.6" With this modification, such incidenter refer-
ence to the constitutional court is not discretionary. In Germany and It-
aly, the same principaliter and incidenter ingredients co-exist except all
judges at all levels are required to make such an incidenter referral if a
statute is constitutionally suspect. Likewise, all judges may hold a statute
constitutional without referral.
Having developed this structure of analysis Professor Cappelletti, a
noted Italian constitutional scholar, gave his impressions of the impact of
the differences. He noted that the ordinary continental courts, because of
their more limited constitutional role, experience less pressure for consti-
tutional awareness. Constitutional courts tend to focus in the abstract
84. Spiliotopoulos, supra note 32.
85. See Cappelletti, supra note 22, at 69 et. seq.
86. Id.; see also Spiliotopoulos, supra note 32.
87. Capelletti, supra note 22, at 70.
88. Id. at 71 et. seq.
89. Id. at 73.
VOL. 16:1
HONG KONG BASIC LAW
and ignore concrete reality; their constitutional proceedings are less ad-
versarial and more objective, focusing more on safe-guarding the law and
less on the rights of individuals. Such constitutional courts have less ac-
cess to techniques of avoidance or passive virtues, with even legislative
interpretation being assigned to ordinary courts.' 0 He notes, however,
that American courts may too readily employ avoidance, but that gener-
ally, the American system has spawned a judiciary very sensitive to the
political and potentially anti-democratic nature of constitutional review.
Employing this assessment, if constitutional review is an instrument of
constitutional dialogue and value development, it becomes difficult to jus-
tify a general application of the Austrian or continental model in a com-
mon law jurisdiction. Even in continental countries such as Germany and
Greece, a certain convergence with the American approach is evident.
In addition to the above, certain other structural options should be
noted. Note has already been taken of the rather unique (for civil law
countries) Greek model, employing a decentralized incidenter system with
a special court at the apex to resolve constitutional conflict between
Greece's three court systems.' 1 In a common law jurisdiction, Canada has
recently added some distinctive features.2 As noted above, it permits
constitutional consultation on request from the political branches. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms also provides in Section (1) for
the guarantee of "the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society." Since Canada has judicial review, the
meaning of this provision awaits judicial action. The most distinctive fea-
ture of the Canadian Charter is, however, its provision for express parlia-
mentary override of some but not all of its bill of rights provisions. 3 This
requires an express declaration in the legislation, and last for only five
years, subject to renewal. It is noteworthy that even in the American con-
stitutional debate of two centuries ago Edmond Randolf proposed that
the President "and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought
to compose a council of revision" to examine every act of congress and by
its dissent constitute a veto.'4 This proposal was rejected.
It should be further noted that any decentralized incidenter system
may want to employ a concept similar to the American doctrine of certio-
rari which permits the highest court to choose not to accept a case for
review, with certain limited exceptions where appeal might be permitted
as of right. In America, this could be viewed as another instrument of
avoidance. The highest court in Japan does not have this option to refuse
to accept cases and a leading Japanese scholar notes this often results in
90. Id. at 79-84.
91. See Spiliotopoulos, supra note 84.
92. See TARNOPOLSKY & BEAUDOIN, CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
(1982).
93. Id. at 10-12.
94. See Berger, supra note 33, at 300-301.
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an overload with less careful drafting of opinions.95 Of course this is of
concern where the important tasks of constitutional review is involved.
IV. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
THE HONG KONG SAR
The above theories and structural elements could well provide some
new ingredients in what is a growing constitutional dialogue in Hong
Kong. In some respects, discussion of constitutional implementation has
suffered from the press of other compelling issues. It may also suffer from
the press of history. Neither the Chinese participants nor the English
trained common law lawyers involved in this constitution building process
come from legal traditions that currently employ constitutional judicial
review of legislation. England has benefited, as has Hong Kong in a sub-
sidiary fashion, from a tradition of rights implementation which depends
both on the heavy weight of English tradition and custom, and on an
independent and strongly effectual judiciary which has built up a consti-
tutional dialogue through other techniques such as legislative interpreta-
tion and judicial review of administrative acts. Nevertheless, even the
United Kingdom, outside its heartland, has tended to favor use of consti-
tutional judicial review in its former colonies, as indeed it is so employed
in most.96
Chinese attitudes on constitutional review, constitutional govern-
ment, and human rights, likewise bear the weight of history; recent and
ancient. Without taking up all of this weight, which has been the topic of
a recent book,97 particular aspects may be worthy of note. As noted
95. Tanaka, Legal Equality Among Family Members in Japan -The Impact of the
Japanese Constitution of 1946 on the Traditional Family System, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 611,
616 (1980).
96. It has been pointed out that although England has employed parliamentary
supremacy since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, this doctrine in some respects produced
the opposite result in the British colonies, empowering colonial judges to disregard local
legislation not in conformity with English law. See Capelletti, supra note 22, at 40. It has
been reckoned that more than 600 colonial laws were invalidated by the Privy Council from
1696 to 1782. See id. Canada, Australia and India have likewise adopted constitutional judi-
cial review, while South Africa, with perhaps a more troubled rights record, has not. Id. at
41. While Hong Kong does not have a tradition of constitutional judicial review of legisla-
tion, it does have a British system of judicial review of administrative acts. Though without
a written bill of rights Hong Kong also has some confined and virtually unemployed means
for courts to review legislation. See Wesley-Smith, Legal Limitations Upon The Legislative
Competence of the Hong Kong Legislature, 11 HONG KONG L. REV. 3-13 (1981). Most note-
worthy is a limited power of review for conformity to acts of the British Parliament. Redif-
fusion (H.K.) Limited v. Attorney General, 1968 H.K.L.R. 277 (Sup.Ct.); Rediffusion (H.K.)
Limited v. Attorney General, 1970 H.K.L.R. 231 (Privy Council); regarding an application
by the Attorney General, 1985 H.K.L.R. 381 (High Court). As a practical matter such power
is rarely exercised, and Hong Kong generally adheres to the British tradition in this respect.
Given the experience in other former British overseas possessions, however, building a sys-
tem of constitutional judicial review on this base would be very much within the scope of
Hong Kong's current legal tradition.
97. EDWARDS, MENKIN, NATMAN, supra note 14.
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above, Professor Edwards and his colleagues have pointed out certain
Chinese differences in the conception of rights as an instrument of policy
to advance the goals of the state and not as a claim against the state.
They have also noted the absence of a tradition and process for adver-
sarial claims of rights, which has grave impact for rights development. It
should also be noted that the period during which China borrowed West-
ern legal institutions and constitutionalism, largely from Germany, was a
period during which Germany had a lapse in use of constitutional judicial
review. s While Germany had implemented a system of constitutional re-
view in the middle of the 19th century, that system had fallen out of use
in the latter part of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th cen-
tury. Of course this period also witnessed increased abuse of rights in
Germany, culminating in the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler. All of the axis
countries implemented constitutional review as a safeguard against such
development in the post-war period. The current German system is espe-
cially effective. With France likewise not favoring judicial review, the
Western influence on the Chinese legal system had not in the early years
included this ingredient to a marked degree. More recently, the Soviet
Union and Marxist states (except Yugoslavia) likewise lack such
institution."
Rather than accepting the fruits of history and social policy being
employed in other contexts, one might better focus on the value of this
concept with reference to the goals the participants share for Hong
Kong's future. Such an examination not only favors constitutional review
as a way to implement the Basic Law, but also gives some preliminary
indication of the structural and theoretical components best considered.
Generally one might conclude that the institution committed to the
incremental evolution of higher norms and principles in the process of
dialogue, discussed above, may well advance the common goal of all par-
ticipants of maintaining stability. With fundamental value differences ev-
ident in the political systems of Hong Kong and the rest of China, there
is a great deal of potential for confrontation on fundamental issues in the
political arena; the arena, in Bickel's view best suited to more immediate
issues of policy and expediency. The Basic Law drafting process has al-
ready revealed some of this in debates over such topics as direct elections,
accountability and residual powers. For Hong Kong to go into its future
legislative process with constant signals of approval or disapproval from
the central government, as a basis for proceeding, as has occurred with
98. For an outline of German historical development of constitutional judicial review
see Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 S. CAL. L. R. 773, 775-778 (1980). With lim-
ited exception (1929), there was general hostility to this concept from 1871 up to the demise
of the Nazi regime, a period which would encompass Chinese exposure to German legal
traditions. France, another source of Chinese exposure to modern constitutional systems,
has likewise had a tradition of hostility to constitutional judicial review, tradition which is
only now starting to break down. See supra note 67. France, however, like England, has
vigorously employed administrative judicial review.
99. See supra note 66.
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Basic Law drafting, seems an inherently unstable and perhaps undesir-
able way to proceed. In a system that tends to shift all issues into the
political arena of the legislative or executive branches, the chances are
good, with fundamentally different views on rights and democracy, that
other hot fundamental issues will someday emerge to replace the current
ones. While constitutional judicial review will not completely purge these
sensitive issues from the political arena (nor should it), it tends, as Bickel
suggests, to render the dialogue in this area more ordered and thus ad-
vances stability. The judiciary has a greater potential to insulate itself
from the more aggressive political debate than perhaps other supposed
stability generating political bodies that have been mentioned from time
to time in Hong Kong, e.g., a large appointed group of senior advisers. No
one would suggest that the court is totally insulated, nor should it be, in
informing its constitutional dialogue.
My initial feeling is that Hong Kong might best benefit from use of a
bifurcated system. At the local level this would include a decentralized
incidenter system of judicial review similar to the one employed in most
common law jurisdictions (all common law jurisdictions with written con-
stitutions or basic laws). This system should be employed, permitting the
local judiciary at all levels, bound by the highest court's precedent, to
review the acts of the legislative branch, as well as the executive branch,
for conformity to both the powers and rights components of the Basic
Law. This should generally include the full extent of the Basic Law. Yet,
being part of a national system based initially on civil law traditions, cer-
tain components of a centralized principaliter system could be used to
resolve constitutional issues involving constitutional power or jurisdic-
tional questions between the central and local government or questions
involving the constitution of the People's Republic of China. This latter
feature would preserve national authority in areas of national concern;
yet it is anticipated that it would rarely, if ever, be employed because of
its limited field of coverage and the ability to resolve most such issues in
the Basic Law itself.100 A special committee composed of an equal num-
ber of Hong Kong and mainland compatriots could be set up either in the
NPC or independent of it. To satisfy any question under Article 67 of the
PRC Constitution, the Basic Law could expressly delegate such power to
the local courts and the special committee as indicated. To preserve au-
tonomy and the independence and finality of local courts, I would permit
100. The Basic Law and any revisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the Peoples
Republic of China should seek to resolve all such issues to the extent possible and this latter
institution should stand more as a symbol of national authority and be available to avoid a
constitutional crisis within the limited areas indicated. In the latter respect such an institu-
tion seems eminently more preferable than political avenues often evident in current debate
over the Basic Law. This solution of the problem does not require any conflict with Article
67 of the Constitution of the PRC since such a system of local constitutional judicial review
could already be considered authorized by Article 31 and the Joint Declaration and/or could
be delegated in the Basic Law. The concern here is with achieving the objectives of the Joint
Declaration in a manner satisfactory to both levels of government.
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referral of constitutional issues to the special committee only by the SAR
executive or 2/3 of the legislature and by an appropriate organ of the cen-
tral government. Local courts would not make such referral, exercising
their constitutional judicial review independently. With this limited ex-
ception, all other constitutional judicial review would be vested in the
local Hong Kong courts, along with the power of final adjudication. Local
courts would ultimately be held in check by the amendment power
though the rather conservative Hong Kong courts are unlikely to move
beyond the general values of the Hong Kong community or mainland
China's expectations.10 Numerous reasons can be advanced both for em-
ploying constitutional review generally, and for using this particular de-
centralized incidenter system with limited supplementation as indicated.
Some of these arguments are efficiently suggested in the following ten
points.
1. The current British approach to rights development under a sys-
tem of parliamentary supremacy may not be realistic outside of the Brit-
ish cultural and political context.
2. Constitutional review seems more appropriate to a written consti-
tution and is generally so employed in most common law jurisdictions.
3. Pure reliance on mainland style legislative implementation seems
101. There should be no serious concern with the ability of Hong Kong's common law
courts to exercise restraint within certain limited areas of national concern. Under the
American political question doctrine, the common law courts in the United States have
shown similar restraint with respect to issues more appropriately left to other branches of
government. Within the foreign affairs area the English act of state doctrine reveals such
restraint, as does the rather different act of state doctrine in United States. Under the En-
glish act of state doctrine "an act of state is essentially an exercise of sovereign power and
hence cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by municipal courts." 18 HALs-
BURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, § 1414 (4th ed.). An act of state is defined as a "prerogative act of
policy in the field of foreign affairs performed by the Crown in the course of its relationship
with another state or its subjects". Id. § 1413. It includes matters such as entering treaties,
declarations of war, annexation of land, etc. Id. The occasion for restraint under the Ameri-
can act of state doctrine arises with reference to sovereign acts of foreign states and is prin-
cipally concerned with notions of separation of powers in the American government. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see generally Davis, Domestic Develop-
ment of International Law: A Proposal for an International Concept of the Act of State
Doctrine, 20 TEx. INT'L L. J. 341 (1985). It is for the courts to determine the occasion for
applying the political question doctrine and the act of state doctrines. This tradition of
restraint by common law courts should adequately address any concern with Hong Kong
courts aggressively intruding on areas of national concern, including any inappropriate in-
trusion on China's retained Powers over foreign and defense affairs for Hong Kong. See
Joint Declaration, paragraph 3(2). In such areas common law courts are appropriately
equipped to the determine occasion for restraint. Such occasion for restraint will also occa-
sionally arise with respect to Hong Kong's exercise of foreign affairs in those areas where it
has retained such power (e.g. commercial relations) under the terms of the Joint Declara-
tion. On other occasions such restraint may be unnecessary with respect to an issue con-
cerned with foreign or defense affairs. While this line is difficult to draw, within the Hong
Kong context, the common lawcourts may generally be best suited for this task. The consti-
tutional committee can in effect serve as a back up devise in this sensitive area and symbol-
ize national authority. Yet, the Hong Kong courts should interpret the entire Basic Law
independently and without being subject to appeal to higher authority.
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unlikely to achieve a rights commitment that would be trusted and would
thus cause considerable local tension and instability, not to mention of-
fense to the notion of autonomy and "one country, two systems. '10 2
4. Current discussions in the Basic Law Consultative Committee
suggest general agreement on employing separation of powers with checks
and balances, as opposed to the separation of functions approach often
evident in French style civil law systems, suggesting the appropriateness
of a more common law approach.
5. Yet, as is true of the function of the French Constitutional Court,
a special committee employing a centralized principaliter system may
function well for the limited purpose of functional separation of powers
between the local and national government, as well as providing an ex-
pression of national authority.
6. The existing use of common law and stare decisis in Hong Kong
likewise favors the common law decentralized incidenter system, as does
generally the education and training of the local judiciary and lawyers.
7. Decentralized judicial review with access to avoidance techniques
or passive virtues, may better take advantage of the dialogue based evolu-
tion of principles in general, in common law systems and of rights in
particular.
8. Decentralized incidenter judicial review offers more avenues for
evolutionary change in fundamental values with less risk of serious con-
frontation, thus advancing political stability and human rights
commitments.
9. The existing legal system in Hong Kong already contains the in-
gredients for such a system and would thus permit continuity and permit
Hong Kong to employ other common law precedent.
10. Hong Kong and thus China would be able to participate in a
growing international commitment to employing proper processes in the
implementation of human rights.
Constitutional judicial review embodies a recognition of, and a com-
mitment to, the basic values of a society. A constitution or a basic law is
not a mere statute but is instead some indication of the way a given soci-
ety constitutes itself. Yet it may at best be an outline of a society's basic
values, one that hopefully rises to the demands placed upon it. One intui-
tively senses that the chances of the success of this enterprise are en-
hanced if the impetus for value growth comes from within the society
that the basic law governs. The almost geometrical growth in use of the
102. It should be noted that while this reference is to placement of such power in the
legislative branch of the central government, it would also not be satisfactory to transfer the
central system of legislative implementation to the local government. This would not take
advantage of this dialogue based system of value development and implementation and
would likewise tend to politicize to a higher degree basic value development. This would of
course give rise to the same destabilizing forces. On the level of higher law development.
employment of common law courts in the central role with legislative bodies constituting
the other side of the dialogue seems much more conducive to a stable democratic process,
advancing the shared goals of all participants.
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instrument of constitutional judicial review in recent years reflects a
growing recognition of the importance of the process of value formulation
and the utility of an independent, less politicized institution for this pro-
cess. Such an institution may serve to provide stable direction to the col-
lective constitutional dialogue.
The Joint Declaration reveals a prominent commitment to stability,
capitalist economy, and human rights in a common law framework, as
well as autonomy and self determination. These concepts collectively pro-
vide the outline of a pluralist, liberal capitalist system. While many ingre-
dients must coalesce to achieve certain shared goals, evidence suggest
that constitutional review could be employed as an effective motor to
drive this system on the level of fundamental values development and
stability enhancement. Constitutional review cannot achieve the expecta-
tions placed upon it without many other ingredients and political com-
mitments. It does not function independently of the polity. It is more like
one side of a conversation. Yet evidence suggests that those other ingredi-
ents and commitments may well be present in Hong Kong. If not the
enterprise will likely fail in any event.
It cannot be stressed enough that this concept of the judiciary and
constitutional review, as one side of a conversation designed to articulate
our basic values, is a concept that depends on the other participants in
this conversation. The people, not the courts alone, are the real guardians
of liberty. Until now, a British political process has afforded Hong Kong a
degree of protection, but that will not be true of the future. If the politi-
cal process of the future does not engage the people and their representa-
tives in this dialogue, then the rights of the citizen will not be protected.
That is the nature of the dialogue in question. Judges are not isolated
from the values of the polity. While they may be more reflective partici-
pants, less troubled by expediency, they are of necessity participants, as
they must be to carry out their mission of value development through
constitutional judicial review.
The Hong Kong experiment in constitution building has many
unique qualities. The concept of "one country, two systems" has never
been tried before, at least with reference to two systems with such a radi-
cally different value base. While unique, this effort also shares common
ground with other constitution drafting efforts in the world. As is true of
many constitutions, observers, both at home and abroad, will be espe-
cially attentive to the potential for successful implementation of the con-
stitutional scheme. The Hong Kong case tends to dramatize this concern.
As Hong Kong compatriots and other interested parties contemplate their
confidence in the future success of "one country, two systems," they will
no doubt consider whether China's leaders have demonstrated a will to
implement the constitutional scheme and the high degree of autonomy
promised in the Joint Declaration. Such demonstrated will depends in
part on the legal content that has been given to interpreting and applying
the Basic Law. Whatever model is ultimately adopted, the complex fac-
tors discussed herein may inform our judgments about the final product
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and its likelihood of success. In the interim, we can only hope that all of
these concerns will be addressed before a final model is adopted. At a
minimum, this process will certainly prove instructive about the enter-
prise of comparative constitutional law.
The War Powers Resolution: Conflicting
Constitutional Powers, the War Powers and
U.S. Foreign Policy*
BRADLEY LARSCHAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Fourteen years, some practical experience and several Supreme Court
decisions have passed since the War Powers Resolution1 (WPR) was en-
acted over a Presidential veto on November 7, 1973.2 Since then, the
United States' foreign policy has grappled, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, with this unique legislation, which seeks to control the Executive's
use of armed force in situations short of war. The effectiveness of this
legislation has been problematic at best s and its future is clouded by lin-
gering questions as to its constitutionality and, on a policy level, by con-
cerns about the potential use of U.S. armed forces with respect to, among
other things, international terrorism.4
This paper will examine briefly the political and legislative history
of the War Powers Resolution. It will then set the War Powers Resolution
in historical perspective by analyzing the original intention of the Fram-
* The author gratefully acknowledges his appreciation to Carl J. Green, Esq., a partner
resident in Milbank's Tokyo office, Elliot L. Richardson, Esq., a partner resident in
Milbank's Washington office; and Alfred P. Rubin, The Fletcher School of Law &
Diplomacy for their comments. Special thanks to my wife, Anita Mosner Larschan, Esq., for
her penetrating comments; to my friend and colleague Dr. Guive Mirfenereski for his
extensive comments; and to Charles Haviland, a student at Albany Law School, for his
research assistance.
** M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; J.D., Boston College Law
School; Ph.D. candidate, The Fletcher School. Mr. Larschan is an associate with the Wash-
ington, D.C. office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. Copyright 1987, Bradley R.
Larschan.
1. Pub. L. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973)).
2. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 24,707-708 (1973). President
Nixon vetoed the bill Oct. 24. Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1285 (Oct. 29, 1973). The House overrode the veto (284-135), 119 CONG. REc. 36,202, 36,221
(1973), as did the Senate (75-18), 119 CONG. REC. 36,174, 36,198 (1973).
3. Turner, The War Powers Resolutions: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary and Un-
helpful, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 683 (1984).
4. See, e.g., The testimony of the State Department's Legal Adviser of April 29, 1986,
before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, reprinted in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEP'T STATE,
CURRENT POLICY No. 832, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND ANTITERRORIST OPERATIONS 1
(1986).
5. For a comprehensive account of the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution,
see H.R. Doc. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2346.
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ers of the Constitution from a domestic and international legal perspec-
tive. This paper analyzes the fundamental constitutionality of sections
5(b)&(c) of the War Powers Resolution, as well as the Resolution's consti-
tutionality in light of the legislative veto cases. Finally, it will examine
the policy aspects of sections 5(b)&(c) of the War Powers Resolution, es-
pecially as they relate to the U.S. response to international terrorism.
A. Historical Development of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution was born of Congressional frustration
over the United States' prolonged military involvement in Vietnam,6 the
second most divisive conflict in our history. The WPR was the culmina-
tion of Congressional efforts to curtail Presidential authority to commit
American troops into combat, beginning with the 1967 Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearings7 and Report.8 Under the stewardship of
Senator J. William Fulbright, a sense of the Senate Resolution was
adopted in June 1969 proclaiming that "a national commitment by the
United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive
and legislative branches of the United States government by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress, spe-
cifically providing for such commitment."9
This country's involvement in Vietnam continued, however, as did
Congressional attempts to control (short of requiring complete with-
drawal), the President's discretion to commit U.S. forces in Southeast
Asia. 0 Following the announcement of the 1973 ceasefire agreement, the
Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment 1" and the Mansfield
6. J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONGRESS 268-71 (1973).
7. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations on S. Res. 151, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
8. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Many of the questions raised in the report questioning the
President's constitutional authority have been answered by the Executive branch. See, e.g.,
Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 12 (1976).
9. On the effects of a concurrent resolution, see Sofaer, id.
10. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 119-
28 (1982).
11. The Cooper-Church amendment to the Department ( Defense Appropriations Act
of 1970, § 643, 83 Stat. 469, provides that "none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall
be used to finance the introduction of American combat troops into Laos or Thailand." The
Cooper-Church amendment to the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, § 7, 84 Stat. 1942,
provides:
(a) In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States,
none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act
may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat
troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for
Cambodian military forces in Cambodia.
(b) Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambo-
dia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not
be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its
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amendment.'2 These amendments forbade use of government funds for
American military activities in Indochina "unless specifically authorized"
by Congress. The Congress then approved a measure to cut off all funds
for U.S. combat activities in Cambodia and Laos. This measure, however,
was vetoed by President Nixon and an attempt to override the veto
failed."s President Nixon was compelled, for political reasons, to agree to
a "compromise" on July 1, 1973 in which funds for military activities in
Laos and Cambodia were cut off on August 15, 1973.1" The President
agreed thereafter to seek congressional authorization for further military
activities in Indochina. 5
During this period, a more subtle and yet infinitely more important
struggle was taking place. There was a clash of constitutional titans for
defense.
12. The Mansfield amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1972, § 601(a), 85
Stat. 430, provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the
earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indo-
china, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United
States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied
with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces. The Con-
gress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above-ex-
pressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:
(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all mili-
tary forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied
with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.
(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate
cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.
(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement
which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United
States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of
phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any re-
maining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all re-
maining military forces of the United States by not later than the date estab-
lished by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) hereof or by such earlier
date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties.
13. The Constitution provides for an override of a Presidential veto by a two-thirds
vote of the Congressmen present in each house, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, providing there
is a quorum. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919). A quorum is a
majority of the members of each house. Id. See also Senate Rule 6, para. 1.
14. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 99, 129 (1973). The Act
provided:
None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to
support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North
Vietnam and South Vietnam by the United States forces, and after August 15,
1973, no other such funds heretofore appropriated under any other Act may be
expended for such purposes.
15. See 87 Stat. 99.
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the control of U.S. foreign policy. The "Imperial Presidency" was under
siege by an assertive and powerful Congress. Since Franklin Roosevelt's
Presidency, the American Chief Executive's powers swelled on all things
touching foreign policy. The United States had emerged as the first Su-
perpower. Moreover, it was the only Western democracy in a position to
halt Soviet expansionism in what remained of war-torn Europe and other
areas of the globe. Of the two political branches of government, it was the
Presidency which was best equipped to meet the challenge of and to re-
spond quickly to political and military crises. Congress watched from the
sidelines as the Presidency grew increasingly independent of the legisla-
tive branch on matters of foreign policy.
Prior to Watergate, it was not the Congress but the Supreme Court
that had checked the growth of presidential power over foreign affairs.1"
The Congress became frustrated as Presidents committed this country to
a series of controversial policies, including the Berlin airlift, Korea,
NATO, the Bay of Pigs, the Congo rescue operation, intervention in the
Dominican Republic and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was not until the
Nixon Presidency was confronted with the dual political crises of Water-
gate and Vietnam that the Congress was able to reassert itself. When it
did, it was with a vengeance. With an active and increasingly powerful
Congress confronting a President whose personal and political powers
were waning, the stage was set for the introduction of the War Powers
Resolution.17
B. Promulgation of the War Powers Resolution
Two provisions contain the heart of the War Powers Resolution,
which Professor Gerald Gunther characterized as "an unusual, quasi-con-
stitutional variety of congressional action, delineating not substantive
policy but processes and relationships." ' Section 5(b) requires the Presi-
dent to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities or situations of imminent
hostilities within 60 or 90 days, unless Congress either declares war or
specifically authorizes continued military activities. Section 5(c) requires
the President to withdraw U.S. forces if directed by a concurrent resolu-
16. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as Steel Seizure Case]. It is interesting that this case has become the dumping ground of
constitutional reasoning, and is often invoked to support the thesis that war powers belong,
by negative implication, to the Congress. See, eg., Buchanan, In Defense Of The War Pow-
ers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1155, 1162, n. 26 (1985). For a
discussion of the circumstances leading up to and including the Steel Seizure Case, see M.
MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977);
A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE
CO. V. SAWYER, THE STEEL SEIZURE DECISION (1958).
17. The War Powers Resolution was conceived and zealously promoted by Senator Ja-
cob K. Javits, who has written extensively on the subject. See, eg., J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES
WAR; THE PRESIDENT VERSUS CONGRESS, supra note 6.
18. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 371, n. 4 (11th ed. 1985).
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tion.' 9 It should be emphasized that the concurrent resolution was chosen
quite deliberately by the WPR's drafters as a device to avoid the consti-
tutionally-required two-thirds vote of each House to override a Presiden-
tial veto, so that a simple majority vote would replace the presentment
process."0
President Nixon rejected the War Powers Resolution. In his October
1973 veto message, he stated that it was "dangerous to the best interests
of our nation," and "that both these provisions [Sections 5(b)&(c)] are
unconstitutional. The only way in which the constitutional powers of a
branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitu-
tion ... and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is
clearly without force.
2 1
In the view of this writer, President Nixon was correct on both
grounds. The War Powers Resolution is bad public policy and it is uncon-
stitutional. It impairs the President's flexibility to project military power
as an instrument of American foreign policy. Moreover, it is unconstitu-
19. A concurrent resolution is to be distinguished from a joint resolution in that the
former is intended to become operative after it is approved by each house of Congress while
the latter is subject to Presidential disapproval and Congressional override. See generally
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 396-97, H.R. Doc.
No. 403, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
20. See Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Surrender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 844-49 (1975). During the congressional debate on
the War Powers Resolution, Rep. Zablocki observed that, were it otherwise, "[o]ne-third of
either body will thwart the will of the majority." 119 CONG. REc. 24,689 (1973). See also
War Powers Resolution of 1973, H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
21. "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
Every Chief Executive since President Nixon has complied with the War Powers Reso-
lution but has explicitly stated that Sections 5(b) & (c) are without constitutional force. For
instance, in his signing statement enacting into law the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution, Pub. L. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805, reprinted in 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1422
(Oct. 17, 1983). President Reagan said:
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state in signing this resolu-
tion that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the
Constitution as President and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
armed forces. Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgement that
the President's constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by stat-
ute, that congressional authorization would be required if and when the period
specified in Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution might be deemed to
have been triggered and the period had expired or that Section 6 of the Mul-
tinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be interpreted to revise the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to deploy the United States armed forces.
Former President Gerald R. Ford noted in a 1977 lecture that "[t]he United States was
involved in six military crises during my presidency .... In none of those instances did I
believe the War Powers Resolution applied .... Furthermore, I did not concede that the
resolution itself was legally binding on the President on constitutional grounds." "The War
Powers Resolution: Striking a Balance between the Exectuive and Legislative Branches,"
speech by former President Gerald R. Ford, University of Kentucky, Louisville (Apr. 11,
1977), reprinted in A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolu-
tion: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325,
327 (1977) (statement of Pres. Gerald R. Ford).
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tional on two grounds: at least part of it is a legislative veto of the type
found unconstitutional in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha 22 and Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC.13 The WPR also violates
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, depriving the Presi-
dent by means of mere statute (and against his will) of certain powers
vested in the Executive by the Constitution and reassigning those powers
to the Congress.24
II. MECHANICS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Congress' stated purpose in enacting the WPR was to:
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution... and insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States armed forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
25
The WPR seeks to apply this "collective judgment" to three classes
of activities involving American armed forces2" (unless war has been de-
clared by the Congress). It is triggered where U.S. troops are introduced:
1. "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;"
2. "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to sup-
ply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces;" or
3. "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.""7
Under the War Powers Resolution, three discrete duties are imposed
upon the President:
1. He must consult the Congress prior to committing United States
armed forces "in every possible instance"."a
2. Once U.S. armed forces are deployed, he must submit a written
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23. 691 F.2d 575 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nor., Process Gas Consumer Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, Inc., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S.
1250 (1983).
24. Sec. 8(d) of the WPR expressly states that the War Powers Resolution does not
alter the constitutional authority of the President. This is not only a self-serving statement,
but also is an erroneous legal conclusion, for the reasons set forth below.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1982).
26. Actually, the three types of activities are explicitly set forth in § 4(d), the "report-
ing requirement." Sec. 5(b) attempts to include these activities by reference, covering "any
use ... with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted)." Sec.
3 applies only to forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982).
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report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate explaining (a) why the troops were committed;
(b) the President's legal authority to deploy the forces; and (c) the "esti-
mated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement." '29 If the U.S.
involvement continues, the President must report to the Congress period-
ically, but no less than every six months.
3. He must end the projection of American military power unless
the Congress takes positive action to authorize its continued use.
Section 5(b)30 requires affirmative congressional action to continue
the deployment or engagement of U.S. forces in an area of hostilities.31
Under Section 5(b), the President must withdraw U.S. armed forces
within 60 days unless both Houses of Congress agree, by concurrent reso-
lution, to continue American involvement. If either or both Houses of
Congress fail to authorize continued U.S. military involvement, through
action or inaction, the 60 day period may be extended automatically for
not more than an additional 30 days "if the President determines and
certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the contin-
ued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about" their
prompt removal.32
Section 5(c) provides that Congress may, by concurrent resolution,
require the President to remove U.S. armed forces at any time, notwith-
standing the 60 day provision in Section 5(b). The concurrent resolution
may be adopted by a simple majority of both Houses. Since it is not to be
presented to the President, a concurrent resolution is not subject to a
presidential veto.
Finally, the WPR contains a separability clause which provides that
if any provision is found to violate the Constitution, the remainder of the
WPR is to continue in effect. 8s
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Section 5(c): Violates the Presentment Clause
Section 5(c), which has never been invoked by Congress, is clearly
unconstitutional. 4 Article I, § 7, cl. 2 of the Constitution requires that
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(A)-(C) (1982).
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
31. "Hostilities" are not defined in the WPR. However, one definition is found in the
Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
quoted in Comment, A Tug of War: The War Powers Resolution and the Meaning of "Hos-
tilities," 15 PAc. L.J. 265, 282 (1982).
32. Id.
33. The constitutionality or effect, if any, of the severability clause is beyond the scope
of this paper. For a thought-provoking discussion, see Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision:
A Law By Any Other Name, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21-27 (1984).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35-51. See also Lungren & Krotoski, The War
Powers Resolution After The Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767, 777 (1984), Tur-
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every bill passed by the Congress "shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States.""5 Since a concurrent
resolution is a unilateral congressional action, and not presented to the
President, it violates the presentment clause."6 Of course, the enactment
of the War Powers Resolution in itself met the requirements of the pre-
sentment clause. But the effect of Section 5(c) is to amend the present-
ment clause as it applies to future congressional acts. Put another way,
Section 5(c) is nothing less than a unilateral attempt to effect an ongoing
ner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, supra
note 3, at 684; Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than
Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 577 (1984).
35. A concurrent resolution, for purposes of constitutional analysis, would be consid-
ered a bill. But even if it weren't so considered, clause 3 provides:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Clause 3 was inserted precisely to prevent a measure from being enacted by Congress
without Presentment to the President. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42. The pro-
cess of law-creation was intended to be cumbersome, with certain built-in time constraints,
to prevent Congress from encroaching upon the President's powers. See 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 301 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Presentment is also more than
a procedural nuisance, since the Framers wanted the Congress to be apprised of the Presi-
dent's reasons for a veto and then to reconsider their actions in this light. See infra text
accompanying notes 40-42.
36. The Supreme Court noted in Chadha that
[n]ot every action taken by either house is subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I. Whether actions taken by either House
are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative powers depends not on their form
but upon whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as leg-
islative in character and effect.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. Any action legislative in character must be performed by passage
in both houses and presentment to the President. E.E.O.C. v. Ingersoll Johnson Steel Co.,
583 F. Supp 883 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
In Chadha, the Court relied on an 1897 Senate committee report to determine what
action constitutes an exercise of legislative power and thereby necessitating that a bill be
presented to the President. 462 U.S. at 952. In the report, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary had been directed by the Senate to, among other things, report whether concur-
rent resolutions must be submitted to the President. "The Constitution," the report notes,
"looks beyond the mere form of a resolution.., and looks rather to the subject matter." S.
Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1897). Thus, it is the legislative substance of the
resolution, not necessarily the legal form, which is controlling. The report continued, "every
exercise of 'legislative powers' involves the concurrence of the two Houses; and every resolu-
tion not ... involving the exercise of legislative powers, need not be presented to the Presi-
dent." Id. at 8.
The Senate Committee found that, for an action to be an exercise of legislative power,
the measure must "contain matter" which would properly be "regarded as legislative in its
character and effect." Id. Chadha found that the immigration statute had a legislative ef-
fect because it altered the "legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including [executive
branch officials and others], all outside the legislative branch." 462 U.S. at 952.
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restructuring of the Constitution by legislation. 7 It attempts to alter arti-
cle I, § 7, cl. 2 by granting to Congress the power for all time to decide, by
simple majority, without presentation to the Executive, that it may re-
quire a President to withdraw U.S. armed forces upon demand. 8 Thus, it
is unconstitutional on its face.
Equally important, Section 5(c) subverts the delicate balance of the
separation of powers.8 9 In this sense, the presentment clause is part of the
"checks and balances" and, as such, is a cornerstone of our constitutional
framework. The Supreme Court has noted "[t]he records of the Constitu-
tional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be
presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted
by the Framers."4 The Court went on to observe that:
Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were consid-
ered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure
that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final
debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it
might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed
law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." As a consequence,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 . . . was added.41
Writing in The Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton observed that
the President's veto power
establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to
guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of
any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to in-
fluence a majority of that body.... The primary inducement to con-
37. Although only recently addressed by the Supreme Court, the debate surrounding
the Presentment Clause has been with us for some time.
The issue was raised in connection with a proposed reservation to the Treaty
of Versailles authorizing American withdrawal from the League of Nations by
"concurrent resolution." Although the proposal was accepted by a majority of
the Senate, several Senators expressed the view that it was unconstitutional,
and President Wilson wrote in a letter to Senator Hitchcock, "I doubt whether
the President can be deprived of his veto power under the Constitution even
with his own consent." Clearly, neither a treaty nor an Act of Congress can
amend the Constitution, and an alteration of the procedure provided in the
Constitution for making any "order, resolution or vote" effective, would be
such an amendment.
Wright, The Power To Declare Neutrality Under American Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 302,
307-08 (1940).
38. It might be argued that Congress has the power without § 5(c), based on its consti-
tutional mandate, to require the withdrawal of U.S. forces. But if this were true, why did
Congress believe it necessary to promulgate § 5(c) to begin with? Why not simply pass a
resolution mandating withdrawal? And why was it viewed as necessary to circumvent the
Presentment Clause? See supra note 7.
39. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 109-120.
40. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946, citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 611 (3d ed. 1858); 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
supra note 35, at 21, 73-74, 97-104, 138-140, 181, 301-305.
41. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 (citations omitted).
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ferring the power in question upon the executive, is to enable him to
defend himself; the secondary one is to encrease the chances in favor
of the community, against the passing of bad laws, through haste, in-
advertence, or design.
42
During the constitutional debates, James Wilson stated that "[w]ithout
such a self-defence, the legislature can at any moment sink [the Execu-
tive] into non-existence. '48 It was in this sense that the presentment
clause question was central to the Supreme Court's landmark decision
finding the legislative veto unconstitutional. In Chadha, the Court said
that "[t]he decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified
power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound
conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the
powers to be most carefully circumscribed.""
Of course, Chadha dealt specifically with the one House veto,"' while
Section 5(c) may be seen as a two House veto." But this ignores the fun-
42. The Federalist No. 73 (A. Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 372-73 (Bantam
Classic ed. 1982), quoted in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947. Of the 85 Federalist Papers, which
first appeared on October 27, 1787, 26 discussed defense or foreign policy. Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote 51 papers, James Madison 29 and John Jay 5. For a fascinating and well-written
account of the events leading to the publication of The Federalist Papers, see R. MORRIS,
WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
The Federalist Papers were written to persuade the people of New York State to ratify
the Constitution. One observer has noted that
[t]heir practical wisdom stands pre-eminent amid the stream of controversial
writing at the time. Their authors were concerned, not with abstract arguments
about political theory, but with the real dangers threatening America, the evi-
dent weakness of the existing Confederation, and the debatable advantages of
the various provisions of the new Constitution.
3 W. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
258 (1957).
43. 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 151 (J. Elliot ed. 1845) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Accord id. at 347 (Ma-
son); id. at 344 (Ellsworth); id. at 345 (Madison).
44. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (citations omitted). The Court went on to observe that
"[iut is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the
President." Id. (citations omitted).
The Founding Fathers assumed that the Congress would become the "first among
equals" in the federal government. For instance, based upon his experience, Madison be-
lieved there was "a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative
vortex." He observed that legislative encroachment "was the real source of danger to the
American constitutions," and suggested that this justified "the necessity of giving every de-
fensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles."
5 DEBATES, supra note 39, at 345. See also L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND
POLICY 21-2 (1972).
45. Therefore, the issue of bicameralism was also presented in Chadha. However, the
issue in Chadha revolved around the legislative veto of a certain express delegation of con-
gressional authority to an administrative agency. See generally Ratner & Cole, The Force of
Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 715, 738, n.
99 (1984).
46. Sec. 5(c) requires the President to withdraw troops if so directed by a concurrent
resolution of the Congress. This clearly is a two house veto. It is not clear, however, whether
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damental ground upon which Chadha was based: that there must be a
clear division in functions between branches, even though powers may be
shared. It was upon this basis that a two House veto was held unconstitu-
tional in Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC.47 In a per curiam order affirmed
without opinion by the Supreme Court,'8 the District of Columbia ap-
peals court, en banc, held unconstitutional Section 21(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, which provided that an
FTC regulation would become effective unless disapproved by concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress. The court found that Section 21(a)
violated both the separation of powers and "the procedures established
by Article I for the exercise of legislative powers." ' If anything, the War
Powers Resolution suffers from a greater constitutional infirmity because
it addresses not an independent administrative agency but the Presi-
dency. Section 5(c) is a legislative veto since it may act only in a unilat-
eral manner. It is a legislative action that overrides executive decision.
There can be no more clear a violation of the presentment clause and
the prohibition against the legislative veto than Section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution. From all outward appearances, it seems likely that
§ 5(b) is a one or two house veto. Sec. 5(b) requires the President to withdraw troops after
60 days, subject to a 30 day extension, unless Congress (1) has declared war, (2) passed a
concurrent resolution authorizing continued activities or (3) is physically unable to meet as
a result of armed attack upon the country. Thus, joint action is required by the Congress.
It should be noted, however, that § 5(b) also may be a one house veto. For instance if
the Senate approved Presidential action and the House rejected it, the President would be
required (under § 5(b)) to withdraw U.S. forces by virtue of the action (or inaction) of one
house of Congress. Lungren & Krotoski found that:
Section 5(b) has a significant effect because the action or inaction of one House
can terminate the use of armed forces abroad. While it is true that section 5(b)
does not contain express language providing for a one House legislative veto,
this is irrelevant since the operational force of the section is the functional
equivlent [sic] of a one House legislative veto.
Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 785-86.
47. Consumers Union, 691 F.2d 575.
48. United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission, 463 U.S.
1216 (1982).
49. Consumers Union, 691 F.2d at 578.
50. Sec. 5(c) may be unconstitutional on another ground, depending upon the factual
context, because it may conflict with the President's powers as Commander in Chief. See A
Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 21, at 72, 74-5 (statement of former
State Dep't Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh). This is especially true in the area of self-defense,
which is a constitutional function of the President. But see § 2(c) of the WPR, which nar-
rowly defines the President's powers as Commander in Chief. This led one observer to note
that
[tihe legislative veto provisions of section 5(c) would allow Congress unilater-
ally to determine whether or not to permit the use of the armed forces in cases
of self-defense, for example. A power which lies in the domain of the Executive
under the Constitution would thus be transferred to the control of Congress.
No resolution of Congress is constitutionally capable of accomplishing this
feat.
Statement of Monroe Leigh, id., at 76.
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the current Supreme Court"1 would strike down Section 5(c) as long as
Chadha stands52 (if the challenge surmounts the issue of justiciability).
B. Section 5(b): Fundamental Constitutional Issues
1. Violates The Separation Of Powers
A more detailed analysis is required to demonstrate that Section 5(b)
violates the doctrine of the separation of powers and institutions.5 3
Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. armed forces
engaged in hostilities or imminent hostilities within 60 days, subject to a
30 day extension, unless war has been declared or both Houses of Con-
gress specifically authorize an extension. Thus, both Houses of Congress
must take affirmative action, by a simple majority vote on a concurrent
resolution, to authorize the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces.
Or, to put it the other way, the President is required to withdraw Ameri-
can forces if Congress fails to act." Moreover, either House may block the
use of American troops by a simple majority vote or by failing to address
the issue.55
In Chadha, the Court found the legislative veto unconstitutional be-
cause it has "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons, including [Executive branch officials], all outside
The delegation of the Commander in Chief power is quite narrow. See infra text accom-
panying notes 139-49.
51. There is an aversion by the courts to reach the merits of war powers disputes. See
Henkin, Constitutional Issues in Foreign Policy, 23 J. INr'L AFF. 222 (1969).
52. Apparently, Justice White reached the same conclusion. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 970-71
(White, J., dissenting).
53. But see Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 782-83 (arguing that Chadha has
rendered § 5(b) unconstitutional per se). For a well-reasoned and precisely contrary view,
see Buchanan, supra note 16 (arguing that the War Powers Resolution is unaffected by
Chadha).
54. Unless Congress is physically unable to meet, in which case the President may con-
tinue to act. See § -, WPR, supra note 1.
55. Arthur Schlesinger asks: "If one house of Congress could prevent the declaration or
authorization of war, why should not a single house be able to prevent the continuation of
undeclared or unauthorized war?" A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 306 (1973).
This presupposes, of course, that the President did not have the original authority to com-
mit U.S. armed forces to combat - a thesis with which I disagree as a matter of constitu-
tional delegation of powers, and to which two centuries of practice stands in opposition.
Moreover, the termination of hostilities is distinctly different, from a constitutional law per-
spective, from a declaration of war. Cf. 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, at § 1171 ("It should
therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war, but not to make peace."). See also note 72,
infra.
It is widely accepted that the President, as Commander in Chief, has the power to
negotiate and enter into armistice agreements without Congress' consent. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 52 (1975). Similarly, the President has the constitu-
tional authority to make executive agreements, while treaties require consent of the Senate.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Finally, the constitution is quite
precise as to the law-making process, a fact Prof. Schlesinger's reasoning overlooks.
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the legislative branch."" The legislative effect of Section 5(b) is to termi-
nate the Executive's use of armed force in the absence of express ap-
proval by both Houses within a short time frame. This can be done
through Congressional inaction or by the "veto" of one House.
The only way to interpret Section 5(b) consistently with the prohibi-
tion against the legislative veto, is to assume that the decision to use
American troops is assigned solely to the Congress by the Constitution.
5 7
As Fredrick S. Tipson, former chief counsel of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, put it, under Section 5(b) "the president's authority to
act in emergencies simply runs out in 60 days if Congress does nothing.""
Under this view, the Constitution vests the Congress with the requisite
war powers; the Congress has delegated to the President discretionary
powers for only 60 days without further Congressional approval. This as-
sessment of the war powers is premised upon the assumption that consti-
tutional separation of powers and institutions accords the Congress,
rather than the Executive, most of the War Powers. This paper will argue
that the constitutional separation of powers and institutions is that once
Congress has raised an army, appropriated funds for its support, ap-
proved pay scales and appointments, and promulgated rules for military
conduct, it then falls to the President to use the armed forces in his ca-
pacity to conduct foreign policy in situations short of war. Because the
War Powers Resolution is based upon a constitutional interpretation
under which the Congress exercises certain Executive War Powers, it is a
usurpation by the Congress of the President's power and, thus, a violation
of the constitutional separation of powers.
2. The Powers Shared
In domestic affairs, the Constitution's sharing of power and responsi-
bility are fairly clear. "In foreign affairs, it was often cryptic, ambiguous
and incomplete."" Like other principal functions of national government,
the War Power" is a "pattern of shared constitutional authority.., not
56. 462 U.S. at 952. The Court went on to state that "[t]he one-House veto operated in
these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the
House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action
has altered Chadha's status." Id. The same may be said of the effect of one house voting
against continued use of force, or inaction by either or both houses, under § 5(b).
57. See, e.g., the comment of Rep. Clement Zablocki that "under the Constitution, Con-
gress is given the exclusive power to commit troops into hostilities. Congress does not dele-
gate this power to the President in the War Powers Resolution." Zablocki, War Powers
Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 579, 590 (1984).
58. Tipson, The War Powers Resolution Is Constitutional and Enforceable, A.B.A. J.,
March 1984, at 10, 14.
59. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 2.
60. War has been defined as an international legal "state of armed hostility between
sovereign nations or governments." 7 J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1906).
The War Power of the federal government is more difficult to define. "This power is tremen-
dous," said John Quincy Adams; "it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every bar-
rier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property and of life." Quoted in
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an hermetic separation of powers, but a scheme of divided power - what
Hamilton called an intermixture of powers, the only effective way to pre-
vent a monopoly of power in any one branch of government."'
It is axiomatic that the Constitution divides the War Powers between
the Executive and the Congress.6 2 The Constitution does not address ex-
plicitly the issue of which branch of government has the power to decide
to deploy U.S. armed forces in situations of hostilities or imminent hostil-
ities. The Congress' War Powers are specifically enumerated in the Con-
stitution. With respect to the use of force, Congress has the power to de-
clare war,"3 to raise and support Armies," to provide and maintain a
Navy,"5 to make laws regulating the armed forces,66 and to support the
militia of the several states.67
The President's powers, by comparison, are described vaguely but are
hardly less important. The "executive power" is vested in the President."
He is the Commander in Chief of U.S. armed forces,6 9 as well as of the
militia when called into federal service. 70 He also has the power to call
forth the militia in certain circumstances. 7' The President has "declared
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war success-
fully." It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially
to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of
victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase
of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the
members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend
the rise, prosecution and progress of the war.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
[Tihe war power of the Federal Government is not created by the emergency
of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a power to wage
war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of
the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
When used in this article, the War Power will refer to so much of that sweeping consti-
tutional grant of power as is implicated by the War Powers Resolution, i.e., the power to
send U.S. armed forces into combat abroad.
61. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833,
847 (1972). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
62. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. at 93 ("The Constitution commits to the
Executive and the Congress the exercise of the war power").
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
64. Id. at cl. 12.
65. Id. at cl. 13.
66. Id. at cl. 14.
67. Id. at cls. 15 & 16.
68. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See infra note 134.
69. Id at § II, cl. 1. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 135, 139-49.
70. Id.
71. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-33 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1, 44-48 (1849); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862); Sterling v. Con-
stantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932). Compare U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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peace''72 and proclaimed neutrality.78 And, very early in our history, John
Marshall observed that "[tihe President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
7 4
Indeed, the President may obligate the United States to other States
72. This is a non-exclusive power which has been exercised unilaterally by the execu-
tive. The Supreme Court observed that" '[t]he state of war' may be terminated by treaty or
legislation or Presidential proclamation." Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168 (1948). See
also Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919); McElrath v. United
States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871); United States
v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56, 70 (1869).
73. In 1793, when revolutionary France declared war on England, President Washing-
ton proclaimed U.S. "impartiality." (The international law term "neutrality" was avoided,
Letter of Jefferson to Monroe, July 14, 1793, in 7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at 1004, just as
the international law term "blockade" was avoided in President Kennedy's "quarantine" of
Cuba during the missile crisis. Address of Oct. 22, 1962 of Pres. Kennedy, 47 Dep't State
Bull. 715 (Nov. 12, 1962); Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.
Kennedy, 1962 806 (1963).) Several pro-French members of Congress vehemently de-
nounced the action as infringing Congressional power. However, President Washington -
outraged by the conduct of the French minister, the notorious Citizen Genet, who sought to
entangle the fledgling nation in the European war and, among other things, issued letters of
marque and reprisal from his American legation to U.S. merchantmen and established Prize
courts in French consulates, B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 183
(1939) - believed the power was at least in part vested in the President. See H. LODGE,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 172-74 (1882). This dispute sparked the well-known Pacificus-
Helvidius letters initiated by Alexander Hamilton and acrimoniously replied to by James
Madison. See generally Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neutral-
ity of 1793 (1845, reprinted in 1976). Similarly, following the outbreak of the First World
War in August 1914, Pres. Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality.
It should be noted, however, that in 1794, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, 1
Stat. 381 (1794), and in 1917 passed another Neutrality Act, 40(1) Stat. 217 (1917).
74. The statement was made in the House of Representatives when Marshall was a
Congressman debating the Jonathan Robbins affair. 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800), re-
printed in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.), App. 1, at 26 (1820). This phrase has been invoked repeatedly
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 766-68 (1972); Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 109 (1948)(paraphrased); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208 (1948)(per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); Ludecke
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (paraphrased) (Black, J. dissenting); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
20 (1936); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
444 U.S. 996 (1979). See also REP. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 15,
1816, Compilation of Reports, 1901, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Doc. 231, Vol. 8, p. 24 ("The
President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign
nations."), quoted in Curtiss-Wright, supra, at 319. See generally Henkin, The President
and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 932-33 (1986).
Hamilton characterized this power as "the constitutional agency of the president[] in
the conduct of foreign negotiations." The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at
381. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 164-65 (1978); L. HENKIN, supra note
55, at 45-50, criticizing this characterization of the President's powers as too sweeping and
without constitutional foundation. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661, et seq.
(1981); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion: An Historical Assessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1977); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly
of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1972).
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through executive agreement, including certain military agreements, with-
out the advice and consent of the Senate.75
75. Under the Constitution, of course, the Senate must advise and consent to a treaty
before the President may ratify it. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Supreme Court has held that
a treaty must involve an issue "properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign country."
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25. How-
ever, all international compacts are not treaties which require the "participation" of the
Senate. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. See also U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230. The
parameters of the Executive's power to make international agreements is unresolved. L.
TRIBE, supra note 74, at 170. See also State Dep't Circular No. 175, Dec. 13, 1955, reprinted
in 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 784 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 119, Comment (1965). Dr. Guive Mirfendereski commented that the
President's constitutional power to enter into sole executive agreements is narrow.
The language in Belmont may lead some to conclude that there is a class of
agreements that the President can ratify independent of the "advice and con-
sent" of the Senate. Such a conclusion is untenable. The Belmont decision
speaks of agreements whose ratification does not always require the participa-
tion of the Senate. In other words, not every agreement requires the active or
affirmative exercise of the Senate's power of "advice and consent." The Sen-
ate's "advice and consent" - i.e., approval - may take other forms: silence,
implied approval, acquiescence. In fact, the presumption of congressional ap-
proval is upset only where the Congress does in some way resist the exercise of
Presidential authority. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-88
(1981). Therefore, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court found Congress' im-
plicit approval to be "crucial" to its decision to uphold the President's power
to bind the U.S. to a series of agreements with Iran for the release of U.S.
citizens. 453 U.S. at 680. Furthermore, the Court went as far as to suggest that
the ratification of agreements without the explicit advice and consent of the
Congress is only so because of the Congress' decision not to require it. The
Court took judicial notice of the fact that the Congress is quite capable of
objecting to executive agreements, as it did with respect to a 1977 Executive
Agreement with Czechoslovakia, forcing the Executive to renegotiate the
claims settlement agreement. Id. at 688, n. 13.
Letter from Dr. Guive Mirfendereski to the author (Jan. 31, 1987) (discussing the issue of
Presidential powers under the Constitution to engage in sole executive agreements). See
further Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955); Wright, The United States and International Agree-
ments, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1944). See the interesting discussion of the tension in the use
of executive agreements as a method of the President's conduct of foreign policy, in Rehm,
Making Foreign Policy Through International Agreement, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 126-38 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976). See generally United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds 348
U.S. 296 (1955) ("The executive may not by-pass congressional limitations regulating ...
[imports] by entering into an agreement with [a] foreign country that the regulation be
exercised by the country through its control over exports"); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 109-10 (1801).
One of the most important executive agreements was the "Destroyers for Bases" ar-
rangement of Sept. 9, 1940, between the United States and Great Britain, prior to the U.S.
entry into the Second World War. E.A.S. No. 181 (1940). See 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 484 (Aug.
27, 1940). The U.S. traded 50 destroyers for 99-year leases on military bases in eight British
possessions from Newfoundland to the Carribbean. In his memoirs on the war, Winston
Churchill characterized the arrangement as "a decidedly unneutral act by the United States.
It would, according to all the standards of history, have justified the German Government in
declaring war upon them." 2 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THEIR FINEST HOUR
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It is clear that the Congress may prohibit the use of U.S. armed
forces in certain areas by statute. It is also clear that it is the President
who orders deployment of troops. Nowhere, however, does the Constitu-
tion specifically set forth which branch of government has the power to
decide to deploy American forces in situations of hostilities or imminent
hostilities. We must, therefore, indulge in constitutional interpretation.
There are two principal methods of inquiry: first, to analyze the intent of
the Founding Fathers; second, to examine the theoretical structure of the
government-the separation of powers and institutions-to determine
where the power reposes.
3. Original Intent
Any attempt to discern the original intent7 ' of the Founding Fathers
as a method of constitutional interpretation is, at best, a dubious affair.
As John P. Roche observed:
The prodigious outpouring of "authoritative" interpretations of the
"original intent" of the Framers of the Constitution ... is rather baf-
fling to one who has spent almost 40 years laboring in the primary
sources of 18th-century American constitutionalism ...
What finally emerged was not a separation of powers but a sepa-
ration of institutions: the President's veto is a legislative power of im-
mense impact, as is the authority of the Federal judiciary to hold acts
of Congress unconstitutional . . .. The Senate clearly moves in on ex-
ecutive power when it approves appointments, and if Hamilton's ob-
servations in Federalist 77 that "the consent of that body would be
necessary to displace as well as to appoint" had ever been ranked as
an "original intent," the President would really be locked in.
[Affter four decades I can sadly testify that not only do I not
know the "original intent" of the Framers - a fantastic reification on
its face - but I increasingly suspect that much of the time on many
of the provisions they didn't either. I know what Madison thought of
some things, what Hamilton thought about others, but have no to rea-
son to believe their views were the accepted wisdom.77
404 (1949).
The effect of the destroyers-for-bases arrangement may have been to move the U.S.
from "neutrality" to the uncertain international legal status of "non-belligerency." In ap-
pealing to President Roosevelt for weapons in May 1940, Prime Minister Churchill urged
the United States to "proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us
with everything short of actually engaging armed forces." Id. at 24-25. On the question of
non-belligerency, see, e.g., Wilson, Some Current Questions Relating to Neutrality, 37 AM.
J. INT'L L. 651 (1943); Kunz, Neutrality and the European War 1939-1940, 39 MICH. L.
REV. 719 (1940-1941). Cf. note 80, infra.
76. Reference to original intent is instructive on the broad structure of the government.
On issues of detail, however, original intent is as often misleading as it is informative.
77. Roche, "A Constitution Short on Intent," N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, at 24, col. 4.
Compare, for example, Hamilton's view of the constitutional authority to direct the use
of force, 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 437-44 (H. Lodge ed. 1904), with Madison's
view. 6 THE WRINGS OP JAMES MADISON 138-88 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
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The futility of discerning original intent is exemplified by the debate
over the substitution of the phrase "declare War" for "make War" during
the drafting of Article I.7 The debate usually starts like this: under the
Articles of Confederation, Congress had the power to declare and make
war.7 9 The original draft of the Constitution gave Congress the power to
"make war," which was changed during the Constitutional Convention to
"declare war." This is significant because "one of the chief purposes of
the Convention was to separate the legislative from the executive func-
tions."80 The inference is that the power to declare war - that is, to mo-
bilize the country and to alter the United States' international legal sta-
tus (with its many ramifications), in itself a constitutional law issue -
was of a clearly legislative character and, thus, belonged to the Congress.
The power to "make war," however, was considered an executive function
and, thus, belonged to the President.81
Another view is that the Founding Fathers themselves intended a
more narrow meaning. Of late, the most often quoted" treatment of the
debate on the War Power during the Constitutional Convention is by
Judge Abraham Sofaer, now Legal Adviser to the Department of State,
who observed:
78. Changes in language between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution
may be significant. In McCulloch v. Maryland, for example, Chief Justice Marshall noted
that the word "expressly" does not appear in the Tenth Amendment, although it was con-
tained in the Articles of Confederation. "The men who drew and adopted this amendment
had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Arti-
cles of Confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those embarrassments." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819). See also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85 (1900) (recognizing
the "distinction between the Articles of Confederation and the present constitution" for
purposes of discerning the meaning of words within the Constitution).
79. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9.
80. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-16 (1926) (Taft, C.J.). The Court did not
alter its reasoning on the separation of powers as it relates to this argument in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958).
81. The traditional view is that the change from "make" to "declare" war was intended
to give the President significantly greater powers. See, e.g., Emerson, The War Powers Res-
olution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 187,
209 (1975). See also Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 769-772. But see Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YAE L.J. 672 (1972).
Professor Lofgren considers the change from "make" to "declare" as an ambiguous one, and
sets forth five explanations of its significance. First, America would therefore restrict itself
to fully declared wars. Second, America would limit its intercourse with other nations to
trade and commerce. Third, if Congress' power to declare war is strictly interpreted then the
power to make undeclared wars must be viewed as not belonging to Congress but to the
President. Fourth, as used in the Constitution, "declare" was taken to mean "commence"
and not the narrower international law term of art. Finally, any war-commencing power not
covered by Congress' power to declare war must be considered as vested in Congress because
of Congress' control of reprisals, e.g., the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. Id.
at 694-95.
82. See, e.g., A. Lakeland, The War Powers Resolution: Necessary and Legal Remedy
to Prevent Future Vietnams, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 153, 153-54
(S. Soper ed. 1984).
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The draft Constitution assigned Congress the power to "make" war.
Charles Pinckney sought on August 17 to vest the power in the Senate
alone; the Senate would be familiar with foreign affairs, it already had
the power to make treaties of peace, and action by both houses would
take too long. Pierce Butler responded that, if informed judgment and
efficiency were the relevant criteria, he was "for vesting the power in
the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not
make war but when the Nation will support it." Madison then "moved
to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive
the power to repel sudden attacks." Sherman apparently assumed the
President already had power to repel attacks. He thought the clause
"stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to com-
mence war. 'Make' better than 'declare' the latter narrowing the
power too much."
Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts, who seconded Madison's mo-
tion to substitute "declare" for "make," attacked Butler's suggestion:
he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war." Ellsworth then spoke against Pinck-
ney's motion to give the power of war to the Senate. "[Tihere is a
material difference," he said, "between the cases of making war, and
making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, then into it. War
also is a simple and overt declaration. Peace attended with intricate &
secret negotiations." George Mason of Virginia also was for clogging
war and facilitating peace, and therefore "was agst giving the power of
war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to
the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it." He
added that "he preferred 'declare' to 'make," and Rufus King con-
curred because "'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it which
was an Executive function."
Pinckney's suggestion that the Senate be given the power to make
war was rejected overwhelmingly, but Madison's motion to change
"make" for "declare" was approved. The change was intended by
Madison and Gerry to enable the President to respond to "sudden
attacks" without a declaration of war, and by King and others to leave
the conduct of war in executive hands. They therefore appear to have
intended the clause to authorize the President to defend the United
States from attack without consulting the legislature, at least where
the attack is so "sudden" that consultation might jeopardize the na-
tion. But nothing in the change signifies an intent to allow the Presi-
dent a general authority to "make" war in the absence of a declara-
tion; indeed, granting the exceptional power suggests that the general
power over war was left in the legislative branch. 83
Judge Sofaer suggests that the Founding Fathers intended by "make
war" only to give the President power enough to repel sudden attacks,
but that Congress retained the power to decide when and where force was
to be used.
83. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 31-32
(1976) (citations omitted).
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Now that is a powerful argument to draw an opposite inference. But
this conclusion is historically incorrect and raises more questions than it
answers. For one thing, it does not consider what the Founding Fathers
meant by "war." There is a strong argument that the Founding Fathers
had in mind something more akin to the international law" distinction"8
between "war" and "peace"" than to the practice of using force without
declaring war,8 7 such as the French intervention in the American war of
84. "International law had unobtrusively been woven into the fabric of our national
existence." Raymond & Frischholz, Lawyers Who Established International Law in the
United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 803 (1982).
85. "War is an aspect of a nation's international relations and must therefore be seen
from the perspective of the international as well as the domestic order." Wallace, The War-
Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 720 (1972). This has been
a recognized and well-settled proposition at least since Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
54, 83-84 (1795). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 315, et
seq.
86. As Grotius observed, "inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium" (between war and
peace there is no other category). H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis III, xxi, 1 (1625). Mod-
ern international law also recognizes this distinction. See, eg., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, Vol. 1, PEACE (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), Vol. 2, War (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed.
1952) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht].
87. Among other things, the declaration of war alters the declarant's international legal
status, empowering the declarant to take action, i.a., against certain shipping, and forcing
other States to declare war or neutrality - a fact the Federalists, mostly from northern
trading states, were keenly aware of. Indeed, it was in Massachusetts that the first American
Prize court was established. 1 J.B. SCOTT, PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME CoURT 1789-1918 2 (1923). In the 1807 British Prize case The Neptune, Sir William
Scott (Lord Stowell) observed that "[ilt is well known that a declaration of hostility natu-
rally carries with it an interdiction of all commercial intercourse; it leaves the belligerent
countries in a state that is inconsistent with the relations of commerce." 165 Eng. Rep. 978,
979, 6 Rob. 403, 405-06 (1807). See also Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 535-36
(1867) (it is universally accepted that "the immediate and necessary consequence of a decla-
ration of war is to interdict all intercourse or dealings between the subjects of the belliger-
ent states."); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377, 405 (1866) ("War necessarily in-
terferes with the pursuits of commerce and navigation, as the belligerent parties have a
right, under the law of nations, to make prize of the ships, goods, and effects of each other
upon the high seas."); Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855) ("The con-
sequence of this state of hostility is, that all intercourse and communication between [bel-
ligerents] is unlawful."; The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 395-407 (1816) (Marshall,
C.J. concurring) (declared war between the U.S. and Britain gave the U.S. the "declared
right" under international law to capture a Prize Swedish vessel where Sweden was a co-
belligerent with Britain against France, a war in which the U.S. was neutral); The Nereide,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418 (1815) ("[Wlar gives a full right to capture the goods of an
enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend."); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
155 (1814) (A state of war provides states with the right to authorize capture of enemy
vessels); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193 (1814) ("[I]n war, all intercourse between
the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal"); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 382 (1814) (Property of enemy nationals as well as citizens of U.S. trading with the
enemy, captured on the high seas, is prize of war under international law); Hannay v. Eve, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 242, 247 (1806) (during a declared war, international law authorizes the U.S.
government to allow the crew of an enemy vessel to submit their ship and collect the Prize).
See generally The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 791-913 (1968); 7 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-341; A.
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independence, or limiting the Executive from using armed force short of
war in pursuit of the then-recognized international law rights of self-help
or reprisal."8 It was perhaps in this sense that Oliver Ellsworth observed
during the constitutional debate that "[wiar . . . is a simple and overt
declaration."89 Similarly, when Elbridge Gerry said he "never expected to
hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare
war," he contemplated a declaration, not the tactical use of force."' It
VERZIJL, LE DROIT DES PRISES DE LA GRANDE GUERRE (1924); 7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at
342-858.
A preliminary exercise to the taking of Prize is the right of visit and search. The Ner-
eide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 427-28; G. HACKWORTH, supra, at 175-76. The Supreme Court
noted that "[tihe right of visitation and search [is] strictly a belligerent right." The Ante-
lope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.). "[T]he right of visitation and
search ... is strictly a belligerent right, allowed by the general consent of nations, in time of
war, and limited to those occasions." The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826)
(Story, J.). In The Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 165 E.R. 1464 (1817), the High Court of Admiralty
observed that
[t]his right; incommodious as its exercise may occasionally be to those who are
subjected to it, has been fully established in the legal practice of nations, hav-
ing for its foundation the necessities of self-defense, in preventing the enemy
from being supplied with the instruments of war, and from having its means of
annoyance augmented by the advantages of maritime commerce.
2 Dods. at 238, Id. at 1475. Accord The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 Rob. 20, 165 E.R. 81
(1798); The Maria, 1 Rob. 340, 165 E.R. 199 (1799).
Because of this, the War Power was linked to the Commerce Power, which is specifically
assigned to the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. One highly respected scholar has
observed that "[n]eutral merchants had very profitable possibilities connected with the car-
rying trade of belligerents, while merchants operating as privateers, or others exercising bel-
ligerent rights had quite different opportunities which called for a careful readjustment of
mercantile rights." A.P. Rubin, Foreign Policy by Congress: Book Review, 4 FLETCHER FOR.
283, 284 (1980). See also L. ATHERLEY-JONES, COMMERCE IN WAR (1907); F. UPTON, THE LAW
OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR 16-36, et seq. (3d ed. 1863). It was, perhaps,
in this vein that President Washington urged in his Farewell Address that "[tihe great rule
of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to
have with them as little political connection as possible." G. Washington, Farewell Address,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 70, 77 (R. Morris ed. 1965). The
linkage of "war, peace and commerce" is also made in The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay), supra
note 42, at 325.
88. See, e.g., A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE: FORCE SHORT OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 85, passim (1933, reprinted in 1973). The eminent international law scholar
Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed that self-help and reprisal "are not necessarily acts
initiating war." 2 Lauterpacht, supra note 86, at 203.
89. Quoted in A. SOFAER, supra note 83.
90. John Bassett Moore noted that:
Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that by the term
war is meant not the mere employment of force, but the existence of the legal
condition of things in which rights may be prosecuted by force. Thus, if two
nations declare war one against the other, war exists, though not force
whatever may as yet have been employed. On the other hand, force may be
employed by one nation against another ... and yet no state of war may arise.
... The distinction is of the first importance, since, from the moment when a
state of war supervenes third parties become subject to the performance of the
duties of neutrality as well as to all the inconveniences that result from the
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should be recalled that it was Gerry who, in June 1775, proposed the es-
tablishment of the first American Prize court,91 while Ellsworth had
served as an appeals judge in the Prize case of The Active,9" illustrating
their understanding of and concern for the international law of war." Fi-
nally, Rufus King appears to say that he agreed that Congress' power
should be restricted to a declaration of war because making war "was an
Executive function." This distinction (between making war and declaring
war) was recognized in Bas v. Tingye" and Montoya v. United States.9 In
both cases the Supreme Court found that a declaration of war was a
profound legal act by the Congress," as opposed to the use of force in
armed conflict.9
7
The Founding Fathers surely were concerned with the effects of a
declaration of war on commerce."' Professor Alfred P. Rubin noted that
exercise of belligerent rights.
7 J.B. Moore, supra note 60, at 153-54.
91. 1 J.B. SCOTT, supra note 87, at 2. In November 1775, General Washington urgently
requested the Continental Congress to set up a system of national Prize courts. "Washing-
ton to the President of Congress, Nov. 8 and 11, 1775," in 4 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799 73, 81-82 (J. Fitzpatrick
ed. 1931-1944). On Nov. 25, 1775, Congress responded by establishing for a trial period Prize
courts. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CoNrINENTAL CONGRESS 371-75 (W. Ford ed. 1904-1937).
92. Bourguignon, Incorporation of the Law of Nations During the American Revolu-
tion - The Case of the San Antonio, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 270, 295 (1977).
93. Id. On some legal effects of war, see, eg., W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 952-54 (3d ed. 1971).
94. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
95. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
96. "We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war
where no war has been declared or exists. Where peace exists the laws of peace must pre-
vail." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140 (1866) (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J.,
and Wayne, Swayne and Miller, J.J.).
97. Hague Convention III of 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271 (1967) provides in article I that:
"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence
without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or
of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." This statement may have been more a
reflection of prior rather than contemporary practice. See, e.g., Moore, who noted: "It is
universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a state of war."
7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at 171. Nevertheless, the practice continued. See the British
ultimatum to Germany initiating hostilities in the Second World War.
98. In The Rapid, the Supreme Court noted that, upon a declaration of war
a new state of things has occurred - a new character has been assumed by this
nation, which involves it in new relations, and confers on it new rights ....
The nature and consequences of a state of war must direct us to the conclu-
sions which we are to form in this case .... The universal sense of nations has
acknowledged the demoralizing effects that would result from the admission of
individual intercourse. The whole nation are embarked in one common bottom,
and must be reconciled to submit to one common fate. Every individual of the
one nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own
enemy - because the enemy of his country ... The law of prize is part of the
law of nations. In it, a hostile character is attached to trade, independently of
the character of the trader who pursues or directs it.
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 160-62.
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the fact that the Constitution entrusted to Congress the power to de-
clare war in the same clause as the power to grant letters of marque
and reprisal makes it overwhelmingly clear to those familiar with
classical legal distinctions that the war-declaring power was connected
with the status of merchants.9
Perhaps the best evidence of this distinction is the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bas v. Tingy.10 0 The case grew out of a dispute involving the
prize owed in the recapture of the Eliza during the "undeclared war"
with France between 1798-1800. A unanimous Court observed that the
United States could wage hostilities without a declaration of war, because
the declaration of war was a distinct constitutional act affecting com-
merce and relations with other States.10' The Court thus recognized that
the country could wage armed conflict 101 absent a declared war. 03
In The Aurora, Pinkney argued that "[tihe rule, that trade with the enemy is illegal,
results necessarily from the declaration of war, and is included in it: there was no necessity
for any subsequent law to enforce the rule." 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 203, 213 (1814). He went on
to argue that "this principle was decided to be correct as early as 1704 and 1707; and it is
presumed, that those decisions were founded upon former cases." Id. at 213-14. Lauterpacht
found the origins of this rule in the 15th century. 2 Lauterpacht, supra note 86, at 261.
Moreover, it was "settled doctrine" that the declaration of war extinguished commercial
relations between citizens of belligerent States. "The doctrine is not at this day to be ques-
tioned, that during a state of hostility, the citizens of the hostile states are incapable of
contracting with each other." Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833).
Accord Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1833) (Declaration of war
authorizes Congress under international law, to enact legislation to seize enemy property
within the territorial U.S.); Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 112. (During a state
of war, "all intercourse and communication" between the belligerents' citizens is prohibited
by "the law of nations"); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 405. ("Public war, duly
declared or recognized as such by the war-making power, imports a prohibition by the sover-
eign to the subjects or citizens of all commercial intercourse and correspondence with citi-
zens or persons domiciled in the enemy country."); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at
535 (1867). (It is a universal principle of international law that when war is "duly declared
or recognized" all commercial transactions are extinguished); Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 542, 557 (1868). (Under international law, contracts made during war are "utterly
void").
99. A.P. Rubin, supra note 87, at 283-84. This point is completely missed by Judge
Sofaer, who interpreted the clause on letters of marque and reprisal, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11, as granting to Congress the constitutional basis for directing the use of armed force
short of war, a proposition which finds no support in the classic legal literature. A. SOFAER,
supra note 83, at 32. While letters of marque and reprisal could be issued in peacetime, as
was done in the "undeclared war" with France in 1793, it would nevertheless be a causus
belli under international law and, therefore, a means to trigger a declaration of war.
100. 4 U.S. 37.
101. 4 U.S. at 40. See Talbot v. Seemans, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 18-20 (1801) (The U.S.
and France were in "partial war"). This case is discussed infra at note 197.
102. Professor Franck has noted that "[s]ince the decision of the Supreme Court in Bas
v. Tingy in 1800 and in the Prize cases in 1862, and up to and including the Vietnam cases
of 1971 to 1973, the courts have refused to sustain the proposition that the use of force by
the President is unconstitutional except after a formal declaration of war by the Congress."
T. FRANCK, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE UNTIL VIETNAM: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 16 (1984).
103. But even this persuasive distinction is blurred by the ambiguous use of "war" at
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This distinction was also drawn by Daniel Webster, who noted that:
This act [of May 28, 1798], it is true, authorized the use of force,
under certain circumstances, and for certain objects, against French
vessels. But there may be acts of authorized force; there may be as-
saults; there may be battles; there may be captures of ships and im-
prisonment of persons, and yet no general war. Cases of this kind may
occur under . . . the laws and usages of nations, and which all the
writers distinguish from general war.' °0
Professor Rubin concluded that
the Constitution contains two distinct legal [war] powers. The power
to order troops into action, bringing the law of war into play with
regard to that action but not with regard to uninvolved merchants,
belongs to the President. The power to change general relations be-
tween the United States and any other country from the regime of the
international law of peace to the regime of the international law of
war belongs to the Congress. There is no reason legally or historically
to view either of those powers as a limit on the other, and the refusal
of the President to order forces into battle regardless of a Constitu-
tional declaration of war, like the refusal of the Congress to declare
war regardless of a Presidential order of military action, illustrates the
political tensions built into the Constitution for sound legal and polit-
ical reasons. 105
The Framers appear to have regarded the declaration of war as distinct
from the use of armed force, such as the numerous Indian "wars" and the
two Barbary "wars," and even the French intervention in the U.S. war of
independence.
It is impossible to state with certainty, however, the intent of the
Founding Fathers. As Justice Jackson noted in the Steel Seizure Case,
the time of the Constitutional Convention. "War," at that time, usually was perceived in its
international legal sense, which could not have escaped notice by the Founding Fathers. On
the other hand, "war" was sometimes used colloquially to mean "combat." This ambiguity
was reflected in the Articles of Confederation, which provided that "[tihe United States, in
Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war .... " and that "[tihe United States ... shall never engage in a war ... in
time of peace .... Art. 9, paras. 1 & 6. This ambiguity led at least one author to equate,
erroneously, the power to "declare war" with the power "to authorize the international use
of force." Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 1407, 1417
(1984).
104. Speech on French Spoilations, 4 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER
164 (1903). Webster went on to note that
On the same day in which this act passed .... Congress passed another act,
entitled 'An act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provi-
sional army; and the first section declared, that the President should be au-
thorized, 'in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of
actual invasion of their territory, by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of
such invasion,' to cause to be enlisted ten thousand men.
Id. at 164-65.
105. A.P. Rubin, "The President and the Congress at War - Part I" (unpublished
paper 1984).
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the "partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each
side of any question."' 1  In fact, it is quite likely the Founding Fathers
disagreed among themselves on the nature of the War Power, preferring
for the sake of political expediency to leave the issue unresolved and to
let future generations grapple with the question.107 It should come as no
surprise that John Quincy Adams observed that "[t]he respective powers
of the President and Congress of the United States, in the case of war
with foreign powers are yet undetermined. Perhaps they can never be
determined. '"108
One of the few things that is clear is that advocates can muster au-
thority for just about any interpretation of original intent on the War
Power. Therefore, perhaps the more reliable path to an understanding of
the War Power is to analyze the structure of the Constitution itself to
106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
107. Another view is that much of the "foreign affairs power" is not mentioned in the
Constitution because the Founding Fathers assumed the new government had the powers
any State may possess under international law. Justice Story observed that powers in the
Constitution flow not only from the aggregate of enumerated powers but also "from the
aggregate powers of the national government." For instance, Story argued, since the Consti-
tution omits reference to extending jurisdiction over conquered territory, one must look to
the nature of government (and not Amendment X) for this power. "This would perhaps
rather be a result from the whole mass of the powers of the national government, and from
the nature of political society, than a consequence or incident of the powers specially enu-
merated." 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, at 148. See also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212 (1890). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936). In The Chinese Exclu-
sion Cases, the Court noted that Congress possessed jurisdiction over and could, therefore,
exclude aliens (even though there is no specific constitutional authority) since
U]urisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every inde-
pendent nation. It is a part of its independence .... [T]he United States, in
their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation,
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and
security throughout its entire territory.
130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889). See also Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933); MacKen-
zie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
Perhaps the most radical exposition of this thesis was by Mr. Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., where it was stated that
the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sover-
eignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to main-
tain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been men-
tioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality .... The power to acquire territory by
discovery and occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, the power to
make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the consti-
tutional sense, none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, never-
theless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality. This
the court recognized, and... found the warrant for its conclusions not in the
provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations.
299 U.S. at 364 (citations omitted).
108. J.Q. ADAMS, EULOGY ON MADISON 47 (1836).
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determine, from an architectural perspective, where the power should
resides.
4. The Separation of Institutions and Powers
John Roche observed that ours is a government of separated institu-
tions sharing powers. 10' The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he princi-
ple of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in
the minds of the Framers; it was woven into the document that they
drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."11' "This separation is not
merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object
is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially
different powers of government in the same hands."'11 In this regard, the
Framers of our Constitution were profoundly influenced by Montes-
quieu,"' whose injunction against the concentration of political power in
any single branch of government was reflected in the Constitution's bal-
ance of powers."' Montesquieu observed:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; be-
cause apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con-
109. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 610 (1838). The doctrine of the separation of powers is
nowhere stated in our Constitution; rather, it is "a conclusion logically following from the
separation of the several departments." Springer v. Government Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 201 (1928). Accord Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 89.
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 124. The separation of powers "is at the heart of our
Constitution .... Id. at 119. Accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-52, 962; Springer v. Govern-
ment Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. at 201. Cf. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto:
Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 390 (1977) ("It is doubtful that
the concept of separation of powers can really have any objective meaning.").
111. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
112. Madison observed that "[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on this
subject is the celebrated Montesquieu." The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42,
at 244. Although Montesquieu profoundly influenced the Framers, his injunctions were more
in the nature of philosophical views than a blueprint of English government. Professor
Fisher quotes Justice Holmes as saying that Montesquieu's "England - the England of the
threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial - was a fiction invented
by him .... " L. FISHER, supra note 44, at 248. Indeed, Fisher argued that
[o]ur structure of government owes its existence to the experiences of the
framers, not the theory of Montesquieu or precedents borrowed from England.
The framers used Montesquieu selectively, adopting what they knew from
their own experience to be useful and rejecting what they knew to be inappli-
cable. The product was more theirs than his.
L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 10 (1985).
113. Montesquieu's view that the maintenance of independence as between the legisla-
tive, the executive and the judicial branches was a "security for the people" and had the
"full approval" of the Framers. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 116.
VOL. 16:1
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
troul; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and
oppression."'4
In The Federalist No. 47, Madison found that when Montesquieu
said that governmental powers should be separated, he (Montesquieu)
did not mean isolated or fully independent.
[H]e did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other. His meaning...
can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution, are subverted. '
The Framers were rather pragmatic and motivated by a belief that
political powers should not be divided completely among institutions,
only that institutions should be independent of one another. ' Thus, said
Madison, the three branches of Government "ought to be kept as sepa-
rate from, and independent of each other as the nature of free govern-
ment will admit; or as is consistent with the chain of connection, that
binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
unity and amity. '11
7
The powers of government, however, were to be shared, so that each
branch would have a check upon the other. "Even a cursory examination
of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that
checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government
that would protect liberty.""" Madison argued in The Federalist No. 48
that the political powers of each department should not "be wholly un-
connected with each other"
unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give
to each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separa-
tion which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can
never in practice, be duly maintained.
114. Quoted in CONSTrrUONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMs 649 (4th ed. P.
Freund, A. Sutherland, M. Howe, E. Brown, eds. 1977).
115. The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 245 (emphasis deleted).
116. This concept is often misunderstood. See, eg., Vance, Striking The Balance: Con-
gress And The President Under The War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84
(1984) (arguing that the war power does "not fit neatly into the classic concept of the sepa-
ration of . . .powers. Instead, the area is one of shared and overlapping responsibilities
117. The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 246, quoting with approval
the New Hampshire Constitution (emphasis deleted).
The Supreme Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 120, that there is "com-
mon ground in the recognition of the intent of the Framers that the powers of the three
great branches of the National Government be largely separate from one another."
118. Bowsher v. Synar, -- U.S. -- , 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986) (Striking
down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985).
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It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one
of the departments, ought not to be directly and compleatly adminis-
tered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that
neither of them ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling
influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature,
and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it. After discriminating therefore in theory, the several
classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive,
or judiciary; the next and most difficult task, is to provide some prac-
tical security for each against the invasion of the others. What this
security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. 9
Perhaps the quintessential example of this sharing of powers is the
War Power, which is divided between the political branches.1 20 One can
discern the constitutional repository for the power to decide to deploy
U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities from an exami-
nation of the theory and practice of the separation of powers or, put an-
other way, "by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions."''
There are two paths to find the constitutional resting place of this
power. The first is the "more like" line of inquiry: Is the power to decide
to deploy U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities more
like the power to raise and support the army, or is it more like the power
to command the forces once deployed? This is a theoretical inquiry in-
volving an analysis of specifically enumerated war-related powers. The
119. The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 250.
120. RoSTOW, supra note 61, at 847. See also E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR (1982); A.
SOFAER, supra note 83, at 1-60. In Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd
mem. 411 U.S. 911 (1973), the district court noted that "the courts that have considered the
war-making power of the United States have all agreed that such power is shared by the
executive and legislature to the exclusion of the courts." See also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.
2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird , 451 F. 2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971);
Berk v. Laird, 429 F. 2d 302, 305 (2nd Cir. 1970), afj'd sub nom., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854,
859 (D. Mass. 1973).
The conduct of foreign relations generally is reserved to the political branches. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). "The conduct of the foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative...
Departments." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 3-2 (1918). See also Chicago &
Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). U.S. v. First Na-
tional Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2nd Cir. 1968). This does not mean that "every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). It is clear that
[t]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements,
and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recur-
ring and accepted task for the federal courts. . .. We cannot shirk this respon-
sibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society -- U.S. -- , 54 U.S.L.W. 4929,
4931 (June 30, 1986).
121. Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4. Wall.) at 139 (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J., and
Wayne, Swayne and Miller, JJ.)
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other line of inquiry is to look for constitutional analogies to determine
where this power most properly resides. This will be done by an examina-
tion of cases involving the separation of powers.
a. Constitutional division of war-related powers.
As noted previously, the Constitution specifically assigns certain
powers to Congress and others to the President.'22
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and
auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due ex-
ercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, in-
trude upon the proper authority of the Congress, nor Congress upon
the proper authority of the President. Both are servants of the people
whose will is expressed in the fundamental law. 2'
i. The Congress
Congress' powers include the raising of armed forces,'1 24 appropriating
funds to support them, 25 prescribing rules to regulate their conduct2 "
and, most importantly, the power to declare war. 27 Moreover, the Senate
must approve Presidential nominees for promotion in the armed
services. 28
The War Powers Resolution appears to be founded upon only one of
Congress' powers: the power to declare war. It is clear, or at least well
settled by custom and usage, that the Congress' power is not wider, since
the President may send U.S. armed forces anywhere in the world, at any
time he pleases,1 29 subject only to restrictions in the law,'3 0 including (ar-
guably) the War Powers Resolution. The theory underlying the War Pow-
ers Resolution is that the use of force may catapult the United States
into a war, depriving the Congress of its power to decide whether or not
122. Moreover, a fundamental constitutional distinction exists between powers exer-
cised in domestic and foreign affairs. See, eg., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304.
123. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139 (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J., and
Wayne , Swayne and Miller, JJ.). In his veto message of the War Powers Resolution, Presi-
dent Nixon stated: "The authorization and appropriations process represent one of the ways
in which such influence can be excercised." "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
See also Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-String
Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 28-38 (1975). But see the possible constitutional conflict
raised in note and text accompanying note 200 and as a possible limitation upon this power.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 13.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 13.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 2.
129. See supra note 114.
130. Such as prohibitions to spend funds for combat forces in a certain place. See, eg.,
Act of July 1, 1973, supra note 14.
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to declare war.1 " Thus, the President's use of force may on this ground
be restrained. This reasoning is historically and constitutionally flawed.' s
At least since the outset of the 20th century, this country has run
little or no risk of becoming embroiled in a declared war because of the
use of American troops without congressional approval. In the two largest
military actions short of war, Korea and Vietnam, ' the Congress will-
ingly and continuously exercised its power in support of the use of troops
in combat by raising armed forces through conscription and supporting
them with ongoing appropriations. In the numerous minor incidents in
which the President has ordered troops into hostilities, such as the Do-
minican Republic in 1965-1966 and Grenada in 1983, there was little risk
of declared war.
ii. The President
The President's powers flow from his broad mandate; he is: vested
with the "executive power, 1 3 4 Commander in Chief' 3 and the sole organ
131. Professor Henkin offers an alternative and interesting theory. He sees the policy
aspect of the use of force as a source for Congressional war powers. See Henkin, 'A More
Effective System' For Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Framework, 61 VA. L. REV.
751, 764 (1975).
132. This reasoning also ignores the fact that in the conduct of contemporary diplo-
macy, a wide variety of factors not involving the use of U.S. military forces might lead to
war, such as food embargoes, economic sanctions, economic assistance to a State involved in
an armed conflict and so forth. For instance, it is widely believed that the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor which triggered the U.S.' entry into the Second World War, was caused in
part by U.S. economic policies towards Imperial Japan. See generally B.H. LIDDELL HART,
HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 199 (1970); G. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UN-
TOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR (1981). Surely, the Congress may not control or interfere with
the President in these areas pursuant to its power to declare war; therefore, Congress' War
Power has limits. Based upon the writings of the Founding Fathers, international law at the
time and Revolutionary War-era Prize cases, there is little reason to doubt that the phrase
"declare war" meant anything other than what it says.
133. Professor Henkin observed that
[o]f the numerous recent 'uses' of force, only Korea and Vietnam would have
been clearly covered [by the War Powers Resolution]. Had such legislation
been in effect, President Truman would perhaps have acted anyhow, but might
have been impelled to seek Congressional approval within thirty days. Vietnam
was expressly authorized, and, presumably, any Tonkin Resolution would have
clearly authorized hostilities beyond thirty days as we:-.
L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 103.
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. "The executive power was given in general terms, strength-
ened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed . Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at
118.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 139-149.
Alexander Hamilton distinguished between the broad language of article II, § 1 and the
specific grants in article I, § 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States." 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (H.C. Lodge ed.
1851). Hamilton concluded that "[t]he [article II] enumeration [in §§ 2 & 3] ought therefore
to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the defini-
tion of executive power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, inter-
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for the conduct of foreign relations.' so These are amorphous but ex-
tremely potent powers, which led the Supreme Court to observe that
"[t]he difference between the grant of legislative power under article I to
Congress, which is limited to powers therein enumerated, and the more
general grant of the executive power to the President under article II is
significant." '
A President may act upon the sum of his powers, while congressional
action requires a specific constitutional provision, sweeping though it may
be (consider the commerce power, for instance). Thus, a theoretical anal-
ysis may be reduced to a single question: Does the power to decide to
deploy U.S. armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities
flow to Congress from one of its specific powers, or to the President under
his broad mandate of executive powers?
(A) Commander in Chief Power
It has been stated repeatedly, and wrongly, in my view, that the font
of the President's War Power is his constitutional appointment as Com-
mander in Chief."'8 One former Chief Executive and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he President is the Commander-in-
Chief of the army and navy, and the militia when called into the service
of the United States. Under this, he can order the army and navy any-
where he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transporta-
tion." I 9 This is probably not the power upon which the President prop-
erly may ground a decision to decide to deploy U.S. armed forces into a
new armed conflict, although it is the power to wage war effectively.4 0 It
is, therefore, a very potent power. For example, it was in the exercise of
this power that Franklin Roosevelt agreed with Winston Churchill during
preted in conformity with other parts of the constitution." Id. at 80-81.
136. See supra note 74.
137. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 128.
138. In his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson observed that
the Commander in Chief power implies "something more than an empty title. But just what
authority goes with the name has plagued presidential advisers who would not waive or
narrow it by non assertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends." 343 U.S. at 641.
139. W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 94-95 (1916). During the debate sur-
rounding the Congressional approval of the Act of March 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 773-74, requiring
the President to maintain a complement of marines on Navy capital ships and cruisers of
not less than 8 percent of the enlisted strength, Senator Borah stated:
Congress has not the power to say that an army shall be at a particular place
at a particular time or shall manouver in a particular instance. That belongs
exclusively to the Commander in Chief of the Army. The dividing line is be-
tween the question of raising, supporting and regulating an army, and com-
manding it. It is difficult to define, for the reason that it is difficult to tell
where the dividing line is. But when it is ascertained, there is no question
about the constitutional provision covering it.
43 CONG. REC. 2452 (1909).
140. T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL
SURRENDER 113 (1974); Wallace, supra note 85, at 744-52 et seq.
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the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 that their countries would
demand the "unconditional surrender" of the three Axis powers; 41 a deci-
sion of profound significance for the war effort. Similarly, President Lin-
coln based the emancipation proclamation upon the Commander in Chief
power, claiming it was justified by military necessity. 42 Further, Presi-
dent Truman based his decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan but
not to use it in the Korean conflict upon the Commander in Chief power.
The Commander in Chief delegation was intended to insure civilian
control of the military 43 and, once hostilities existed, to vest the power to
wage the struggle in the President.14 In one of the most often quoted
141. For an interesting and well researched account of this momentous decision , see 7
M. GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: THE ROAD TO VICTORY, 1941-1945 309 (1986); H. FEIS,
CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED AND THE PEACE THEY SOUGHT 108-11
(2d ed. 1967). Roosevelt stated:
Peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Jap-
anese war power .... The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war
power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That
means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the de-
struction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the
destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest
and the subjugation of other people.
Quoted in id. at 109.
142. See supra note 143.
143. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 79 (1861). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 50; A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 6. "By making the Commander in Chief a civilian who would
be subject to recall after four years, the Founders doubtless hoped to spare America tribula-
tions of the sort that the unfettered command and consequent political power of a Duke of
Marlborough had brought to England." Id.
The Commander in Chief power may and, in fact, has crossed the threshold and become
a substantive power. Perhaps the best example of this is when President Abraham Lincoln
used this power as his constitutional authority for the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln
claimed this was a necessary military measure to shorten the Civil War. W. WHITING, WAR
POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (10th ed. 1864, reprinted in
1971). See also G. MILTON, THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1789-1943 118 (1965). Whether
or not the Emancipation Proclamation was needed for military reasons, it certainly aided
Lincoln politically in the northern states. Of all the Presidents, Lincoln made the widest
and most frequent use of this power. Id. at 316.
144. The Founding Fathers wanted to assure that control of military activities was not
vested in the Congress because of the experience of war by committee during the war of
independence. It was in this vein that Hamilton wrote that "[ If all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish
the excercise of power by a single hand." The Federalist No. 74 (A. Hamilton), supra note
42, at 376.
It has been observed that:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to
declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war.
This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of
war with vigor and success, except such as interfere with the command of the
forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belongs to the
President as commander-in-chief.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139 (Chase, C.J., and Wayne, Swayne, and Miller,
JJ., concurring) (emphasis added). In Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893),
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passages of The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton opined that the power of
the Commander in Chief "amount[ed] to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral .... -' Although the Commander in Chief power is broad
and involves policy-making when war (and, perhaps, even high intensity
armed conflict) exists,"' this power was neither intended to nor does it
authorize the President to make the policy decision to involve U.S. armed
forces in combat, with the exception of areas such as self-defense and
preemptive strikes.1 7 Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in the
Steel Seizure Case, rejected the notion that it vests the President with
the "power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or
navy. 1 4 8 Chief Justice Stone observed in the Nazi Saboteurs Case that
the Constitution "invests the President as Commander in Chief with
power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect
all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the govern-
ment and regulation of the Armed Forces." 9 In United States v.
Sweeny,150 the Supreme Court observed that the Commander in Chief
power "is evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over
all the military forces, - such supreme and undivided command as would
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war."' ' Surely we would
not claim that the joint chiefs of staff have the constitutional authority to
decide, as a matter of national political policy, that armed force as op-
posed to negotiation should be employed in a given situation. How, then,
can it be that the "first General and Admiral" is to be treated differently?
The Commander in Chief power gives the President the authority to de-
ploy armed forces, but not to decide to deploy them.
(B) Foreign Policy Power
The decision to use American troops, in situations short of war, is
clearly related to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy-an executive, rather
than a legislative, function.15 The President'1 3 is responsible for sending
aff'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897), the Court of Claims noted that "Congress may increase the Army,
or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether . . . but so long as we have a military force
Congress can not take away from the President the supreme command."
145. The Federalist No. 69 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at 350. See also Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). (The Commander in Chief power did not "extend
the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the
legislative power.")
146. This includes certain powers affecting citizens within the United States. See E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984 231, 242 et seq. (5th rev. ed. 1984).
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra.
147. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 53. But see Rehnquist, The Constitutional Is-
sues - Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 628, 631-32 (1970).
148. 343 U.S. at 641-42 (Jackson, J., concurring).
149. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
150. 157 U.S. 281 (1895).
151. 157 U.S. at 284.
152. The State Department took the position at one point that the President's use of
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and recalling ambassadors, opening and closing embassies, formulating
and coordinating geopolitical strategy, negotiating trade agreements, en-
tering into executive agreements, presenting and prosecuting interna-
tional claims, and a host of other international activities inherent in the
foreign policy power. There is no question that the projection of military
power is a means of conducting foreign policy."" Diplomacy and the use
of force "are complementary aspects to the.., art of conducting relations
with other states."155 Thus, "foreign policy and war are on a contin-
uum." 56 Consider, for example, the "Carter Doctrine." In his State of the
Union address on January 23, 1980, President Carter proclaimed: "An at-
tempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It
will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military
force."' 7 Similarly, in his State of the Union address on December 2,
1823, fearing the reconquest of Spanish America by the Holy Alliance in
favor of the Bourbons, President James Monroe declared that the United
States "should consider any attempt ... to extend [foreign intervention]
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety."' 8 This became known as the Monroe Doctrine.' 59 President
force in foreign policy is outside the Congress' direct power to control.
Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in car-
rying out the broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing trea-
ties, but it is equally clear that his authority may not be interfered with by the
Congress in the excercise of powers which it has under the Constitution.
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 92-93 (1951) (statement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson), reprinted in THE POW-
ERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE UNITED
STATES 66, 71 (D. Schaffer & D. Mathews eds. 1974). The implication of this testimony is
that the constitutional restraints on the use of force in the conduct of foreign policy are the
same as those which apply to the normal conduct of diplomacy.
153. In foreign policy making, Americans tend to adopt an anthropomorphic view. Of
course, the President does not single-handedly make foreign policy decisions; rather, there
are any number of departments of the U.S. Government which daily contribute to the for-
eign policy process. For instance, there are 26 federal government agencies, departments and
offices which regularly participate in international trade policy making.
154. Clausewitz observed that the use of force is yet another means of conducting polit-
ics. K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 101 (1968).
155. R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIC'AL RELATIONS 24 (1966).
156. Wallace, supra note 85, at 733.
157. "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Con-
gress," N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1980, at A 12, col. 3.
158. The Monroe Doctrine, reprinted in R. MORRIS, supra note 87, at 99.
159. In his State of the Union address on December 2, 1845, President James Polk
reasserted the Monroe Doctrine, expanding it to prohibit diplomatic intervention by outside
powers in the New World. He concluded that "[tihe people of the United States can not,
therefore, view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the inde-
pendent action of any nation on this continent." Admittedly, the Monroe Doctrine was
transformed from a defensive measure to a justification for intervention by President Theo-
dore Roosevelt in his State of the Union address on December 6, 1904, in what later became
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, during the heyday of American
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Woodrow Wilson issued the Fourteen Points in a declaration that had
profound consequences for American foreign policy.160 Historian Arthur
Schlesinger noted that "[t]he Fourteen Points were of critical significance
to the war and peace, but this was entirely a presidential initiative, with-
out congressional consultation or clearance."'' Other notable instances
where Presidents have set American foreign policy which implicated the
use of force include: the stationing of combat troops in Iceland in July
1941, the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, and the Truman Doctrine
of March 2, 1947, from which sprang the policy of containment. On Octo-
ber 23, 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued the Proclamation of a
Quarantine of Offensive Weapons to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis. '6 President Kennedy ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade the ship-
ment of offensive weapons to Cuba, using force if necessary, and unques-
tionably bringing this country to the brink of war.
Moreover, is there any doubt that the decision whether or not to rec-
ognize another country, to establish an embassy and to exchange ambas-
sadors, is an executive function? Could the Congress order the President
to recognize a country? Could the Congress block the President's recogni-
tion of a country? The Supreme Court answered these questions with a
resounding "no" in United States v. Pink'63 and United States v. Bel-
mont,6" holding that as the "sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations,' 65 these powers, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, belong to the President. In fact, one proponent of the War Pow-
ers Resolution conceded that "the President undoubtedly possesses an
exclusive power to initiate a military commitment, power that Congress
may not negate or otherwise control."' 66
Perhaps the zenith of Congress' foray into the field of foreign rela-
tions was in the inter-war period, 1919-1939, when isolationists blocked
the U.S.' adherence to the Versailles Treaty, entry into the League of
Nations, rejection of American participation in the Permanent Court of
International Justice and a host of other activities. History has revealed
the failure of these policies and the Congress' role in their formulation.
(C) Executive Power
Even within the foreign affairs context, the President is vested with
perhaps the broadest of all delegations of authority-the Executive
power. It is axiomatic that the Constitution was created to supersede the
gunboat diplomacy.
160. The Fourteen Points, in R. MORRIS, supra note 8.7, at 153.
161. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 93.
162. "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," Proclamation No.
3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,401, reprinted in 47 Dep't State Bull. 717 (1962).
163. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203.
164. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324.
165. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. See supra note 74.
166. Buchanan, supra note 16, at 1170.
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Articles of Confederation, that a stronger and effective central govern-
ment was preferred to a weak one."'7 The raison d'etre of the constitu-
tional blueprint was to replace administration by legislative committee
(and not much of an administration, at that) with government by a single
magistrate. Whether or not the Founding Fathers harbored an original
intention that the President would have the power to decide to deploy
armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities, it is beyond
question today that, of the three branches of government, this is most
appropriately an Executive function, both by constitutional design and by
the reality of conducting foreign policy.
This analysis is also supported by the constitutional concept of
checks and balances. It is beyond doubt that Congress may control the
President's use of the armed forces, among other ways, simply by placing
limitations upon appropriations. Moreover, the Executive branch is re-
quired to continue to report to the Congress because of its oversight re-
sponsibilities and to continue to obtain funds. On a political level, the
President must maintain good relations with Congress, lest he find politi-
cal pressure applied along a spectrum of activities. Admittedly, Congress'
checks against Presidential action cannot be implemented quickly." 8
Then again, the constitutional checks and balances were not intended to
act speedily.
That this system of division and separation of powers produces con-
flicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was de-
liberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and open debate on the
great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the opera-
tion of checks on the exercise of governmental power.'6 9
However, "Congressional unwillingness to use its constitutional powers
cannot be deemed a sufficient reason for inventing new ways to act. '91 0
The Congress can no more appropriate the power to decide to deploy
U.S. armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities, without
specific legislation, e.g., to conduct U.S. naval exercises off the Libyan
coast or to escort ships in the Persian Gulf, than it could to recognize or
to sever relations with another country.
a. Case law
The seminal case on the separation of branches of our government is
Myers v. United States. 1 7 Myers arose when the President dismissed the
Postmaster of Seattle, despite a law requiring the advice and consent of
the Senate. In a thorough and scholarly analysis of the separation of gov-
167. See generally The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42.
168. See infra note 201.
169. Bowsher v. Synar, -- U.S. at -- , 54 U.S.L.W. 5064, 5066 (U.S. July 2, 1986).
170. Consumer Energy Council of America, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, 673 F.2d 425, 477 (1982).
171. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52.
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ernmental branches and powers, the Court reasoned that the constitu-
tional blueprint required a constant tension between the political
branches of government.17' This tension was designed to prevent any sin-
gle branch from usurping the power of another. Since the Constitution
itself was silent with respect to the power of removal,1 7 3 the Court looked
to how the tension between the political branches was to be maintained.
In examining the structure of government, the Court quoted Madison,
who observed:
The powers relative to offices are partly Legislative and partly Execu-
tive. The Legislature creates the office, defines the powers, limits its
duration and annexes a compensation. This done, the Legislative
power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the
man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an Executive nature....
We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the prin-
ciples upon which it was founded .... [I]f the Legislature determines
the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be
insecure if they were to designate the officer also. The nature of things
restrains and confines the Legislative and Executive authorities in this
respect; and hence it is said that the Constitution stipulates for the
independence of each branch of the Government. " "
Here was an explanation of the theory upon which the checks and
balances were grounded. The Legislature and the Executive should have
the ability to impose their wills on the other, to some extent, each within
its constitutional mandate.17 5 This led the Court to conclude that to allow
Congress to have a "veto" over the dismissal of an officer of the Executive
branch amounted to an overreaching of power, vesting too much control
in Congress. 1 6 Besides, the power to dismiss an official is more properly
172. For in this tension, or rivalry for supremacy, the Founding Fathers placed their
hopes for co-equal branches which would prevent the collection of political powers in one
branch or individual. See generally The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison), supra note 42.
Justice Brandeis noted in his dissenting opinion in Myers that
[tihe doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the excercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See further M. FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 400 (statement of Mr. Dayton in the Senate, Nov. 4, 1803).
173. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 gives the President the power to make appointments,
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
174. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 128-129.
175. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 & n. 21.
176. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 131-32, the Court held that Congress could not
appoint a majority of the voting members of an independent commission (Federal Election
Commission) because it violated the Appointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
This amounted to an unconstitutional infringement upon executive power since the Presi-
dent is to nominate and, with the Senate's advice and consent, shall appoint all "Officers of
the United States," even though "Congress has express authority to regulate congressional
elections, by virtue of the power conferred in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The Court's holding,
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an Executive function than a legislative function. To hold otherwise, said
the Court, would violate the principle of the separation of institutions."'
In the War Powers context, the same fundamental dilemma is posed.
Professor Corwin characterized this as "an invitation to struggle for the
privilege of directing American foreign policy. 178 How far can the Con-
gress go without infringing upon the President's power and tipping the
delicate constitutional balance in the struggle for control of foreign pol-
icy? The Congress has the power to raise the armed forces, to provide for
their support, to define the qualifications for its members, to approve ap-
pointments and promotions of officers, and to prescribe rules for its con-
duct. It ultimately can control the use of the armed forces through the
appropriations process. Can it also be said of the War Powers that the
Congress may direct the Executive when and how to use the armed forces
directly or through a legislative veto? How does this differ from ordering
the President to give a prescribed set of policy instructions to the Post-
master General? In this sense, Chadha is implicated. In Chadha, the At-
torney General was delegated certain powers, subject to a congressional
veto. The Court found this violated the doctrine of the separation of in-
stitutions. The same reasoning applies to the War Powers Resolution,
which allows Congress to veto the President's policy decision to use
armed force. It is clear that the War Powers Resolution violates the sepa-
ration of powers and institutions upon which our Constitution is based.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION FOR CONDUCTING
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
One writer has noted that "the problem addressed by the War Pow-
ers Resolution is at least as much political as it is constitutional ..
What effect, if any, does the War Powers Resolution have on the con-
duct of American foreign policy? First, it serves as a symbol to foreign
nations that the Executive branch is not free to project military power,
regardless of the political effectiveness such action could have.'80 Thus,
the War Powers Resolution tends to make the United States look like a
"Paper Tiger" in the eyes of many allies and other countries. Second, the
however, rested upon the explicit nature of the Appointments Clause. In Consumer Energy
v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck down a statute
providing for a rejection of an agency plan to deregulate natural gas prices should either
house of Congress excercise a legislative veto. Following the holding of Buckley v. Valeo, the
court observed that "[i]t would be anomalous in the extreme to hold that Congress may not
appoint the officials who make rules, but may enact a mechanism permitting effective con-
gressional control over those officials' decisions." Id. at 474. See also Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189.
177. Myers, 272 U.S. at 167.
178. E. CORwIN, supra note 146, at 171.
179. P. HOLT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN U.S. ARMED
INTERVENTION 1 (1978). See also Wallace, supra note 85, at 721 et seq.
180. Cf. notes and text accompanying notes 154-159, supra.
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War Powers Resolution may actually encourage a group or a State to pro-
long a conflict beyond the 60 and 90 day deadlines. In this sense, the War
Powers Resolution may actually encourage a higher intensity of fighting,
and for a longer period of time, possibly foreclosing to the United States
the opportunity to apply precise and swift force. Alternatively, it may
force the U.S. to make otherwise unnecessary concessions in negotiations
to terminate the American presence. Third, and perhaps a corollary of the
second point, it may encourage a President to use overwhelming force
where a smaller action was called for in order to avoid the 60 day provi-
sion. Fourth, the War Powers Resolution might force the Congress, for
political reasons, to support a presidential action which, upon deliberative
reflection, it might otherwise have opposed. Finally, the War Powers Res-
olution is an invitation to foreign States to wage a political struggle
within the U.S. By virtue of our open society, we find that State sponsors
of terrorism, such as Iran,' 8 ' Libya182 and Syria,1 83 and even international
terrorists like Yassir Arafat and Abu Abbas, have ready access to the
American news media.1 8" In some cases, this access has been employed
skillfully in an attempt to divide the country politically through
disinformation.
These drawbacks are most evident in the United States' effort to
combat international terrorism. Following the U.S. raid on Libya in re-
sponse to that country's continued State-sponsored terrorism,"8 ' there
was wide disagreement on Capitol Hill whether the War Powers Resolu-
tion did or should apply.'88 The time may come when the President of the
United States is compelled to strike a blow at the international terrorist
network.18 7 What he will need is the full support of the country, including
the Congress, lest the action cause more harm (domestically) than good
(internationally). But the War Powers Resolution may be triggered by
events short of the actual use of force 88 such as naval exercises off the
Libyan coast - arguably an area of "imminent hostilities," or by escort-
ing U.S.-flag vessels into the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. 88
181. See Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Over-
view, 13 OHIo N.U.L.REv. 117, 125 (1987).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 126.
184. See generally TERRORISM, THE MEDIA AND THE LAW (A. Miller ed. 1982).
185. Dale, US defends Libya raid, Financial Times (London), Apr. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 3;
Weintraub, American Bombers Strike Bases in Libya; President Asserts Raid Is In Retalia-
tion For "Reign of Terror" Linked to Qaddafi, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1986, at Al, col. 6;
Wilson & Hoffman, U.S. Warplanes Bomb Targets in Libya As 'Self-Defense' Against Ter-
rorism, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
186. Dewar & Walsh, War Powers Act Scrutinized, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1986, at A30,
col. 1.
187. See, e.g., Ottaway, Schultz Emphasizes Use of Covert Antiterrorism, Vows to
Consult Congress, Wash. Post, May 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
188. See, e.g., the examples cited infra at note 212.
189. Roberts, Congress and White House at Odds Over Growing Presence in Gulf, N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
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This also triggered debate on the applicability of the WPR. 190 One won-
ders whether it is unrealistic to require, as a matter of law, that the Presi-
dent consult the whole Congress 1 before American troops are engaged in
hostilities or areas of potential hostilities? A sound U.S. foreign policy
should not permit requiring the President to withdraw troops in 60 or 90
days because the Congress failed to take affirmative steps to approve the
action. Among other things, this is an encouragement to terrorists to hold
out until the War Powers Resolution requires the withdrawal of American
forces. Turner has analogized this to
the experience of French socialist Premier Mendes-France, who an-
nounced in June 1954 that he would resign if he did not succeed in
arranging a cease-fire in Indochina by July 20 of that year. The com-
munist delegations at the Geneva Conference realized that the longer
they stalled the more concessions he would be willing to make to pre-
serve his job. The serious negotiations took place during the final
hours of July 20, and shortly before midnight the wall clock was un-
plugged to permit the French delegation to make a few more conces-
sions within the artificial time deadline.1 9 2
At the very least, the WPR hands the terrorists yet another propaganda
victory by forcing a political debate over the use of force before the action
is concluded.
The natural and understandable response to this is that Congress
should have a voice in the use of American armed forces. However, this
cannot be effected by methods and processes which themselves under-
mine the Constitution. The proper Congressional role is three-part: legis-
lative, budgetary and oversight. The Congress should be an active partner
in Executive decisions relating to the use of U.S. armed forces. As a prac-
On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi warplane fired two missiles, apparently in error, at the U.S.S.
Stark, on patrol in the Persian Gulf. Thirty-seven American seamen were killed and the
Stark was heavily damaged. Wilson & Cannon, Iraqi Missile Sets U.S. Frigate Ablaze,
Causing Casualties, Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5. President Reagan felt com-
pelled, for political reasons, to publicly state that the U.S. actions would not lead to war.
Sciolino, Reagan Says U.S. Presence In Gulf Won't Lead to War, N.Y. Times, May 27,
1987, at A14, col. 5.
190. See, e.g., Guns in August, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at A22, col. 1 (editorial);
Adams, Invoke the War Powers Act, Wash. Post, June 29, 1987, at A13, col. 3; Cannon,
President Minimizes War Risk, But Senators Warn Of U.S. Involvement In Iran-Iraq Con-
flict, Wash. Post, May 28, 1987, at Al, col. 6. Compare 133 Cong. Rec. S7,262-63 (daily ed.
May 28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Helms)(arguing against applicability of WPR) with letter
from Sen. Claiborne Pell to Sec'y of State Shultz (May 21, 1987) (arguing in favor of appli-
cability of WPR).
191. If, as the war Powers Resolution claims, the Congress has the exclusive war power,
what is the constitutional validity of consulting with only a handful of Congressional lead-
ers? Is not the Congress, as an institution, to be consulted if there is a constitutional re-
quirement? On a practical level, the most that can and, perhaps, should be expected is that
Presidents will consult with Congressional leaders to obtain a sense of the Congress and to
make a symbolic attempt to work in tandem with the legislature prior to and during the use
of armed force abroad.
192. TURNER, supra note 34, at 687.
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tical matter, no use of armed force will succeed without at least some
support from Cognress.19s One must avoid overstating the virtues of the
Congress at the expense of the Executive by overlooking the effect of the
inevitable swings of public opinion on Congress' position on the use of
force. After the First World War, the isolationists in Congress effectively
eviscerated the Executive's foreign policy powers. It is generally agreed
that our international relations in the inter-war period were, perhaps, the
worst in our history. Partly as a consequence, the Presidency emerged as
not the preeminent, but the exclusive organ of foreign relations upon the
U.S.' entry into the Second World War. Indeed, the popular perception,
inside and outside of Congress at that time, was that the legislative
branch was not to be trusted with foreign policy. It was not until the twin
political crises of Vietnam and Watergate that the pendulum swang the
other way, leading to a resurgence of Congressional power - and the War
Powers Resolution. 194 In noting this phenomenon of American politics,
Walter Lippmann observed that
[t]he unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been de-
structively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a
veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They
have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would
have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too
late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and
too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too
intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this cen-
tury. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when
the stakes are life and death.19 5
In this, Lippmann echoed the astute observations of Alexis de Tocque-
ville, who noted "[t]he propensity which democracies have to obey the
impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence. . .."I" Refer-
ring to England's political leadership during the second half of the 1930s,
Winston Churchill summarized the prevailing credo: "I am their leader,
therefore I must follow them."
One must not generalize from this to say that Congress, because it is
most susceptible to the whims of public opinion, should hold or should
exercise all or none of the War Powers."9 7 In fact, American Presidents
193. Revely observed that "the constitution does impose an iron demand on the Presi-
dent and Congress: that they cooperate if any sustained venture for war or peace is to suc-
ceed." W. REVELY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROW
AND OLIVE BRANCH? 49 (1981).
194. Rostow, Once More Unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21
VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1986).
195. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHER 23 (1955).
196. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA Ch. 13, p. 273 (H. Reeve trans.
1974).
197. But see Talbot v. Seemans, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28, in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall said that "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States,
vested in congress .... At least one scholar has stated that Marshall had in mind a federal-
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should and frequently do consult with congressional leaders prior to en-
gaging American forces in hostilities. Often, however, secrecy and speed
are the essential ingredients to a successful foreign policy, including the
use of force. 198 Professor Aron observed that "[tihe weapons of mass de-
struction, the techniques of subversion, the ubiquity of military force be-
cause of aviation and electronics, introduce new human and material fac-
tors which render the lessons of the past equivocal at best."19 9 Consider,
for example, President Kennedy's employment of armed forces during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, President Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Re-
public, President Carter's ill-fated Iranian rescue mission and President
Reagan's actions in Grenada. Should the whole Congress have been con-
sulted? What of speed and secrecy?
To recognize contemporary political realities is not to deny that the
Congress possesses legitimate - and vital - powers. Presidents are polit-
ically dependent upon the Congress for continued support, 00 both for the
use of the troops as well as for the entire range of domestic and foreign
policies. A President can ill afford to alienate the Congress, especially on
an issue as sensitive as the use of American troops. In this sense, the War
Powers Resolution is superfluous.
Moreover, the War Powers Resolution is a disservice to the Congress
and the country. It forces the Congress to confront the use of force in an
artificially narrow period, depriving it of the time to gain a perspective on
the armed conflict, to weigh the effectiveness of the action in terms of
U.S. foreign policy objectives and to determine, as far as possible,
whether the use of force will achieve those objectives. In most cases, the
ism issue when he wrote this, i.e., that the federal government, and not the states, had the
"whole powers of war." B. ZIEGLER, supra note 73. This was the first case decided by the
Supreme Court after Marshall's appointment. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL
16 (1919).
198. Certainly this was recognized with respect to the negotiation of treaties. See The
Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay), supra note 42, at 327; The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton),
supra note 42, at 379.
199. R. ARON, supra note 155, at 2.
200. One respected scholar observed that there are constitutional limitations on Con-
gress' power to control executive conduct of armed conflict through the appropriations pro-
cess. See Wallace, supra note 85, at 748-52. This also seems to be the position taken by
Monroe Leigh when he was State Department Adviser, when he testified that:
I do believe personally that such matters [as the Cambodia and Vietnam evac-
uations] involve the inherent constitutional power of the President and I don't
think that every limitation that Congress might enact on an appropriation or
otherwise is necessarily a constitutional one. I think there are some that would
be plainly unconstitutional.
Hearings on Compliance with the War Powers Resolution Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (testimony of Monroe Leigh) (1975).
It has been stated, however, that the Supreme Court has never held unconstitutional
any use of the appropriations power as a counter-weight to Presidential action. See THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc.
No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1619 (1973).
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use of force is popular in at least the first two or three months; because of
this, Congress may give its blessing to an armed conflict by riding the
crest of nationalistic fervor. The strength of the Congress lies in its thor-
ough - and time-consuming - "step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process,"201 evaluating all the facts, discussing all the issues, before com-
mitting itself.
The War Powers Resolution was designed to deal with one President
and one armed conflict. 0" The Congressional override of the presidential
veto came less than three weeks after the "Saturday night massacre,"
when Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus resigned rather than dismiss Watergate special
prosecutor Archibald Cox. s0 3 But would the War Powers Resolution have
prevented the Vietnam episode? The answer is probably not.24 The Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution20 almost certainly gave the President the legal sup-
201. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. "What emerges from our analysis of the purpose of the
law making restrictions in Article I is that the Framers were determined that the legislative
power should be difficult to employ." Consumer Energy Council of America v. F.E.R.C., 673
F. 2d at 464. Cf. the statement by former Senator Javits that
[iun most situations, even when a clear consensus is presented, it takes a long
time for Congress to make its legislative will, owing, in large measure, to the
various forms a single, affirmative, legislative remedy may take. A simple and
unamenable resolution of approval or disapproval adopted pursuant to a legis-
lative veto provision incorporated into an earlier statute, however, avoids the
institutional delays and permits expedited postenactment review.
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455, 462 (1977).
202. Eugene Rostow observed just prior to the enactment of the War Powers Resolu-
tion that [w]e wisely refrained from curbing the powers of the Supreme Court even after the
catastrophic error of Dred Scott. The same calm prudence should guide our course now,
with respect to the Presidency. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act,
supra note 61, at 836.
203. It is at best problematic that the veto of the War Powers Resolution would have
been overridden absent the unique domestic political conditions in the country at the time,
and especially the "Saturday night massacre." See R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109 (1983); TURNER, supra note 34, at
685.
204. See supra the cases cited in note 120.
205. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 441-42. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
provides that
The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President,
as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggresssion.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of
the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as
the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
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port required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution to bypass the
entire issue of the 60 or 90 day deadlines.2 0 6 In fact, as previously noted,
the Congress enabled the President to continue American involvement in
Vietnam through the draft and massive appropriations. 0 7
The War Powers Resolution would have had a devastating impact,
however, on the United States' entry into the Second World War. The
American Congress was unalterably opposed to entering the war against
Germany between 1939 and 1941, even as Hitler tightened his grip on
Europe and the Battle of Britain raged. 0 8 It is often overlooked that in
August 1941, the House of Representatives renewed mandatory conscrip-
tion by a single vote.209 This led President Franklin Roosevelt, who fa-
vored an early U.S. entry into the war, to confide at the close of the
Argentia summit conference that he intended to wage war, not to declare
it.110 The same can be said of the United States' entry into the First
World War and repelling the invasion of South Korea. Would Presidents
Wilson or Truman have risked precipitating a constitutional crisis by
challenging the War Powers Resolution? 21 1 Perhaps they would have felt
compelled to do so; but would a constitutional crisis have been in the
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international
conditions created by the actions of the United Nations or otherwise, except
that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
On the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, see generally J. GALLOWAY, THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLU-
TION (1970). See also The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incident: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution
was repealed in January 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672; 84 Stat. 2053, 2055, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971).
206. Compare, for example, the remarks of Sen. Fubright, 110 CONG. REc. 18,409
(1964), with Sen. Morse, 110 CONG. REC. 18,430 (1964).
207. See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriation, Pub. L. No. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109; Defense
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-171 § 638, 83 Stat. 469, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 507.
208. When President Roosevelt warned the Congress in 1939 that the world was teeter-
ing on the brink of war, Senator William E. Borah stated that there would be no war with
Germany. "I have my own sources of information," he said, insisting on continuing the pol-
icy of isolationism. W. LANGER & S. GLEASON, THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940 144
(1952).
209. G. PRANGE, supra note 132, at 178. "No wonder that Nomura [Japan's Ambassador
to the United States] could never quite convince the Foreign Ministry that the Americans
'meant business'; talk and bluster were cheap, but when it came to a hard vote to lay before
their constituents, Congress felt safe in nearly scuttling the draft." Id.
210. See, e.g., J. COLVILLE, THE FRINGES OF POWER: 10 DOWNING STREET DIARIES 1939-
1955 428 (1985); P. ABBAZIA, MR. ROOSEVELT'S NAVY: THE PRIVATE WAR OF THE U.S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET, 1939-1942 220 (1975); 6 M. GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR, 1939-
1941 1168 (1983). In fact, this is precisely what Roosevelt did prior to formal hostilities,
with the Destroyers for Bases deal, see supra note 67, and with the so-called War in the
Atlantic, in which Roosevelt declared that any German or Italian warship in the western
half of the Atlantic would be attacked by the U.S. Navy. See, e.g., note 139.
211. Senator Robert C. Byrd stated that "the Chadha decision has driven us to attempt
to correct what would probably be a constitutional crisis at exactly a time the Nation could
not afford it." 129 CONG. REC. S14,164 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983).
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country's best interest at so delicate a period? President Nixon argued
that the War Powers Resolution "would have vastly complicated or even
made impossible" the U.S. actions in the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Congo rescue operation in 1964 and the 1970 Jordanian
Crisis." 2 He went on to observe that the War Powers Resolution would
undercut the ability of the United States to act as an effective influ-
ence for peace. For example, the provisions automatically cutting off
certain authorities after 60 days unless they are extended by the Con-
gress could work to prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress
suspended the deadline, there would be at least a chance of United
States withdrawal and an adversary would be tempted therefore to
postpone serious negotiations until the 60 days were up. Only after
the Congress acted would there be a strong incentive for an adversary
to negotiate. In addition, the very existence of a deadline could lead to
an escalation of hostilities in order to achieve certain objectives before
the 60 days expire.2 51
As tragic as the American experience was in Vietnam, this cannot
erase the lessons learned throughout our history, that the President is far
better equipped than the Congress to determine when armed force should
be used. The effect of the War Powers Resolution is to undermine the
ability of the President to project military power. This is especially im-
portant when the United States is confronted with acts of international
terrorism, where speedy and decisive action may be required.
V. CONCLUSION
Sections 5(b) and (c) of the War Powers Resolution are unconstitu-
tional because they act as a legislative veto, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Chadha, and because they impinge upon the Execu-
tive's war and foreign affairs powers. Section 5(c) is unconstitutional be-
cause it purports to grant to Congress the power to require the President
to withdraw U.S. armed forces pursuant to a concurrent resolution. Thus,
an action undertaken by the President can be vetoed by a simple majority
congressional vote. Section 5(b) is unconstitutional on two grounds; first,
it seeks to limit Presidential authority to use armed forces to a 60 or 90
day time period, unless specifically extended by the Congress, giving rise
to a legislative veto of Executive action. Moreover, Section 5(b) impinges
upon the President's constitutional authority to use armed force pursuant
to his Executive and foreign policy powers, violating the doctrine of the
212. "Veto of the War Powers Resolution," supra note 2. Professor Rostow found that
the War Powers Resolution would have made "illegal": "the expedition of Commodore
Perry to Japan"; "mobilization of troops to the Mexican border after the Civil War to per-
suade France to abandon support of Maximillian"; "President Nixon's policies towards
China... because the heart of those policies is a diplomatic warning to the Soviet Union
not to make war on China"; and, U.S. actions in the 1973 Middle East war. Rostow, Com-
ment, 61 VA. L. REV. 797, 803-04 (1975).
213. "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
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separation of powers and institutions.
As a matter of policy, the War Powers Resolution has undermined
the United States' ability to project military power as a means of con-
ducting foreign policy by creating uncertainty as to the U.S. commitment
and by ensuring an untimely insertion of Congress in the decision-making
process. The Congress has a major and ultimately decisive role to play
with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces. However, congressional pow-
ers are limited by the Constitution. The use of the armed forces is an
Executive function; providing for their support is a Legislative function.
The President should, and often does, consult with congressional leaders
prior to sending U.S. armed forces into combat. This is a matter of com-
ity and politics but not a constitutional requirement.
Finally, the War Powers Resolution is ineffective. It would not have
prevented the Vietnam war. However, it may hamper the effective use of
force against international terrorism by creating an artificial controversy
and by precipitating a constitutional crisis at a time when a united politi-
cal front is needed.
Political Violence and International Law:
The Case of Northern Ireland
ALPHA M. CONNELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the best tradition of British understatement, the violence of the
last twenty years in Northern Ireland is referred to locally as "the Trou-
bles". Sparked off by civil rights grievances, the Troubles are but the lat-
est chapter in a long-running saga of armed resistance to a British pres-
ence in Ireland. The forefront of the resistance in this century has been
the Irish Republican Army. Today armed resistance is concentrated in
Northern Ireland, which is constitutionally part of the United Kingdom.
Here the I.R.A. claims to be waging a war of national liberation on behalf
of the Irish people against alien, i.e. British rule. In this scenario, the
British troops in Northern Ireland are seen not as knights in shining ar-
mor upholding law and order and protecting the ordinary citizen, but as
forces of occupation, oppressors who would deny to the Irish people the
realization of their right to self-determination. This paper will examine
the claim of the I.R.A. at the present day to be an army of national liber-
ation.1 The legitimacy of the claim will be assessed against the norms and
principles of public international law. The I.R.A. itself asserts not only a
moral right to use violence but also a legal right, expressly invoking recog-
* Faculty of Law, University College, Dublin, Ireland. This is a revised version of a
paper delivered to the conference International Terrorism: Challenge and Response at the
University of Denver College of Law, 4 April 1987.
1. In this paper the term I.R.A. is used to signify the Provisional Irish Republican
Army. The Provisional I.R.A. is not the only body using armed force in Northern Ireland
apart from the British army and the police. There are other groups both on the loyalist/
unionist side and on the nationalist side which use force either, as in the case of the loyal-
ists, to maintain the link with Britain, or, as in the case of the nationalists, to sever the link.
The Provisional I.R.A. is the largest organized grouping of a military character to promote
the nationalist cause. There is some uncertainty over whether the Official I.R.A., from which
the Provisionals split in 1969/70, has in fact disbanded, but whether or not it has done so, it
is clear that the Officials have not engaged in any significant military action in recent years
and that, as they moved to the left politically, the voices advocating the use of the estab-
lished political process rather than violence in pursuit of national unity prevailed. The other
main nationalist grouping, the Irish National Liberation Army, which was established in
1975, has itself recently split over the question of its continued existence, and has been
subject to a bitter internal feud, with members of rival factions killing one another. The
examination in this paper of the claim of the Provisional I.R.A. applies mutatis mutandis to
these other militant nationalist groups. The claimed justification for resort to force by loyal-
ist paramilitary organizations, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom
Fighters, is of course somewhat different to that of the I.R.A., and any examination of their
claims is outside the scope of this paper.
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nized principles of international law to validate its actions.2
International law has traditionally applied, and still applies, two gen-
eral tests in relation to armed conflicts to determine the legality of the
use of violence, and each test is based on a different body of rules. The
first is a threshold test with respect to the legality of the initial resort to
violence. In its application to inter-state conflict, this test is often de-
scribed by the Latin tag, jus in bellum, the right to go to war or to engage
in armed conflict. It is, for example, universally recognized that one state
is entitled to use armed force against another in self-defense, and interna-
tional law defines the circumstances in which resort to armed force by
way of self-defense is justified. In the post-1945 era, the concept of inter-
national armed conflict has been extended to cover situations other than
the classic inter-state combat, and a threshold test also applies to these
other situations. Of particular relevance to this paper is the fact that, in
recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the legitimacy of
resort to force by an entity other than the state. This entity is a people,
and the circumstances in which a people (or their representatives) are
justified in resorting to force is when the people are subject to colonial
domination or alien occupation, resort to force being justified against the
colonizer or occupying power. The people often perceive of themselves
(and are perceived) as a nation, and hence when force is used to reject
alien rule, the struggle is described as a war of national liberation. The
I.R.A. claim relates to this threshold test. It is a claim that the I.R.A. is
waging in Northern Ireland a war of national liberation on behalf of the
Irish people against a colonial power.3
The threshold test is a group test. It applies to a state, a people, or
some other collectivity, and is used to assess the legality of resort to force
by the collectivity. It does not apply to specific incidents of violence en-
gaged in by the group or by members of the group. These incidents are
judged by other rules.
When armed conflict erupts, there is an extensive body of rules and
principles of international law, jus in bello, which seeks to regulate the
conflict. There are rules regulating both international armed conflicts (the
type of armed conflict in which the I.R.A. claims to be engaged) and non-
international armed conflicts.4 These rules, known collectively as interna-
tional humanitarian law, have been supplemented over the last forty
years or so by international human rights norms and an evolving interna-
tional criminal law which penalizes certain activities (e.g. genocide and
2. SINN FEIN, A SCENARIO FOR PEACE: A DiscussION PAPER 3-4 (1987).
3. Although the I.R.A. regard the Southern Irish authorities as illegitimate, and indeed
as having aligned themselves politically and economically with Britain, it is I.R.A. policy not
to use violence against these authorities. See, e.g., G. ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREE-
DOM 39f (1986), and T.P. COOGAN, THE I.R.A. 327-8, 681 (3d ed. 1987).
4. See, e.g., the two Geneva Protocols of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949. Protocol I relates to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts; Protocol II to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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hijacking) both in time of peace and of armed conflict. Even if the use of
violence does not meet the minimum level required to constitute an
armed conflict and hence be governed by the rules of international hu-
manitarian law, international criminal law will apply to the activities of
all those engaged in violent conduct, and the state authorities will addi-
tionally be bound by the norms of international human rights law.
The term international armed conflict now includes wars of national
liberation,5 and if, as the I.R.A. claims, the present violence in Northern
Ireland is occurring in the context of such a war, then the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law relating to international armed conflicts apply.
If it is not, then other rules apply. The important point is that irrespec-
tive of the precise categorization of the violence under international law,
and irrespective of the legitimacy of the I.R.A. claim, some rules apply,
and members of the I.R.A. as well as of the state authorities may be held
accountable under international law for their conduct. Even a legitimate
cause does not of itself legitimate every use of violence by those fighting
for the cause. Even a war of national liberation does not necessarily vali-
date every act of violence by the liberation army and its individual
members.
This paper is concerned with the threshold test of the legality under
international law of the I.R.A.'s resort to violence. It is not concerned
with the legality of specific incidents or tactics. Nor is it concerned with
the ethics or politics of the I.R.A. claim. It does not deal with whether the
I.R.A. should be regarded as a national liberation movement, but with
whether it is so recognized under international law at the present time
and with whether its claim to be exercising the right of self-determination
of the Irish people is well-founded in law or not. The self-perception of a
group is not sufficient in law to confer on it the status claimed. The group
must fulfil the requirements posited by law for the enjoyment of that
status.
II. THE I.R.A. CLAIM
The beacon of militant Irish nationalism in this century is the Proc-
lamation of the Irish Republic on Easter Monday, 1916, by a motley col-
lection of insurrectionaries outside the main post office in the center of
Dublin. The Proclamation, "the Magna Carta of all Irish Republicans",'
was signed by seven men claiming to speak on behalf of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Ireland, and was addressed by that Gov-
ernment to the people of Ireland:
"Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead gen-
erations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ire-
land, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her
freedom ....
5. Geneva Protocol I, Art.1(4).
6. CooGAN, supra note 3, at 38.
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We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of
Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign
and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people
and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be ex-
tinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every gen-
eration the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom
and sovereignty.. . Standing on that fundamental right and again as-
serting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the
Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our
lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its free-
dom, of its welfare and of its exaltation among the nations ...
Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the es-
tablishing of a permanent National Government, representative of the
whole people of Ireland, and elected by the suffrages of all her men
and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will ad-
minister the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the
people. . ."(extracts from the Proclamation).
Neither the Sovereign Independent State nor the permanent Na-
tional Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland, envis-
aged by the Proclamation, have ever come into existence. The insurrec-
tion, or the Rising as it is popularly known, was a failure. However, in the
history of Irish nationalism, nothing succeeds like failure, especially a
bloody failure. The execution by the British of many of the leaders of the
Rising elicited revulsion among the Irish people and ensured that the
high-sounding phrases of the Proclamation would echo down the century,
assuring and inspiring those who see in Northern Ireland the continued
denial by an alien government of the right of the Irish people to control
its own destiny.
Irish nationalism was of course not born in 1916. It has its roots deep
in the past in wars of conquest, resistance, reconquest and renewed resis-
tance. Despite centuries of rule by England, the Irish were never assimi-
lated. They retained a sense of separate identity, an identity which ac-
commodated without yielding to colonial influences. The English common
law may have replaced the Irish Brehon law, but the Irish maintained
different traditions and culture to the conqueror. The use of the Irish
language may have diminished in favor of English, but as Engels re-
marked, "The more the Irish accepted the English language and forgot
their own, the more Irish they became". 7 And religion had a part to play
in this maintenance of a separate identity. The colonizer was Protestant,
the indigenous people Catholic.
The association of religion with domination and exploitation is today
nowhere more evident than in Northern Ireland where sectarianism
presents a direct challenge to the noble Republican aspiration of substi-
tuting "the common name of Irishmen in place of the denomination of
7. The Prepatory Material for the History of Ireland, quoted in S. CRONIN, IRISH NA-
TIONALIsM: A HISTORY OF ITS ROOTS AND IDEOLOGY 11 (1980).
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Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter" (Wolfe Tone). The seeds of this con-
flict were sown in the Ulster plantation of the early seventeenth century
when the British confiscated vast tracts of land in the northeast of the
country and handed them over to English and Scottish settlers. The En-
glish settlers were Anglican by religion, the Scots Presbyterian. The set-
tlers prospered, and to be Protestant was to be part of the ascendancy, to
be Catholic was to be disadvantaged and, for the most part, poor. The
deprivation and discrimination suffered over the years by Catholics in the
north of the island fuelled a resentment which later found expression in
the civil rights movement of the 1960s and a more militant voice in the
long tradition of armed resistance by the I.R.A. to British oppression.
Were it not for the partition of Ireland, the I.R.A. would not exist
today, but rather would enjoy pride of place in Irish history books as na-
tional heroes who contributed to the creation of the Republic proclaimed
in 1916. But Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, and
the I.R.A., weathering internal splits and repression by both the British
and Irish authorities, has survived. Seventy years on from the Rising, the
I.R.A. still claims to be an army of national liberation, fighting to remove
the last vestiges of colonial occupation by the British from the northeast-
ern part of Ireland.
The last all-Ireland Parliamentary elections were held in December
1918, when Sinn Fein, the political associates of the I.R.A., won 73 of the
105 Irish seats in the British Parliament. Instead of taking up these seats,
those of the 73 who were not in jail or elsewhere on Republican business
met in Dublin, in January 1919, and held their own parliament, the first
Irish Dail.8 The Dail described itself as the parliament of the Irish Re-
public 'proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday, 1916, by the Irish Re-
publican Army acting on behalf of the Irish people', and inter alia
adopted a Programme of Social and Democratic Rights based on the 1916
Proclamation. The Dail was of course not recognized by Britain, and it
met clandestinely while hostilities with Britain continued. In 1920, the
British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act which effec-
tively partitioned Ireland. Under this Act, there were to be two parlia-
ments in Ireland, both bicameral, one in the North in the six counties,
and one in the South. The first Dail refused to recognize these new insti-
tutions, and when, in 1921, elections were held to the lower house of the
Southern parliament, it regarded the elections as being held for a second
Dail. In the election, 124 Sinn Fein candidates were returned unopposed.
Later in 1921 an Anglo-Irish Treaty was agreed by British and Irish rep-
resentatives, and was approved by the Dail in January 1922, by 64 votes
to 57.
Under the Treaty, a degree of independence was conferred on the 26
8. On the first and second Dails, and the repudiation by the I.R.A. of the 1921 Treaty,
see COOGA, supra note 3, at 40-51; CRONIN, supra note 7, at 123-4, 131f; and J. BOWYER
BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: THE I.R.A. 1916-1979 18-21, 25-26, 30-31 (rev. ed. 1979).
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
counties which were henceforth to be known as the Irish Free State. The
new State fell far short of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916. For one
thing, it did not encompass the whole island, but only 26 of its 32 coun-
ties. The six counties in the North were allowed to opt out of the Free
State and to retain their own parliament and government and status as
part of the United Kingdom. For another, the 26 counties became a self-
governing dominion of the British Empire, on a par with Australia, Ca-
nada, New Zealand and South Africa, and its status within an empire was
marked by the presence of a British Governor-General in Dublin. Mem-
bers of the new southern Parliament also had to swear an oath of alle-
giance to the British Crown, and the British retained control of a number
of Irish ports. Those Dail deputies who opposed the Treaty walked out of
the southern Parliament, and an I.R.A. convention in Dublin rejected the
Treaty and affirmed its allegiance to an all-Ireland Republic. In the I.R.A.
interpretation of Irish history, it is its army council which is today the
provisional government of the Irish people and 'the direct lineal successor
of the Provisional Government of 1916, the first Dail of 1919 and the sec-
ond Dail of 1921'.'
In the I.R.A. view, neither the Free State Parliament and Govern-
ment, nor their successors under the 1937 Constitution of Ireland, re-
present the Irish people. Indeed, they are usurpers who have betrayed the
Republic proclaimed in 1916. Over time the imperial ties of the Free
State with Britain were severed. An Irish Government under De Valera
subsequently abolished the oath of allegiance, persuaded the British to
relinquish control of the ports, and eventually secured the adoption of a
new Irish Constitution. Under this Constitution, the Governor-General
was replaced by a President, and in 1948 the Irish Parliament passed leg-
islation declaring the State to be a Republic. Yet, according to the I.R.A.
view, while six counties in the North remain under British rule, Ireland,
is not, and cannot be, truly independent. The maintenance of the link
between Northern Ireland and Britain is a colonial remnant, left over
from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921; and it is the I.R.A. and its political
wing, Sinn Fein, 10 which have remained faithful to the Irish Republic of
1916 and who are the true representatives of the Irish people. Neither the
'21 Treaty nor events subsequent thereto have brought about the com-
plete decolonization of Ireland. British troops in Northern Ireland are an
army of occupation, and the I.R.A. is engaged in a war of national libera-
tion on behalf of the Irish people against an alien, occupying power.
Such is the claim. Let us examine it against the rules and principles
of international law.
9. I.R.A., Green Book, quoted in CooGAN, supra note 3, at 685.
10. When on 2 November 1986, at its annual meeting in Dublin, Sinn Fein dropped its
abstentionist policy with respect to participation in the Irish Parliament and decided to
contest the next general elections in the South, a splinter group which favored continued
abstention formed, calling itself Republican Sinn Fein.
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III. ASSESSMENT
A. The Right of Self-Determination
The word "self-determination" appears to have entered the language
of politics in the mid nineteenth century in connection with the European
nationalism of that day. 1 It does not feature in the Covenant of the
League of Nations, but when the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945, it
was included, in tandem with equal rights, as a principle of international
law.12 Post 1945, this principle has been developed and fleshed out in the
practice of the United Nations, mainly in the context of that organiza-
tion's decolonization program, but now also extending to situations of
alien domination and occupation as well as racist regimes. Important doc-
uments include the 1960 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 1966
International Human Rights Covenants, the 1970 U.N. General Assembly
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States, 3 and the 1974 Assembly Resolu-
tion on the Definition of Aggression. In these documents, self-determina-
tion is no longer referred to simply as a principle of international law, but
as a right enjoyed by peoples. It has been lifted out of the exclusively
colonial context and brought within the international movement for the
promotion and protection of human rights. In fact, on one widely-held
view of the right of self-determination, it is a prerequisite for the enjoy-
ment of all individual human rights.1" The evolution of the principle post
1945 outside the U.N. has entailed a similar broadening of its application
to situations of alien domination and exploitation. Recent landmarks in-
clude the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, and the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peo-
ples' Rights.
As evidenced by such texts as the International Human Rights Cove-
nants and the African Charter, the right of self-determination is now
widely recognized as a matter of treaty law. Indeed, these treaties, to-
gether with other evidence of state practice such as that mentioned
above, suggest that self-determination is now a universally recognized
right pertaining to peoples under customary international law.
11. See, e.g., U.O. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (1972).
12. Arts.1(2) and 55.
13. These international texts are specifically cited by Sinn Fein in support of the right
of the Irish People to sovereignty, independence and unity: see Fein, supra note 2, at 3-4.
14. See, e.g., H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of
United Nations Resolutions, Report presented to the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities para.78, E/CN./sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980); and
A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the
Basis of United Nations Instruments, Report presented to the Sub-Commission para.228, E/
CN./sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981).
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The I.R.A. claim to be exercising the right of self-determination of
the Irish people therefore has a basis in international law in that the exis-
tence of such a right is generally accepted by the international commu-
nity of states at the present time. In its political dimension," self-deter-
mination signifies the right of a people to reject colonial rule or other
forms of alien domination and the freedom to choose both their own ex-
ternal political status and their own form of government. With respect to
choice of political status, the international texts mention a range of op-
tions from emergence as a sovereign independent state to integration with
an existing independent state. With respect to choice of government, ra-
cist regimes are precluded by many of the international texts, and such
regimes are in fact viewed as a legacy of colonial oppression and alien
domination. Otherwise the choice would appear to be an open one.
The I.R.A. claim cites two principal justifications for regarding
Northern Ireland as a self-determination issue: firstly, that Northern Ire-
land is a colony of Britain; and secondly, that it is subject to alien
occupation."6
While there is an obvious overlap between the two justifications in
that when a people is subject to colonial rule, it is also ipso facto subject
to alien domination, the latter may take forms other than colonial rule.
The argument that Northern Ireland is under foreign occupation of a va-
riety other than the colonial cannot be seriously entertained. Indeed, be-
tween 1922 and 1972, until the introduction of direct rule from London,
Northern Ireland had its own regional legislative assembly and govern-
ment, flawed though these institutions may have been in terms of repre-
senting the interests of all sections of the population of Northern Ireland.
Attempts to revive and to remodel such institutions since 1972 have
failed, and direct rule by Britain continues to be the order of the day.
The argument that this constitutes alien rule, and that the British forces
in Northern Ireland are an army of occupation, does not afford a distinct
legal basis for the I.R.A. claim, but is rather a variant of the contention
that Northern Ireland is a British colony.
As we have seen, the Irish people never entirely accepted being ruled
by Britain or forming part of a larger political unit comprising both Ire-
land and Great Britain. They retained a sense of distinct identity and
resented being governed by what they regarded as an alien administra-
tion. This resentment surfaced periodically in violent resistance and Irish
15. For the economic, social and cultural dimensions see, e.g., Espiell, supra note 14,
paras.135-165, and Cristescu, supra note 14, chs.V-VII.
16. The I.R.A. sometimes analogize between the administration of Northern Ireland
and racist regimes. It is alleged that the administration discriminates against a nationalist,
predominantly Catholic minority, and that this is analogous to racism, e.g. in South Africa.
The international texts on self-determination mention only racist regimes and contain no
reference to other forms of oppressive government unless they be "alien" or "colonial". The
allegation is more suited to the non-discrimination norms of international human rights law,
and does not specifically fall within the law relating to self-determination.
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history records a panoply of national heroes and heroines, some operating
within the established political structures of the day to advance Irish in-
dependence, others without. The problem for Irish unity is that, for the
last three to four hundred years, a significant number of the inhabitants
of Ireland, concentrated in the northeastern part of the island, do not
share this sense of Irishness, but see themselves either as British or as a
different variety of Irish to the rest of the inhabitants. The I.R.A. claim
sees the Irish people as comprising the whole population of the island,
including the loyalist concentration in the northeastern corner. The loyal-
ists may be reluctant Irishmen and women but, in that they inhabit an
island which was colonized by Britain and the majority of the inhabitants
of that island wish it to have an existence separate from Britain as a sov-
ereign, independent state, the veto which the loyalists have been allowed
to exercise over the unity of the country for the last 65 years is, in the
I.R.A. view, invalid and contrary to the right of self-determination of the
whole people.
There is some strength in this argument in that most colonial territo-
ries have been treated as a unit for the purpose of decolonization. Colo-
nies with many disparate ethnic groups within their borders have become
independent without reference to the wishes of each of the component
parts, and any tension between groups has been treated as a problem to
be resolved post-decolonization by the new state. However, although this
has been the predominant pattern of decolonization, it has not been a
uniform pattern. There have been instances of a colonial territory being
divided, and of the wishes of the inhabitants of one part of the territory
being respected when they did not accord with those of the inhabitants of
another part or parts. Thus, the Belgian colony of Ruanda-Urundi was
granted independence as two separate states, Rwanda and Burundi; and
the northern region of the British Cameroons joined with Nigeria, the
southern with the state of Cameroun.1 7
The argument is therefore not watertight. The counter-argument,
that decolonization was effected under the Government of Ireland Act
1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921, also has merit. But even if it is
accepted that the decolonization of Ireland in 1920/1921 was only partial,
that Northern Ireland is a colonial remnant, and that full decolonization
in line with the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the island has
yet to occur, there remains one important question with respect to the
I.R.A. claim - the entitlement of the I.R.A. to speak and act on behalf of
the Irish people, and this involves consideration of the status of national
liberation movements under international law and of the credentials of
any group claiming to be such a movement.
17. See, e.g., M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 19-20 (1982)
for these and other examples.
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B. National Liberation Movements
National liberation movements clearly enjoy a degree of legal person-
ality under international law. Organizations such as the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization and the South-West Africa People's Organization have
been afforded observer status in a number of intergovernmental bodies
including the U.N. The League of Arab States has repeatedly endorsed
the right of the P.L.O. to act on behalf of the Palestinians and expressed
support for national liberation movements in South Africa. Polisario rep-
resents the Sahrawi Democratic Republic in the Organization of African
Unity. Of particular significance with respect to the law relating to armed
conflict is the fact that, in 1974, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflicts adopted, by consensus, a resolution inviting na-
tional liberation movements recognized by regional intergovernmental
organizations to participate without voting rights in the Conference. Ten
delegations participated in the Conference as representatives of national
liberation movements: the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO),
the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Angola
National Liberation Front (FNLA), the African National Congress
(ANC), the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANCZ), the Pan Afri-
can Congress (PAC), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),
SWAPO, the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), and the PLO.
Over 100 states were represented at the Conference, and provision was
made in the Final Act of 1977 for ANC, PLO, PAC and SWAPO to sign
it."8 Moreover, as we have seen, one of the treaties negotiated at the Con-
ference, Geneva Protocol I, has extended the concept of an international
armed conflict to include wars of national liberation. 9 International law
therefore addresses itself to liberation movements, and in accepting the
credentials of particular movements confers on the armed struggles in
which they are engaged a status under the law which is denied to other
situations of violent conflict.
The I.R.A. claims to be a national liberation movement. It is anxious
to distinguish itself from the violent anti-capitalist exploits of groupings
such as the Red Army Faction, Action Directe and the Red Brigades in
Europe. Whatever the merits or demerits of the violent activities of these
groups, they are seen as belonging to a different category to the violent
activities of national liberation movements. Rather the I.R.A. analogizes
between its struggle in Northern Ireland and the Algerian war of indepen-
dence and refers, as a present day parallel, to the oppression of the
colored inhabitants of South Africa by a racist regime.20 The parallels are
at best partial, but they do clearly tie the I.R.A. claim to legitimacy to a
18. See, e.g., Espiell, supra note 14, para.233. See also id. paras.104-5 and 191-233 on
the legal personality and recognition of national liberation movements generally.
19. Art.1(4). See also 96(3).
20. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 3, at 5, 28; and CRONIN, supra note 7, at 185, 208.
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recognized institution of international law, the national liberation move-
ment. But is the I.R.A. in fact such a movement? Has it been recognized
as a national liberation movement for the purpose of exercising the right
of self-determination of the Irish people?
Despite the many changes in the nature and structure of interna-
tional law in this century, international law is still essentially a state-
based system of law, and the self-perception of a particular group as a
national liberation movement is not of itself sufficient to confer that sta-
tus on it as a matter of international law. Such status can only be con-
ferred by states, acting either individually or collectively. Have either of
the two internationally-recognized states most directly concerned, the
United Kingdom and Ireland, or any other state or grouping of states
accepted the claim of the I.R.A. to be an army of national liberation?
1. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom does not accept the I.R.A. as the legitimate
representative of the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, still less of
the whole people of Ireland. Rather the attitude of the British authorities
in recent years has been one of straightforward criminalization. The
I.R.A. is proscribed by law, and persons convicted of offenses relating to
its activities are treated as common criminals.
Government policy towards the I.R.A. had earlier been somewhat less
harsh. In the early '70s, those detained for I.R.A.-related activities were
given special category status while in detention. Special category prison-
ers were housed in special compounds, were allowed to wear their own
clothes, were not required to work, and were afforded additional privi-
leges, such as extra visits and food parcels. In November 1975, however,
this changed. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the
Government's intention to phase out special category status, and this pro-
cess began on March 1, 1976. No prisoner convicted on or after that date
has been accorded special category treatment.2 ' Neither 'dirty protests',
nor hunger strikes, nor resort to the human rights institutions in Stras-
bourg, have succeeded in securing the reintroduction of such status.
Even when granted, the status, although signifying an acceptance by
the authorities that the I.R.A. prisoners were of a somewhat different spe-
cies to 'ordinary' criminals, cannot be regarded as tantamount to confer-
ral of prisoner-of-war status or to recognition by the United Kingdom of
the I.R.A. as a national liberation movement. As we have seen, Geneva
Protocol I brings within the scope of international armed conflicts and
therefore of the substantial body of international humanitarian law relat-
ing thereto "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exer-
21. See McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 20 DECISIONS AND REPORTS OF THE EUR. COMM'N
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 44, 48 (1980) (decision of the Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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cise of their right of self-determination."22 At the time of signing this
Protocol in 1977, the British Government entered several reservations in-
cluding one requiring a certain level of intensity of military operations
before a situation could be regarded as an armed conflict, and another
that an authority which claims to represent a people "be recognized as
such by the appropriate intergovernmental organization." No such recog-
nition has been afforded the I.R.A., and the British authorities would
deny that the level of intensity of military operations in Northern Ireland
is sufficient to constitute a non-international armed conflict (governed by
Protocol II), let alone an international armed conflict (governed by Proto-
col I).23
Another indicator of possible recognition by the United Kingdom of
a conflict situation in Northern Ireland is the fact that for years the Brit-
ish Government took advantage of Article 15 of the European Convention
on Human Rights to derogate from its human rights obligations under
that Convention. Article 15 allows derogation in "time of war or other
emergency threatening the life of the nation." But while the British au-
thorities would concede that there was an emergency situation in North-
ern Ireland, they would not concede that there was a war or international
armed conflict. Moreover, on August 22, 1984, the United Kingdom with-
drew its notice of derogation under the Convention.
2. Ireland
Articles 1-3 of the Irish Constitution assert the right of self-determi-
nation of the Irish nation and give expression to the nationalist aspiration
to a united Ireland. Article 1 affirms, inter alia, the right of the nation to
choose its own form of government. Article 2 states that the national ter-
ritory comprises the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial
seas. Article 3 provides that, although the Parliament and Government
established by the Constitution have the right to exercise jurisdiction
over the whole of the national territory, the laws enacted by that Parlia-
ment shall, pending the re-integration of the national territory, apply
22. Art.1(4).
23. The U.K. has not yet ratified Protocol I. Under it, even a member of a national
liberation movement will forfeit the right to be regarded as a prisoner-of-war when captured
if she/he fails to carry arms openly during each military engagement and during such time
as that member is visible to the adversary while engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack: see Art.44(3). The U.K. has also signed (but not yet ratified)
Protocol II which applies to non-international armed conflicts between the armed forces of a
Contracting Party and "dissident armed forces or other organized groups which, under re-
sponsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [the] Protocol",
Art.1(1). It does not apply to situations of "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts", Art.1(2). Although the I.R.A. is an organized armed group with a command struc-
ture, it is debatable whether, by the level and nature of its military operations, it would
attract the application of this Protocol.
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only to the 26 counties. No Irish Government post 1922 has accepted that
the I.R.A. is entitled to act on behalf of the Irish people. The present
Constitution was adopted by referendum in the 26 counties in 1937 in the
name of the people of Ireland,2' and according to Article 3 it is the Parlia-
ment and Government established by the Constitution which have the
right to exercise jurisdiction over the entire national territory, not any
other institution or group.
There is widespread sympathy among the population of the South
for the nationalist aim of the I.R.A., but less sympathy for the means it
uses to realize this goal. It has often been noted that the Irish are ambiva-
lent in their attitude to violence, but this ambivalence has been less
marked in recent years with increasing condemnation not only of indis-
criminate bombings in the North but also of targeted attacks on state
personnel such as members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and of the
judiciary.2" After a slight upsurge in popular support following the death
of ten hunger strikers in the North in 1981,26 concern has switched to
more mundane matters such as the high level of taxation, the ever in-
creasing rate of unemployment and the continuing drain of emigration.
The unity of Ireland by any means, whether violent or non-violent, is no
longer high on the list of political priorities in the South.
This hardening of popular opinion in the 1980s towards the use of
violence has been mirrored in the courts. Where less than ten years ago a
person wanted for I.R.A.-related activities in the North would have suc-
cessfully resisted extradition on the basis of the political offence excep-
tion, the plea is now much more readily rejected by the courts. Instead of
being categorized as political, the offence for which the person is wanted
is more likely to be described as "revolting and cowardly" and as
'dishonoring the cause espoused by its perpetrator',2 7 and the fugitive ac-
cordingly extradited to the North. Moreover, the courts now cite the Irish
Constitution to condemn organizations such as the I.R.A. as treasonable
and hence deny then any recognition under the political offence
exception."8
In like vein, Irish Governments have taken a succession of measures
to suppress and marginalize the I.R.A. In February 1986, the then Gov-
ernment signed the European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism, and in December of that year introduced legislation into Parliament
24. 65% of the electorate voted and 57% of those who voted approved the
Constitution.
25. There has been particular revulsion at attacks on economic targets, such as building
contractors who repair British army barracks.
26. See ADAMS, supra note 3, at 80-85. Sinn Fein polled a low vote in the February 1987
general election in the Republic and failed to gain a seat.
27. McGlinchey v. Wren [19821 I.R. 154 at 159. See also Shannon v. Fanning [1984]
I.R. 569, and Quinn v. Wren [1985] I.R. 322.
28. Arts. 15.6 and 39: see Quinn [19851 I.R. 322. This case concerned the I.N.L.A., not
the I.R.A.
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to give effect in Irish law to the Convention. The main targets of this
legislation are of course groups such as the I.R.A. and the I.N.L.A. A
year earlier, in November 1985, the Government concluded the Anglo-
Irish Agreement. 9 This agreement tackles head on, in its very first Arti-
cle, the question of the status of Northern Ireland. Under it, the British
and Irish Governments 'affirm that any change in the status of Northern
Ireland will only come about with the consent of a majority of the people
of Northern Ireland', "recognize that the present wish of a majority of the
people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern
Ireland", and "declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establish-
ment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respec-
tive Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish."
In concluding this Agreement, the two Governments recognize and
attempt to reconcile the two traditions in Northern Ireland, the loyalist
and the nationalist, and assert that any change in the status of that terri-
tory may only come about by constitutional means, and moreover by
means which respect the wishes of the majority of the population of
Northern Ireland. This sounds very like a classic implementation of self-
determination, except that the people exercising the right are no longer
the people of the whole island, still less those of the United Kingdom as a
unit, but the people of Northern Ireland. On the one side, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom has formally accepted that a majority of the
inhabitants of Northern Ireland may one day wish to be united with the
Irish Republic rather than to continue as part of the United Kingdom,
and has undertaken to give effect to that wish should it arise. On the
other side, the Irish Government has conceded that the nationalist claim
to Northern Ireland should not take priority over the wishes of a majority
of its inhabitants, and that, although the Irish Government has been
given a consultative role under the Agreement with respect to certain
matters in Northern Ireland, it is ultimately the people of Northern Ire-
land who will themselves decide their own future.
3. Other States
It would appear that the only state which today unequivocally recog-
nizes the I.R.A. as waging a war of national liberation in Northern Ireland
against an occupying colonial power is Libya. W'ile statesmen of other
countries have from time to time expressed support for the nationalist
cause, there has been no endorsement of violence in pursuit of this cause,
much less acceptance that the I.R.A. is the legitimate representative of
the Irish people for the purpose of securing Irish unity.
The situation in Northern Ireland has over the years come before
29. The present Prime Minister of Ireland, after initially rejecting the Agreement while
in opposition, has indicated that his Government will in fact honor it: see The Irish Times,
March 17 and 18, 1987.
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many international fora including the U.N. Human Rights Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights, but concern about human
rights violations is one thing, categorization of the situation in which they
occur as an international armed conflict is another, and it has never been
accepted by any intergovernmental organization that there is currently
being waged in Northern Ireland a war of national liberation. In 1969,
when violence escalated in Northern Ireland, the Irish Government at-
tempted to bring the situation before the U.N. and to persuade the Brit-
ish Government to allow a U.N. peacekeeping force into Northern Ire-
land. The U.K. rejected this suggestion, and when it also managed to
persuade the U.S.A. that the situation was an internal civil rights matter,
the prospect of U.N. action evaporated.80 Furthermore, as we have seen,
one of the fora in which the question of the status of specific organiza-
tions as national liberation movements was addressed was the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the
I.R.A. was not among the movements invited to participate in the
Conference.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the argument that Northern Ireland is a British colony ap-
pears at first sight plausible given the history of Ireland, on closer exami-
nation, it becomes clear that it does not mesh entirely with reality. As far
as the vast majority of states in the world today are concerned, Ireland
was decolonized in 1922 with the establishment of the Irish Free State, or
at some time in the following decades when the new state began to assert
its independence of Britain. Northern Ireland is today legally part of the
United Kingdom, a status most recently confirmed in the Anglo-Irish
Agreement by the government with the greatest interest in the territory
and its inhabitants apart from Britain, that is, the Irish Government.
But even if it be accepted that Northern Ireland is a lingering out-
post of a once great empire and represents "unfinished business", 3' the
claim of the I.R.A. to be exercising the right of self-determination of the
Irish people is weak and has not been generally endorsed by the interna-
tional community of states. Nor can it claim to represent the people of
Northern Ireland, the majority of whom have for the last 65 years made it
clear that they want no part of Irish unity. That leaves the nationalist
minority in Northern Ireland, but international law has not yet accepted
that a minority may constitute a people for the purpose of exercising the
right of self-determination.
To reject as not well-founded in international law the claim of the
I.R.A. to be a national liberation movement is not to denigrate the cour-
age of many of its members or to question the sincerity with which they
30. See COOGAN, supra note 3, at 426; and BOWYER BiL, supra note 8, at 364.
31. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 38.
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hold this view. The fact is that they are not 'ordinary' criminals, and no
amount of terrorist labelling can make them so. Both the British and the
Irish Governments should recognize this. Some recognition may be af-
forded the ideological motivation of members of the I.R.A. and some dis-
tinction drawn between them and 'ordinary' criminals, without conceding
that they are waging a war of national liberation and without conferring
on them the status of combatants or prisoners-of-war when detained.
Thus, the authorities in Northern Ireland could allow them certain privi-
leges denied to other prisoners, and the Irish authorities could retain the
political offence exception to extradition for acts which, if they had oc-
curred in a situation of recognized armed conflict, would be regarded as
legitimate. In this latter connection, it is my view that the European Con-
vention on the Suppression of Terrorism is too crude an instrument in
that it provides for extradition for certain offenses irrespective of motiva-
tion and of the context and circumstances in which the offence occurs. To
kill an 'enemy' soldier in an imagined war of national liberation is not the
same thing as to plant a bomb on a crowded bus. In an actual war or
armed conflict, the former killing may be legitimate, the latter is
prohibited.
The I.R.A. of 1987 is not the same organization as the I.R.A. (Irish
Volunteers) of 1916. It is a time-warp to view the I.R.A. today as an army
of national liberation. Much water has passed under the bridge since
1916. A new state with democratic institutions has come into existence in
the greater part of the island, and even in the North some democratic
institutions survive, however inadequate they may be.
The way forward in Northern Ireland with its horrendous social
problems and imbedded religious bigotry is not through the gun. Signifi-
cant social reform is needed not only to end discrimination in such mat-
ters as jobs and housing, but to secure to each member of the community
irrespective of religious affiliation, political beliefs or social class, a life of
dignity. The greatest problem of all is clearly sectarianism, and one of the
greatest perpetrators of sectarianism is the system of segregated educa-
tion at primary and secondary levels- segregation not on the basis of
color or sex, but of religion. Integrated schooling must be seen as a prior-
ity. Such radical change would be resisted by powerful vested interests,
but where there's a will, there's a way. Ironically, the introduction of such
reform would in all probability be fundamentally undemocratic in that it
would have to be introduced against the wishes of the majority of the
population on both sides of the sectarian divide. Without such reform,
however, little will change. Bigotry will continue to stalk the land claim-
ing victims and, as in the past, the seething cauldron will periodically
bubble over in violent fashion. There must be a better way.
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Management Agreements in Dutch
Agricultural Law: The Contractual
Integration of Agriculture and
Conservation
MARGARET Rosso GROSSMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing vulnerability of the world's finite land resources, and
especially of the world's agricultural land, has led to implementation of a
number of programs designed to prevent conversion of land from agricul-
tural to nonagricultural uses, to protect especially fragile land from grad-
ual loss of productivity through erosion and other causes, and to retain
the irreplaceable nature and landscape values that inhere in some land
used for farming. These programs vary from nation to nation (and even
between states or other governmental subdivisions within a nation), de-
pending on the amount of productive agricultural land and the severity of
threats to its retention, attitudes of citizens and governmental officials
about the land, and the mechanisms offered by the legal system to pro-
tect and regulate use of that land.
A. Agricultural Land in The Netherlands
One nation that has adapted comprehensive legal methods to protect
its land resources is The Netherlands. Agricultural land is crucial for The
Netherlands, which has an intensive agricultural industry that produces
high-quality products for consumption at home and abroad. A small na-
tion, with a total area of 4.15 million hectares," The Netherlands has 2.02
million hectares of cultivated land, used for arable farming, grassland,
horticulture, and other agricultural purposes.2 Although farmers make up
* Associate Professor, Agricultural Law, Department of Agricultural Economics, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. B. Mus., University of Illinois, 1969; A.M., Stan-
ford University, 1970; Ph.D. 1977, J.D. 1979, University of Illinois. C 1988 Margaret Rosso
Grossman.
Research for this article was supported by a Fulbright research grant under the West-
ern European Regional Research Project and thereafter by a Senior Research Fellowship
from Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands. The author expresses apprecia-
tion to the Agrarian Law Department of Wageningen Agricultural University, and especially
to Professor mr. Wim Brussaard.
1. The Netherlands is about the size of the combined states of Massachusets and Con-
necticut. Its area includes about 34,000 square kilometers of land and 7000 square kilome-
ters of water areas (lakes and inland sea branches). Each square kilometer is equal to 100
hectares. van Lier, Rural Land Uses in the Netherlands, 51 EKisTics 4, 4 (1984).
2. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES, DUTCH AGRICULTURE in FACTS AND FIGURES
3 (1986) (1985 -statistics)[hereinafter FACTS AND FIGURES].
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only a small proportion of the inhabitants of Holland,' agriculture con-
tributes significantly to the economy, and agricultural products make up
a relatively large percentage of annual exports.4
Yet, at the same time, Holland's extreme population density has led
to increased pressure on the agricultural land. Interests other than agri-
culture have demanded a share of rural areas. Urbanization, industrializa-
tion, and infrastructural developments have intruded on the countryside.
Conversion of agricultural land to other purposes, in The Netherlands as
in the United States, 5 has meant that the amount of land under cultiva-
tion has dwindled.6 In addition, in recent years special values inherent in
the countryside have become important to particular sectors of the Dutch
population. For example, increased demands for outdoor recreation have
required dedication of rural land to satisfy the recreational needs of those
living in cities and towns. Also, and most important in the context of this
article, an enhanced realization of the importance of protecting valuable
natural resources and landscape characteristics has made new demands
on agricultural land, particularly on the management of that land.
In many instances, optimal use of land requires that it satisfy several
interests of society simultaneously, when the land-use functions de-
manded to fulfill those interests are compatible. Multiple uses of land are
particularly appropriate in rural areas, and because the majority of rural
land in Holland is in agricultural use, this possibility affects agricultural
land in particular. In The Netherlands, a distinction is often made be-
tween situations involving integration and separation of land uses.7 Law
and policy concerning land use recognize this distinction. Following the
motto "integration where possible, separation where necessary", physical
planning policy strives to maintain a diversity of land uses, along with
3. Agriculture, involving 270,000 workers, makes up about 6 percent of the active work
force. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 4, 14, 19.
5. Much has been written concerning the loss of agricultural land in the United States.
See, e.g., GAO, PRESERVING AMERICA'S FARMLAND-A GOAL THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SHOULD SUPPORT, Rep. No. B-114833 (1979); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, THE
PROTECTION OF FARMLAND: A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(1981).
6. Presently about 5,000 hectares per year are lost, a sign'!icant amount in light of Hol-
land's small size. A. CRiNs, THE REGULATIVE PHASE OF LAND DEVELOPMENT, at I
(Landinrichtingsdienst Information Paper 7 (1986)). At the end of the 1960s and during the
early 1970s, the annual loss was about 10,000 hectares.
7. A distinction is sometimes made between functional and spatial integration (verwev-
ing). Functional integration involves a situation in which the manager of an area focuses
management on two or more different societal goals for example, a meadow with
meadowbirds. This normally occurs within a relatively small scale-an area managed as a
unit. Spatial integration is relevant when an area fulfills different functions; management of
the area may be in one hand or several (for example, specially managed banks of trees
(houtwallen) in an agrarian region). See Dauvellier, Achtergronden en perspectieven van
het beleid voor de landelijke gebieden, in VERWEVING IN HET LANDELIJK GEBIED 5-6,
Rijksplanologische Dienst, publicatie 85-4 (1985).
VOL. 16:1
DUTCH AGRICULTURAL REFORM
coherence of spatial use in the rural areas.8
The issue of integration or separation of land uses has particular rel-
evance for agricultural land with special landscape or natural values. In-
deed, in The Netherlands there are 500,000 to 700,000 hectares of agricul-
tural land where natural-scientific or landscape values exist and where
integration is desirable. 9 In these areas, a direct connection often exists
between valuable natural conditions and relatively poor farming situa-
tions. Such natural conditions as high water levels, for example, interfere
with efficient farming, but provide the kind of environment in which val-
uable birds breed and rare flora thrives.
Dutch law offers several instruments that can help to preserve natu-
ral values on agricultural land. In the context of rather complicated and
stringent physical planning that strictly regulates development, the mu-
nicipal land-use plan offers the opportunity to preserve some natural ele-
ments by requiring permits before certain damaging activities can be car-
ried out in agricultural or natural areas. ° It can require a type of passive
management, but generally is not effective in limiting the intensity of the
land use that can threaten natural elements. 1 Another legal instrument,
land development-consolidation or reallocation of ownership-also has
the potential to contribute to the preservation of natural values, as it
restructures entire areas of the countryside to provide the most effective
interrelationship of agricultural, natural, and other land uses."
A third instrument is the program of specialized agricultural land
management often referred to as Relatienota policy, which is the subject
of this article. Although the Relatienota operates on a relatively small
scale, it has demonstrated its potential to integrate agricultural land use
with the important and vulnerable nature and landscape values that exist
in some areas of The Netherlands. By compensating farmers for activities
that maintain existing natural conditions and for the adaptations in their
farm businesses that those activities require, this instrument provides the
incentive needed for extraordinary efforts to protect environments for
valuable plant and animal species. Indeed, it offers some of the Dutch
farmers, whose land is characterized by inefficient production circum-
8. RIJKSPLANOLOGISCHE DIENST, MINISTERIE VAN VOLKSHUISVESTING, RuiarrmTELw
ORDENING EN MILIEUBEHEER, RuIMTELIJKE PERSPECTIEVEN, OP WEG NAAR DE 4E NOTA OVER DE
RUIMTELIKJE ORDENING 116 (1986).
9. Dauvellier, supra note 7, at 14; Brussaard & van Wijmen, Natuur en landbouw. En-
kele juridisch-bestuurlijke beschouwingen over scheiding en verweving, 46 AGRARISCH
RECHT 157, 162 (1986).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 232-251 for a discussion of physical planning.
11. This lack of effectiveness is due in part to practical considerations. In rural areas
the elected municipal councils charged with enacting land-use plans include farmers, who
are reluctant to restrict the use of agricultural land. Even when the provincial deputed
states desire restrictions, the councils often do not implement the restrictions fully.
12. See generally Grossman & Brussaard, The Land Shuffle: Reallocation of Agricul-
tural Land Under the Land Development Law in the Netherlands 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
209 (1988).
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stances, the opportunity to make nature conservation one of the products
of their farms. At the same time, it recognizes that integration of agricul-
tural and natural functions does not always serve the best interests of
either function. Thus, the policy also provides for establishment of some
areas in which farming is terminated in favor of active nature preserva-
tion efforts.
Relatienota policy involves the use of private law contracts with indi-
vidual farmers, as well as government purchase and management of vul-
nerable land. The policy has used these contracts, referred to as manage-
ment agreements (beheersovereenkomsten) effectively to achieve goals
important to Dutch society. This article explores the background and de-
velopment of this important policy in adapting agricultural and nature
conservation practices, and analyzes the process of implementation of the
policy in vulnerable regions of The Netherlands. In addition, it considers
the contracts entered between farmers and the government, and focuses
on difficulties in implementation of Relatienota goals. In so doing, the
article sheds light on a fascinating aspect of Dutch agrarian law, which
has demonstrated potential in accommodating the often-conflicting inter-
ests of agriculture and nature.
B. Management Agreements in Perspective
A consideration of the structure and efficacy of Dutch Relatienota
policy and the management agreements used to implement that policy
has potential significance beyond the borders of The Netherlands. Hol-
land is only one of several nations with some type of legally authorized
program designed to accommodate agricultural practices to the require-
ments of nature and landscape. Management agreements are available,
for example, in several European Community member states: France, the
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark." Al-
though the goals of the programs in these states are generally similar,
variations in implementation exist; these variations can be explained in
part by differences in the legal and administrative frameworks that sup-
port the programs."
The programs share some general characteristics. They usually are of
relatively recent origin and are significant because they provide a neces-
sary supplement to other agricultural and environmental policy instru-
ments. Management agreements can offer flexi'le protection in areas
where stringent land-use regulation or government acquisition and man-
agement is impossible. Typically, these agreements operate only in specif-
13. COMMISSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT:
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FOUR COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, at vii (EUR
10783 (1986)) [hereinafter COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES].
14. For information on the legal bases of management agreements in France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, see id. at 16-18. Concerning the United
Kingdom, see also Leonard, Management Agreements: A Tool for Conservation, 33 J.
AGRIC. ECON. 351 (1982).
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ically designated land areas; the kind of site actually eligible for protec-
tion varies from state to state.' 5 For comparable types of sites, however,
the practical management requirements of the various schemes are some-
what similar. 6 Dutch management agreements share these characteristics
with programs in other EC states; the Dutch program is unique and per-
haps more efficient, because a national agency is the sole authority with
power to enter agreements with landowners.1" In other nations, several
different agencies-often at national, regional, or local levels-have the
authority to negotiate and enter agreements.'"
As this discussion has indicated, European Community member
states have experienced a rapid growth in opportunities to use manage-
ment agreements to adapt farming practices to wildlife and landscape
conservation goals. Interest exists in the possibility of implementing a
system of management agreements within the EC. Such a scheme, involv-
ing EC financial contributions for qualifying, but optional, national pro-
grams, could promote environmentally sensitive agricultural management
practices, and thereby conserve vulnerable rural resources. Moreover,
with careful design it could help to provide a framework to unify the
management agreement schemes now being developed in EC member
states.' 9 A workable program would require participating farmers to obli-
gate themselves to fulfill active management practices in exchange for re-
alistically high payments made on a flat-rate basis, and reflecting both
the income potential of farmers in the sensitive area and the obligations
imposed by the agreement.2 0 The differences in conditions in the member
states will require a flexible system, with room for local variation.2 '
An EC management agreement program is not without problems.
Cash payments per hectare are convenient, but may not be accepted uni-
formly by farmers or by member states fearing either the financial com-
mitment or the precedent of payment for environmental conservation.
Another difficulty concerns identification of the areas that would qualify
for participation. Logically, the scheme should apply to environmentally
sensitive areas that are farmed; budgetary realities would require a limit
within each state of a percentage of the agricultural land base.22
Despite the complications inherent in designing and implementing a
management agreement scheme adaptable to the different EC member
states, the prospect of protection of vulnerable agricultural landscapes
15. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 18-19.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 18-19. Presently, the Netherlands is the only nation in which management
agreements are connected with the implementation of the European Community Less Fa-
vored Areas Directive. See infra text accompanying notes 194-202.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 38-39.
20. Id. at 40-41.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 39-40.
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and habitats makes such a program desirable. The Netherlands' manage-
ment agreement program, thoughtfully designed and carefully imple-
mented, offers an optimistic preview of the viability of an EC scheme.
Moreover, its design may well serve as a starting point for consideration
of an EC-wide system of management agreements.
II. RELATIENOTA POLICY
During the 1970s, the attention of many in The Netherlands turned
increasingly to the care of valuable cultural landscapes and the position
of agriculture in those areas. Nature and landscape values in vulnerable
areas were diminishing rapidly, and agriculture threatened to deteriorate.
The importance of intensive attention to these areas was articulated in a
physical planning document, the Ori~nteringsnota, which first appeared
in 1973.2 This document acknowledged the vulnerability of the existing
nature areas and cultural landscapes, and articulated a number of mea-
sures appropriate for protecting these valuable landscapes. The measures
taken included creation of a program directed at landscape management
performed by agricultural land users, and establishment of reserves in sit-
uations where continued agricultural production was inconsistent with a
management directed toward nature and landscape. "
The rather broadly-sketched policy of the Orignteringsnota began to
take shape in another policy document, the so-called Relatienota or Rela-
tionship Report, which appeared in 1975.15 This report, focusing on the
relationship of agriculture to nature and landscape conservation," re-
viewed recent developments in agricultural land use from the points of
view of both agriculture and conservation, and established a policy frame-
work for coordination of conflicting interests in particularly vulnerable
areas. It presented a number of policy resolutions and measures intended
to protect the most valuable and sensitive parts of the cultural landscape
from further damage and to enable the farmer to carry out responsible
nature protection in the framework of farm management.2 "
23. The final version appeared in 1979. Derde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening in Ne-
derland-Deel le: Ori6nteringsnota ruimtelijke ordening (Tekst van de na parlementaire
behandeling vastgestelde nota) (1979) [hereinafter Ori~nteringsnota].
24. Id. at 63. Other measures suggested were the provision of protection through the
land use planning system and the development of forms of land development and agricul-
tural management especially appropriate for areas requiring landscape protection. See Nota
betreffende de relatie tussen landbouw en natuur- en landschapsbehoud, at 29. Tweede
Kamer der Staten Generaal, zitting 1974-1975, 13 285, Nos. 1-2 (1975) [hereinafter Relatie-
note]. See also Wind, Beheersregeling in de praktijk, 42 AGRARISCH RECHT 105, 105 (1982).
25. Relatienota, supra note 24. For some general information about the Relationship
Report in English, see Fornier, Managing the Natural Environment in Agricultural Areas,
11 PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS 161 (1979).
26. Its subtitle is "Common starting points for the policy concerning agrarian cultural
landscapes valuable from the viewpoint of nature and landscape conservation" (Gemeen-
schappelijke uitgangspunten voor bet beleid inzake de uit een oogpunt van natuur- en land-
schapsbehoud waardevolle agrarische cultuurlandschappen).
27. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 2.
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A. Agricultural Land Use and Nature Protection: Emerging Conflicts
1. Developments in Agriculture
General prosperity in Holland, leading to an increase in real wages,
helped to stimulate the development of labor-saving methods for agricul-
ture. The economic situation required use of those methods to increase
production and to keep up with higher incomes in other sectors of soci-
ety.2 8 Cultural-technical improvements and intensification of land use,
among other factors, made possible a significant increase in worker pro-
ductivity. But, at the same time, slow growth of markets for agricultural
products and a diminished availability of agricultural ground led to de-
creasing work opportunities in agriculture. Developments in agriculture in
the decades before publication of the Relatienota were characterized by a
noticeable decrease in the number of workers, a resulting decline in the
number of farms, an enlargement in scale of surviving farms and tillage
units, and increasing specialization. 9
The Relatienota recognized that significant improvements in produc-
tivity can occur from a number of directions: replacement of labor with
capital (mechanization); increasing use of "nonfactor inputs" such as arti-
ficial fertilizers and feed concentrates; increased animal and crop produc-
tivity; improvement of production mechanisms (better machines) and
farm organization; or improvement in external production circumstances
such as water management, parcel size and shape.30 Each of these pos-
sibilities, however, has the potential to influence the natural environment
and landscape.
Particular aspects of agricultural development are especially threat-
ening to nature and landscape values. For example, redevelopment in ag-
ricultural regions for improvement in access to fields of more workable
size and shape (landinrichting) usually interferes with natural conditions.
Water management directed toward agricultural productivity also threat-
ens some natural environments, as do intensive fertilization and use of
concentrates. 1
At the same time, however, protection of nature can threaten the via-
bility of agriculture. Within certain limits, care of nature and develop-
ment of agriculture can operate compatibly, allowing the farmer to link
his economic function with protection of the environment in which he
works. Some nature protection requirements, however, cannot be met
without economic disadvantage to farm businesses. The farmer who is re-
quired to refrain from making infrastructural improvements or to use less
fertilizer and pesticides, for example, will enjoy a less profitable business.
28. The Relatienota suggested, however, that maintenance of income in agriculture can
also take place by transition to a different type of business through expanding the produc-
tion tasks not connected to the ground. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 3, 6.
31. Id. at 5.
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That farmer will be unable to improve production. He will face higher (or
at least not lower) costs for field work and transport, as well as increased
expenses for care of animals. "'
Such decreases in farm income are significant even beyond their ef-
fect on the individual farmer. The farmer's income is important both for
providing the family's livelihood and for financing continued investment
in the farm business. When requirements of nature conservation, or other
factors often beyond the individual farmer's control, force a decline in
income so that investment is impossible, farms eventually decline. Be-
cause agriculture is important to the national economy, both for produc-
tion of food and raw materials and as a source of work opportunities,
other sectors dependent on farming also suffer from farm deterioration.
Moreover, the socio-economic and social structure of entire agrarian re-
gions can be affected by incursions in agricultural production."3
2. Developments in Conservation
Society in The Netherlands has assigned an increasing value to types
of human needs that cannot be expressed in terms of money and prop-
erty. This trend is reflected, in part, in the more concentrated attention
paid to nature and landscape and to its preservation in light of threats
from agriculture and other sources, and also in criticism of activities that
endanger the natural environment. Rapid changes in the countryside
have made such activities pervasive. Natural areas have faced increasing
pressure from developments accompanying the prosperity, increased pop-
ulation density, and greater mobility of recent decades. Road building,
industrialization, expansion of living areas, and recreational provisions
have affected the character and atmosphere of the countryside, both re-
ducing the size of natural areas and threatening the quality of nature and
landscape.34
Changes in traditional uses of agricultural land also threaten the en-
vironment. Historically-evolved farming practices have helped to shape
the Dutch landscape in rural areas. Different rural ecosystems developed
in part through application of stable and permanent farming practices,
which varied from area to area. The ecosystems thus were dependent on
historical types of agricultural land use, which resulted in landscapes
characterized by diversity and variety. Changes and intensification of
land use threaten these valuable landscapes. 5
32. This loss in income can be quantified accurately only in specific cases, but the Rela-
tienota makes some general observations on the subject. Id. at 6-10.
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. Id. at 13-14.
35. Id. at 14. Of course, these changes are not unique to Holland. See, e.g., COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 15.
The enormous changes which have taken place in European agriculture
over the last three to four decades have had a profound effect on the rural
environment. Many valued landscapes and wildlife habitats depend on a par-
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Agriculture, now focused on enlargement of scale, mechanization, in-
tensification, and specialization, is directed toward increased productivity
per worker and per surface unit. In its modernized form, agriculture now
often threatens, rather than creates and maintains, valuable cultural
landscapes. Species of plants and animals, especially those that require
traditional agricultural practices to provide suitable habitats, are disap-
pearing, and small-scale landscapes are threatened.
According to the Relatienota, the landscape must be viewed as a
source of cultural-historical and natural-historical information. Both
types of information are vulnerable to loss through developments in land
use. Individual and collective activities play a role in the process of loss.3 6
Natural elements in the landscape are threatened, for example, by activi-
ties like water management, land reclamation, use of chemical pesticides
or herbicides, and development to improve access to the countryside. In-
terference with the natural terrain, through change in parcel size and
shape, often displaces elements that have existed for centuries. Other ac-
tivities, such as changes in the water level or the use of chemicals, lead to
a decline in species of plants and animals."'
But developments that modernize agriculture also threaten valuable
cultural-historical elements, like traditional structure of farm parcels,
with their ancient earth walls and planted hedges, and traditional road
and watercourse patterns. Historically valuable farm buildings are lost
through modernization or conversion to nonagricultural use, and new
buildings often destroy the cultural-historical unity of landscape and
character of agricultural construction in the region.38
B. Response: Relatienota Policy
In light of these developments, policy directions espoused in the Re-
latienota take their shape from the articulation of the problem:
The problematic nature of these landscapes is that on the one side as
a consequence of the developments of agriculture in its economic
function (production of food and raw materials) a process of harmful
effects on nature and landscape takes place, while on the other side it
is important that agriculture continues to fulfill a management func-
tion in such areas.3-
ticular form of farm management and therefore are vulnerable to change. One
form of change is the abandonment of traditional techniques, or even abandon-
ment of farming altogether, another is the removal of existing features, such as
hedges, another is the adoption of new techniques which are incompatible with
the conservation interest of a site, such as the use of certain herbicides.
See also id. at 5.
36. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 14.
37. Id. at 15-18.
38. Id. at 18-20.
39. Id. Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk,
at 1.
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As the Relatienota made clear, existing legislative schemes offered only
partial solutions to the conflicts between agriculture and nature conserva-
tion.4 A number of reconsiderations and possible legislative amendments
appeared desirable.41
1. Financial Compensation
The Relatienota policy, which led to establishment of the instrument
called the beheersovereenkomst (management agreement), recognized
that for generations the farmer has functioned as a protector of nature
and landscape. Though modern agricultural practices often threaten,
rather than protect, natural values, continued agricultural use remains an
essential characteristic of important cultural landscapes. These vulnera-
ble areas require an agricultural management directed towards goals of
nature protection. Because such management is not always consistent
with the production goals of agriculture, the nature protection function of
the farmer must receive financial recognition.2 In recommending an ad-
ministrative system for such recognition, the Relatienota recognized two
important considerations: that continuation of agricultural activity as
such forms an essential part of valuable agrarian cultural landscapes, and
that the producing and management functions of farmers are mutually
dependent-strengthening of the management function results in declin-
ing production, and vice versa.' s Moreover, the level of compensation to
the farmer must be related clearly to the required management. At the
same time, however, the payment plus production income must offer the
farmer an adequate income."
The Relatienota suggested three possible types of compensation for
the farmer: payment for performance of clearly described maintenance
and management activities; payment in connection with permanent natu-
ral handicaps, on the basis of the less-favored areas directive (the so-
called mountain-farmer rules) of the European Economic Community; 5
and compensation for adaptations in the farm business, such as underuse
of facilities, made necessary by management tailored to nature and land-
scape interests.' More detailed application of these general suggestions
40. Id. at 20-28. The Relatienota considered the potential of physical planning law, as
well as other legislation. No law could provide the desired imposition of land-use conditions
directed to nature conservation along with the necessary financial incentive to farmers.
41. Id. at 33-35, 39-40.
42. Id. at 30.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 31.
45. This program is regulated by Directive 75/268/EEC, and implemented in The
Netherlands by the Beschikking bijdragen probleemgebieden, Nr. J. 7398 (Stcrt. 251)(De-
cember 22, 1982). For further information about the operation of this program in connection
with Relatienota policy, see infra text accompanying notes 194-202.
46. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 31. In practice, this third element is not paid sepa-
rately. Instead, it is part of the total management compensation and can only be awarded in
connection with management activities.
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was the task of the government. 7 The possibility of compensation should
be available to all farms that demonstrate need for management directed
to interests of nature protection."
When a farmer works in a vulnerable natural area and receives com-
pensation for management of nature and landscape, his enterprise ideally
should have the same income possibilities as farms with similar external
production circumstances,' 9 but without restrictions on management.
Thus, the farmer's compensation must ensure maintenance of an ade-
quate income. Nonetheless, the compensation offered to the farmer and
necessary for continuation of the business must also bear reasonable rela-
tion to the economic importance of the continuation of the agricultural
use of the protected area. Payments to the farmer cannot be more than
the value that his management activities contribute to society. Otherwise,
as the Relatienota makes clear, it may be more appropriate to set the
area aside as a reserve, rather than to keep it in active, though extensive,
agricultural use.50
2. Special Protection: Management Areas and Reserves
Maintenance of nature and landscape values as envisioned by the Re-
latienota, can be achieved in part through specialized management tasks
undertaken by farmers. This can occur in several types of situations. In
some areas, the values to be protected are geographically localized; ele-
ments like hedges, trees or groups of trees, ditches or pools are prevalent.
Depending on their location and their density, these can interfere with
development of the farm. To protect such natural elements, the Relatie-
nota suggests the use of private contracts called onderhoudsovereenkom-
sten (maintenance agreements), under which the landowner would agree
to preserve the natural amenity in exchange for payment for the neces-
sary work and a subsidy for the burden created by the protected
element."1
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 31.
49. External production circumstances are water management, accessibility, allotment,
and parceling or arrangement of farmland parcels.
50. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 32.
51. Id. at 36. The maintenance agreement (onderhoudsovereenkomst) is not the major
focus of this article. Maintenance agreements are carried out under authorization of the
Natuurbeschermingswet, 1967 Stb. 572, Ned. Staats. 165 (1981). The program is governed
currently by the Beschikking onderhoudsovereenkomsten landschapselementen, 1977 Stcrt.
182, as amended, reprinted in Ned. Staats. 165, at 65-71, and the Beschikking aanwijzing
landschapselementen, 1981 Stcrt. 20, as amended, Ned. Staats. 165, at 71-73. The former
beschikking regulates the formation of contracts and the latter, the areas and landscape
elements that can be protected under the contracts. Although these vary from region to
region, they include various types of hedges and earthen walls, small natural areas, and
woods. Both of the regulatory documents may be amended in the future.
A landowner or user who agrees to preserve an important landscape element signs a
formal maintenance agreement contract with a representative of the government. In that
contract the landowner or user promises, for a renewable period of six years, to maintain a
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In other areas, vulnerable natural values are not separately identifi-
able elements, but are instead environments that were formed through
agricultural exploitation of the area; these include meadow-bird areas or
botanically significant grasslands. Agriculturally used buffer zones around
nature areas are sometimes also vulnerable. For these areas, in which ag-
riculturally exploited ground itself is the object of protection, the Relatie-
nota envisions beheersovereenkomsten (management agreements). Under
these ordinary private law contracts, the agriculturalist owner or user of
the ground would obligate himself to tailor agricultural management to
perform certain actions under circumstances, in a form and on a schedule
determined to be optimal from the viewpoint of nature and landscape
management.
Several distinct types of duties would form part of these contracts.
The farmer would obligate himself to perform the needed maintenance of
valuable natural amenities. He would also promise to direct his farm
management to realize the goals of nature and landscape. Protection of
nature values might include refraining from making improvements in ex-
ternal production circumstances (changes in the natural environment)
that might otherwise be desirable for optimum agricultural efficiency. In
exchange for performing these obligations, financial compensation (the
management income) would be available."3
Private contracts to ensure management of sensitive areas pose dis-
advantages. Such contracts are normally of limited duration, and they are
often difficult to enforce. Moreover, as private contracts, they have lim-
ited effect against those not party to the agreements. Nonetheless, such
contracts are one of the few existing means that can both counteract the
degradation of the natural landscape and compensate land users for their
involvement in landscape management.5 3
For some extremely vulnerable areas, however, the actions necessary
to meet the goals of nature protection place such intrusive demands on
farm management that a profitable farm business is no longer possible. In
these instances, often situations involving natural values of particularly
high quality and special vulnerability, management agreements cannot ul-
timately succeed. While private contracts may be desirable on a tempo-
rary basis, the necessary management can be achieved only by purchase
of these lands and conveyance to a nature protection agency." Manage-
ment can then be directed toward maintenance and restoration of the na-
specific landscape element or elements and to avoid activities that will damage or destroy
those elements. As compensation, the contracting individual will receive an annual payment
from the government. The payment is calculated on the basis of the length or surface area
of the landscape element and reflects the cost, in labor and materials, of maintenance. Suc-
cessors to the land in title or use have the right to continue the agreement, if they wish.
52. Relatienota, supra note 24, at 36.
53. Id. at 26. The document recognizes that, psychologically and economically, private
contracts offer a limited contribution; instead public law rules may be more desirable.
54. Id. at 37-38.
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ture values, as well as increase in quality of the natural environment.
Although the creation of reserves should assume high priority, it
raises difficult issues of selection, acquisition, and management. Land can
only be identified as a reserve after careful consideration of the nature
and landscape values, as well as the planning structure of the region and
the agrarian situation. Significantly, the success of even carefully chosen
reserves depends in large part on the possibilities available for purchasing
these valuable areas from their owners. When purchase on the open land
market is required, reserves may not always be successful. Limited mobil-
ity of agricultural land in a large number of regions, and the often frag-
mented ownership situations in vulnerable areas may pose difficulties for
purchase on the open market.5 5
3. Implementation of Policy
A society that attaches high values to nature and landscape must ex-
pect to bear some financial cost in protecting those values. With natural
landscapes in which agriculture forms an important part of the social and
geographical structure, protection of nature values often requires an agri-
cultural management that, from an economic point of view, is far from
optimal. Thus, payment is necessary both to maintain the living stan-
dards of the agrarian population and to ensure the continued existence of
agriculture in the area." Design of a program to accommodate the inter-
ests of both agriculture and nature and landscape protection must, ac-
cording to the Relatienota, involve cooperation with the agricultural pop-
ulation. Management functions can be designed only in consultation with
the farmers who, in principle, are willing to fulfill the desired manage-
ment conditions.5 7
The policy direction established in the 1975 Relatienota has been de-
veloped in the ensuing years. In the Rural Areas Report (Nota landelijke
gebieden), a planning document that first appeared in 1977,51 the govern-
ment specified that a maximum of 200,000 hectares (approximately one-
tenth of the agricultural land in The Netherlands) should be protected
through application of the Relatienota policy. This maximum would in-
clude both reserves and management areas, and would be implemented
gradually, depending on the urgency of the need for conservation and the
availability of financial means. The first stage would involve approxi-
mately 100,000 hectares. 9
55. Id. at 26-27. The Relatienota suggests that, while voluntary sale is one method, it is
more desirable to have a mechanism for compulsory purchase of such lands. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Derda nota over de ruimtelijke ordening. Nota landelijke gebieden. Deel 3E: text
van de naar aanleiding van de parlementaire behandeling vastgestelde planologische
kernbeslissing. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Zitting 1983-1984, 14 392, nr. 46 (1983).
59. Id. at 23. This recommendation is included in the Structuurschets voor de lande-
lijke gebieden 1983, which forms part of the Nota landelijke gebieden.
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Further documents have implemented this policy. Most important
among these is the Beschikking beheersovereenkomsten (decree on man-
agement agreements)," which will be considered below."'
C. Relatienota Infrastructure
Implementation of the Relatienota policy involves close cooperation
between governmental entities, nature protection organizations, and pri-
vate landowners. Several governmental entities established by law have
been, and continue to be, involved most closely in the process. An under-
standing of these entities and their interrelationship is essential to a com-
plete picture of the Relatienota policy. In essence, one entity makes pol-
icy decisions; another provides personnel to implement these decisions;
and one serves as the legal representative in transactions involving land.
1. Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden
The government of The Netherlands sponsors a number of programs
involving agricultural land. Among these are land development, creation
of wooded areas, maintenance of buffer zones around large cities and in
the vulnerable and heavily-populated Western section (Randstad) of the
country, development of recreation areas, and creation of nature
reserves.6 2 These programs often require the purchase of agricultural
ground on the open market or through special legal provisions, temporary
management of the purchased land, and, in many instances, reconveyance
of the land to new owners.
The Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden (Bureau for Agricultural
Land Management) is the entity authorized to carry out these transac-
tions on behalf of the government. The Bureau was established by the
Wet agrarisch grondverkeer (law on the transfer of agricultural land) en-
acted in 1981." It has the status of a juristic person, capable of entering
legally binding contracts," and is represented in each province through a
60. See infra, note 71. Beschikking van de Staatssecretaris van Landbouw en Visserij
van 24 December 1982, Nr. J. 7417 (as amended).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 111-193.
62. DIRECTIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, MINISTERIE VAN LANDBOUW EN VISSERIJ, Bu-
REAU BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN at 2-6 (1985).
63. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, Ned. Stasts. 175 (1984). Enacted in response to fluctu-
ation in land prices, the law establishes a legal framework to ensure a balanced price devel-
opment for agricultural lands and nature areas. It creates organizations to supervise and act
as representative in several programs involving agricultural land, and it gives a legal frame-
work to a land bank system. The law becomes applicable at a time specified by the govern-
ment, and that time can be different for individual articles. Id. art. 70, lid 2. See Ned.
Staats. 175, at 77. The regulatory system focused on ground prices has not yet been imple-
mented. At the time the law was published, ground prices were steady and the provisions
were not necessary. Although prices have since begun to increase, political considerations
have mitigated against regulation of land prices.
64. Id. art. 28. See Joustra, Naar een Beheerswet voor landbouwgronden, 42 AGRARISCH
RECHT 120, 122 (1982). The Bureau is the successor of the Stichting Beheer Landbouw-
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provincial bureau. Tasks of the Bureau are specified by ministerial regu-
lation.6 These tasks involve the acquisition, temporary management, or
transfer of real property, as required to carry out specific laws and regula-
tions.6 Land acquisition for implementation of the Relatienota program
is among the responsibilities of the Bureau.67 In some instances, the Bu-
reau has the preferential right to buy agricultural land, or even the duty
to purchase it."8
The Bureau has been engaged in a significant volume of transactions
in agricultural land. In 1986, the Bureau had nearly 50,000 hectares under
its administration. This total included primarily land owned by the Bu-
reau, but also a small number of hectares held by the Bureau as tenant. 9
During 1986, the entity purchased 5200 hectares; normally the annual
amount of land purchased ranges between 4500 and 6000 hectares.71 Dur-
ing the same year, the Bureau transferred 6400 hectares, more land than
it purchased, to new owners. This relationship is consistent with the ob-
jective to convey land to the appropriate new owners, rather than to re-
tain it indefinitely.
In connection with implementation of the Relatienota policy, an-
other important task of the Bureau involves the conclusion of manage-
ment agreements with individual land owners and users located in man-
agement and reserve areas. These are the subject of more detailed
gronden (Agricultural Lands Management Association).
This association was founded in 1946 with the stated goal of management, restoration,
and improvement of agricultural land, as well the goal of ensuring that ground would not be
used in a way contrary to the general interest. The association could purchase and sell real
property. In 1977, the primary task of the association was restructured; its new responsibil-
ity was to protect the use of ground most desirable from the point of view of the general
interest. Inleiding, Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, XXIX, Ned. Staats. 175 (1984) (quoted
from the Memorie van toelichting at 25).
The Stichting was dissolved as of 1 June 1983. Beshikking van de Staatssecretaris van
Landbouw en Visserij van 21 december 1982 houdende opheffing van de Stichting Beheer
Landbouwgronden, Nr. J. 7130 (Stcrt. 249), reprinted in Ned. Staats. 175, at 110-111 (1984).
The rights, duties, and obligations of the Stichting passed over to the Bureau. Wet
agrarische grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 67.
65. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 29. This form of regulation is re-
ferred to as algemene maatregel van bestuur.
66. Beschikking van de Staatssecretaris van Landbouw en Visserij van 28 december
1982, Nr. J. 7164 (Stcrt. 253) betreffende de werkzaamheden van het bureau beheer
landbouwgronden, reprinted in Ned. Staats. 175, at 141 (1984). Among these laws and regu-
lations are land development, afforestation, creation of buffer zones, and other purposes.
For a discussion of the land purchase responsibilities of the Bureau, see Hovinga, Het
Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden als het grondbedriff in het landelijk gebied, 16 BEDRUF-
SONTWIKKELING 274 (1985).
67. Id. art. 2, lid. k.
68. Id. art. 2, leden o, p. On the preferential right, see Wet agrarisch grondverkeer,
supra note 63, arts. 37-52; on the duty to purchase, arts. 53-56. See also text accompanying
notes 157-166 infra.
69. Interview with W. de Boer and P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden
(June 3, 1987).
70. Id.
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discussion later in this article.7 1
In its transactions, the Bureau is normally represented by its direc-
tor, a civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.7 ' The
Bureau itself has no separate personnel; Ministry employees carry out
some of its functions. In addition, some of its activities are carried out by
individuals who contract to do the required work and who, with proper
approval, may receive power of attorney.73 The Bureau's land purchases
are negotiated by private individuals (not civil servants) who are paid on
a per-hour basis; these individuals are normally experienced and knowl-
edgeable about land purchase and prices. The tasks of the Bureau can be
accomplished efficiently because normal activities can occur without spe-
cial authorization .7  Some financial commitments involving large sums,
however, must receive prior ministerial approval.75
2. Commissie Beheer Landbouwgronden
Another important entity, this one more than a juridical person, is
the Commissie Beheer Landbouwgronden (Central Committee for Land
Management). Also authorized by the law on the transfer of agricultural
land,70 the Committee was constituted in November 1981. 7 The chair is
named by the government, and the secretary of the Committee is the di-
rector of the Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden.7 8 The Committee, which
meets at least twice a year 7 9 may consist of sixteen members;8 0 these in-
clude representatives of several ministries, organizations of lower govern-
ment, farm and forestry organizations, and nature protection societies.81
71. Beschikking beheersovereenkomsten 1983, as amended, arts. 24, 25. Beschikking
van de Staatssecretaris van Landbouw en Visserij van, 24 december 1982, Nr. J. 7417 (Stcrt.
253). The Beschikking has been amended several times: 1983 Stcrt. 80; 1986 Stcrt. 139; 1987
Stcrt. 115, 130.
72. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 32. The director of the Bureau is
also director of the Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden.
73. Id. art 32, lid 4. See also Beschikking betreffende de vertegenwoordiging van het
bureau beheer landbouwgronden, art. 4. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw en Visserij van 13
december 1982, Nr. J. 5602 (Stcrt. 244) reprinted in Ned. Staats. 175, at 109 (1984) (herein-
after Beschikking betreffende de vertegenwoordiging].
74. Beschikking Financieel beheer bureau beheer landbouwgronden, art. 6. Besschik-
king van de Minister van Landbouw en Visserij van 17 augustus 1982, Nr. J. 3694 (Stcrt.
160), reprinted in Ned. Staats. 175, at 99.
75. Beschikking betreffende de vertegenwoordiging, supra note 73, art. 3.
76. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 30.
77. Boelen, Organen bij het beheer van landbouwgronden, 16 BEDRUFSONTWIKKLING
279, 279 (1985). The Committee was established to replace the administration of the Sticht-
ing Beheer Landbouwgronden.
78. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 31, leden 3, 4.
79. Besluit van 30 oktober 1981, Stb. 677, houdende voorschriften betreffende de
samenstelling en de werkwijze van de commissie beheer landbouwgronden, reprinted in
Ned. Staats. 175, at 85 (1984)[hereinafter Besluit van 30 oktober 1981].
80. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 31, lid. 3, 6.
81. Besluit van 30 oktober 1981, supra note 79, art. 2.
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Members serve for renewable five-year terms.8'
The Central Committee provides general guidance for the Minister of
Agriculture and other ministers on the subject of agricultural land policy
and prices, as well as on policies concerning the relationship between ag-
riculture and nature and landscape. In addition, it provides general guid-
ance and supervises the activities of the Bureau Beheer Landbouw-
gronden. The Committee makes policy connected with transactions
involving agricultural ground as well as implementation of Relatienota
programs and the European Economic Community mountain-farmer
rules.83
Subcommittees can be established to assist in the work of the Com-
mittee.84 Each province in Holland has a Provincial Committee for Land
Management, charged with local responsibilities connected with Relatie-
nota activities, especially the development of management plans, and ac-
tivities on behalf of the Central Committee." Chaired by a member of the
provincial Deputed States, the local committee consists of twelve mem-
bers, representative of interested organizations and governmental entities,
who serve three-year terms.86 The provincial committee can also establish
subcommittees to assist in its activities.87
3. Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden
Although the Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden is an artificially cre-
ated legal entity with no separate personnel, its activities are carried out
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Em-
ployees of the Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (Government Service
for Land Management), a subunit of the Ministry, carry out the regular
activities of the Bureau. The Government Service, with central offices in
Utrecht and representatives in each province, performs activities in the
areas of structure and management regulation for agricultural lands, and
activities involving acquisition, management, and transfer of land.88 Many
of its decisions, particularly land conveyances and contracts, are then exe-
cuted by the Bureau.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE RELATENOTA POLICY
The Relatienota recognized the importance of accommodating both
82. Id. art 3 (the maximum age of service is 65 years).
83. Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, supra note 63, art. 30. See also DMECTIE BEHEER
LANDBOUWGRONDEN, supra note 62, at 24.
84. Besluit van 30 oktober 1981, supra note 79, art. 6.
85. Instellingsbeschikking provinciale commissies beheer landbouwgronden, art. 1.
Staatssecretaris van Landbouw en Visserij van 2 december 1982, Nr. J. 6828 (Stcrt. 236),
amended by Nr. J. 73 (Stcrt. 9) (January 9, 1984) reprinted in Ned. Staats. 175, at 104
(1984). The document was also amended by 1985 Stcrt. 13 and 1987 Stcrt. 130.
86. Id. arts. 2 & 4.
87. Id. arts. 11-13.
88. Boelen, supra note 77, at 280.
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agricultural and/or nature values in vulnerable rural landscapes. The pol-
icy established in that document reflects two goals. The first is the main-
tenance and development of natural-scientific and landscape values in the
most valuable agrarian cultural landscapes through an adaptation of the
agricultural management. This goal is to be achieved in part by giving
farmers the opportunity to enter management agreements voluntarily.
The second goal is the financial subsidization of the sometimes difficult
position of farmers who carry out the farm business in areas valuable for
landscape and natural-scientific characteristics.89
As earlier discussion has suggested, these broad goals are to be
achieved in part by the establishment of Relatienota areas: a limited
number of geographically-defined regions of particular natural values and
vulnerability in which attempts are made to manage the land in light of
those values. Because of the different characteristics and vulnerability of
these natural environments, two types of areas are possible: management
areas and reserve areas.
Management areas are regions in which the present value of nature
and landscape is particularly significant. They often harbor important
animal species like meadow birds. Nonetheless, in these areas agricultural
production is also important and can be continued, often with less inten-
sity and without threat to natural values. In management areas, the
objectives of maintaining present nature values and continuing agricul-
tural use of the land are equally important. In these areas, integration of
land use functions-agriculture and nature or landscape-is the goal. It is
anticipated that farmers will continue to own and manage their land.
They will be offered the opportunity, however, to enter contractual man-
agement agreements, under which they will receive financial compensa-
tion for adapting their farming practices to the requirements of nature
and landscape preservation.
Reserve areas are significant both because the present values of na-
ture and landscape are high and because they offer potential for future
development of these values. The objectives in reserve areas are to main-
tain the present values and to increase the potential values. These areas
often harbor valuable botanical species (for example, orchids) that are
threatened by modern agricultural practices. Continued agricultural use
is inconsistent with protection of vulnerable ecosystems; the adaptations
in management required to preserve those ecosystems would be too intru-
sive to allow effective agricultural production. Moreover, the desired man-
agement of natural values can ultimately be provided only under supervi-
sion of a nature protection organization.
The goal in reserve areas is therefore eventually to end farming en-
tirely. Land in these areas is to be purchased by the Bureau Beheer
89. COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, MINISTERIE VAN LANDBOUW EN VISSERIJ, Bu-
REAU BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, JAARVERSLAG 1985, at 26 (1986) [hereinafter BBL, JAAR-
VERSLAG 1985].
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Landbouwgronden and transferred to conservation organizations, either
governmental or private organizations, for specialized management."0
Farmers are not forced to sell, but may do so voluntarily. In reserve areas,
the Bureau has an obligation to purchase land offered to it." Until the
time of sale, however, farmers in reserve areas have the opportunity to
enter into management agreements. These are viewed as transitional, in-
tended to bridge the years between designation of the region as a reserve
area and actual creation of the reserve through purchase of the land.
A. Choosing the Relatienota Area
Eventually it is expected that 200,000 hectares of vulnerable land will
be protected through the Relatienota measures."s The intention is that
100,000 hectares will be devoted to management areas and the remaining
100,000 hectares to reserves. 98 Actual implementation of the program,
however, has occurred slowly and requires decision-making at three sepa-
rate stages. The first stage involves the general identification of regions to
be designated Relatienota areas; the second includes the specific delinea-
tion of the borders of these regions and the assignment of status as man-
agement or reserve area; the third involves establishment of the manage-
ment plan" as well as the purchase of ground in reserve areas and the
conclusion of management agreements.9"
The first phase of the procedure involves consultation between the
state government and provincial authorities, a process that has moved
rather slowly. The government started to implement the Relatienota pol-
icy in 1977 by identifying and recommending to provincial authorities
86,000 environmentally sensitive hectares that most urgently needed pro-
tection.9 Some of these areas were located within land development
projects in preparation or in performance. Actual designation of these re-
gions as Relatienota areas required agreement with provincial authorities,
some of whom were reluctant to proceed, in part because the effects of
the designation were unclear. 7 By the end of 1985, however, agreement
had been reached with most provincial authorities concerning those
90. For example, the Staatsbosbehepr (Forestry Service) manages a significant amount
of reserve land retained by the government.
91. Beschikking beheersovereenkomsten, supra note 71 art. 76. See also art. 68, and
infra text accompanying notes 157-166, infra.
92. See Nota landelijke gebieden, deel 3E, supra note 58, at 23. For a brief discussion
of management agreements in Holland, see Bennett, Management Agreements in the
Netherlands, Annex 3 in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITlES, supra note 13, at 153-
84.
93. Boelen, De Relatienota in de praktijk, 16 BEDRUFSONTWIKKELING 269, 270 (1985).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 111-136.
95. BBL, JAARVMSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 26-28.
96. Id. at 26. The document in which these areas were identified, along with an expla-
nation of the method of selection, was the so-called Voorrangsinventarisatie Relatienota-
gebieden.
97. Boelen, supra note 93, at 271.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
86,000 hectares;9s during 1986, global identification took place by the
Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, in agree-
ment with the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.0 ' In addition, prov-
inces have been invited to submit their own suggestions for areas to in-
clude within the last 14,000 hectares.'00 Although it is expected that
eventually another 100,000 hectares will come under the Relatienota pol-
icy, no money for expansion of the program is now available. Implementa-
tion of the second phase will require a specific government decision.0 1
After the general identification of the Relatienota areas, the bounda-
ries can be defined more specifically. Provincial authorities play a role at
this second stage too, by submitting proposals for location of areas in
their provinces. These proposals are the result of consultation with mu-
nicipal authorities, water districts, and local organizations. In addition,
farmers and interested authorities are consulted, a step viewed as essen-
tial for successful implementation of policy.1"'
Definite boundaries for Relatienota areas are established in light of
provincial recommendations. Outside of land development areas, the
boundaries are established formally by the Minister of Housing, Physical
Planning and the Environment. Within land development projects,
boundaries are set by the Central Land Development Committee.
10 3
When an area is marked for special protection, the choice between
treatment as management area or reserve is particularly critical; in the
second stage of the Relatienota process, this choice must be made. Three
criteria are important in deciding how to protect an area. The first is the
vulnerability of the nature values to be protected in relation to the cur-
rent agricultural management. Another is the adaptability and suitability
of the desired nature-protection management within the agricultural
management in the region. The third is cost. If the desired management
of a highly-valued natural area is extraordinary, the annual cost of man-
agement compensation is too high. In such situations, the government
98. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 26.
99. COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, BUREAU BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, JAAR-
VERSLAG 1986, at 24 (1987) [hereinafter BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986].
100. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 26-27. Provinces have been assigned a
share of the available hectares on the basis of existence of valuable cultural landscapes and
occurrence of land development projects. During 1986, agreement for global identification
was reached in only one province; three provinces have submitted suggested areas. In the
other provinces, submissions are being prepared. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986, supra note 99, at
25.
101. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 27. This decision, to be suggested by
the Ministers of Finance, Housing, Physical Planning, and the Environment, and Agricul-
ture and Fisheries, must be approved by the Parliament. Interview with W. de Boer and P.
Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (June 3, 1987).
102. Boelen, supra note 93, at 271.
103. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 26. By the end of 1986, definite bounda-
ries had been established for 14,670 hectares of management areas and 25,961 hectares of
reserve areas, for a total of 40,631 hectares. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986, supra note 99, at 25
(Tabel 9).
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may save money by acquiring the property as a reserve, rather than
designating it as a management area.'
0 4
This choice between reserve and management area is crucial for own-
ers of land within the area. The establishment of a reserve always means
that the government will attempt to obtain ownership and use of the land
within the area, with a view to optimal management for nature and land-
scape values. As might be expected, nature protection interests press for
reserve status; if a reserve is formed successfully, the ideal management
for a vulnerable area can be assured. 08 Moreover, the role of those orga-
nizations in acquiring and managing vulnerable areas forms an essential
justification for their continued existence and support by members and
by government.10 6 In contrast to a reserve, however, the designation of a
management area means that agriculture will remain important for the
region, and that farmers will be encouraged to continue to farm.'0 " The
preference of individual farmers for management area or reserve depends
to some extent on their own situations. Farmers without successors to
continue the farm business often have no objection to reserves. Others,
especially in large Relatienota areas, may prefer the status of manage-
ment area.' Although it was originally planned that the hectares desig-
nated as Relatienota land would be divided evenly between reserves and
management areas, the first stage of the program has resulted in a major-
ity of the land being established as reserves.'
B. The Management Plan
Even after the boundaries of a Relatienota area have been estab-
lished, the policy of accommodation of agriculture and nature cannot be
implemented immediately. Instead, more detailed planning is required."0
This stage of the process is governed by a regulation called the Beschik-
king beheersovereenkomsten 1983 (the management agreement
decree)."'
1. Preparing the Plan
The Central Committee for Land Management assumes an important
104. Wind, supra note 24, at 113. See also Biewinga & Schr6der, Beheersgebied of
reservaat, 46 AGRARISCH RECHT 106, 107 (1986).
105. Wind, supra note 24, at 114.
106. See Biewinga & Schr6der, supra note 104, at 113.
107. Boelen, supra note 93, at 271.
108. Biewinga & Schr6der, supra note 104, at 114.
109. About 60 percent of the first 100,000 hectares is designated as reserves. Interview
with Drs. P. Slot, Director of Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (July 22, 1987). See Biew-
inga & Schr~der, supra note 104, at 109-110, for a description of the changes in expected
designation between the Voor rangsinventarisatie and the sitatution in 1985, as well as
some reasons for the changes.
110. For a brief case study of a management area in the northern Holland province of
Friesland, see Bennett, Annex 3, supra note 92, at 161-69.
111. Beschikking beheersovereenkomsten 1983, supra note 71.
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role in planning, as specified in the Beschikking beheersovereenkomsten,
which applies as soon as an area is designated.""3 After each management
or reserve area is defined, the Committee is to establish a cadastral
description, with reference to an accompanying map, and give notice to
the public and to interested governmental authorities.11 s Before farmers
in the area can be offered the opportunity to enter management agree-
ments, a management plan must be in effect. This plan is established for-
mally by the Central Committee, but the plan is actually drafted under
the supervision of the appropriate provincial committee for land
management.
The provincial committee of the province in which the area, or the
greatest part of the area, is located prepares a draft management plan.1 4
This process may begin as soon as the area is globally identified; the pro-
vincial committee need not wait until the management or reserve area has
been described cadastrally. 115 Although the provincial committee is
charged with this responsibility, in practice part of the work is done by a
subcommittee appointed by the provincial committee. Consisting of mem-
bers of the provincial committee, as well as several representatives from
the local area (farmers or representatives of nature protection organiza-
tions), the subcommittee can ensure better communication with residents
of the area and more ready acceptance of the nature conservation pol-
icy.1 6 Formal consultation with interested governmental authorities is re-
112. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986, supra note 99, at 26.
113. Beschikking, supra note 71, (arts. 3 and 13). Until amendments to the Beschikking
beheersovereenkomsten in 1986, 1986 Stcrt. 139, the Central Committee first had to declare
that an area, assigned as a Relatienota area by the proper authority, came under the opera-
tion of the Beschikking. Until amendment, the Beschikking also specified that, in prepara-
tion for declaring the Beschikking applicable to an area, the director of the Bureau Beheer
Landbouwgronden could request the provincial committee to prepare a preliminary draft
plan, in consultation with various lower governmental authorities. Id., arts. 7, 8, 9 (These
articles were omitted in the 1986 amendment). Because the provincial committee can begin
to draw up a draft plan at the time the area is globally identified, the preliminary draft is no
longer necessary. Toelichting bij de wijziging van 18-7-1986, Nr. J. 3861 (Stcrt. 139).
114. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 10, lid. 1, 2, 4, and art. 11. In article 10(1) the
Central Committee can decide that a plan, rather than a draft, be drawn up for a reserve
area. In article 10(2) the Committee can call attention to special characteristics of the area
or its agricultural management, as well as the implications of these for the establishment of
the plan. Id. art. 10, lid. 4. The plan is to be drafted in consideration of certain provisions
listed in the Beschikking.
If a Relatienota area is located in more than one province, coordination and agreement
between the two provinces is expected. Id., art. 11.
115. Toelichting bij de wijziging van 18 july 1986, Nr. J. 3861 (Stcrt. 139). Prior to this
amendment, the Beschikking had to be declared applicable in an area before work on the
plan could begin. See supra note 113.
116. Interview with W. de Boer and P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3
June 1987). See also Instellingsbeschikking provinciale commissies beheer landbouw-
gronden, supra note 85. Contact with farmers in the region (or, in larger areas, with repre-
sentatives of farmers) is seen as essential for the success of the Relatienota program. The
cooperation of social-economic and business advisors is also important to help farmers un-
derstand the program. Boelen, supra note 93, at 272. See Toelichting op het beheersplan
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quired during development of the plan.1 '
Several considerations are paramount in drafting an acceptable plan.
The management specifications included must be adaptable to current
agrarian management and be reasonable to the farmer in technical, eco-
nomic, and organizational respects. In addition, they must contribute ef-
fectively to the protection or development of nature values. The cost of
the specifications must be reasonably related to the effect for nature;
measures with high cost and relatively little impact on nature must be
avoided. Finally, there must be a practical way to ensure that farmers
actually carry out the required management practices." 8
When the draft of the management plan has been prepared and the
director of the Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden has given approval, the
provincial committee must send the draft to organizations with whom for-
mal consultation occurred, and make the draft available for public inspec-
tion and comment." 9 After considering the comments, adapting the plan
accordingly, and making a report, the draft management plan is placed in
the hands of the Central Committee. 20
The Central Committee establishes the plan formally. It may make
changes in the draft, provided that it first consults with the provincial
committee. The Central Committee also sets the date on which the first
management period begins.' 2 ' Normally, the management period is estab-
lished for 6 years. Farmers within the Relatienota area receive notice of
the establishment of the management plan and the time that the first
management period begins. In addition, these land users also learn where
and how they can make known their wishes to enter a management agree-
ment, and which persons with rights in the land must also sign the
voor het beheers- en reservaatsgebied Westzaan, in COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN,
BEHEERSPLAN WESTZAAN at 2 (1986). The subcommittee constituted in that region consisted
of 2 agricultural representatives from the area, 1 representative of a ground-managing na-
ture protection organization in the region, 2 members of the provincial committee, a secre-
tary, and 2 advisors representing livestock interests and a municipality. The role of the
subcommittee was to draw up a concept-draft plan, coordinate consultation in the region
between farmers and nature protectors, increase the quality of the plan through use of local
knowledge and experience, and increase the involvement (betrokkenheid) and understand-
ing with regard to the management rules.
117. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 13. The provincial committee must consult with
municipalities and water districts within which the Relatienota area is located, and with any
other institutions identified by the Central Committee. In addition, when the area is located
within a land development project, consultation with the appropriate committee for that
projuct must occur.
118. Boelen, supra note 93, at 272.
119. Beschikking, supra note 71, arts. 14-15. The public notice may not take place until
after the Director of the Bureau has agreed and the Central Committee has described the
area cadastrally. Id. art. 14, lid 2.
120. Id. art. 16.
121. Id. art. 17. The date on which the first management period begins is always the
first day of a calendar quarter. Boelen, supra note 93, at 273. After the management plan is
established, amendments are possible, even before the end of a management period. See
Beschikking, arts. 19-23.
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agreement.2 2
2. Contents of the Plan
Although formation of the management plan must follow the re-
quired procedure, the contents of each individual plan will be tailored to
the management requirements of the area involved. Nonetheless, the
Beschikking requires each plan to include details concerning the natural
values in the area and the adaptations required to preserve those val-
ues. 11 An explanation of these requirements will provide background use-
ful to the later consideration of management contracts based on the
plan.12 4
As a starting point, the management plan must describe for its area
the goals of nature and landscape management that are to be pursued in
connection with agricultural management. 5 This part of the plan nor-
mally describes the natural and landscape values, including information
about the scenic values, as well as the presence of vulnerable animal and
plant species.2 6 Although the plan itself is relatively brief, an explanation
attached to the plan may give more detail. 2 7 The goals established must
be realistic; for a management area especially, they must be adaptable to
continued agricultural production.
These goals are designed to be met by adaptations in agricultural
management practices. Thus, in addition to the goals, the plan must spec-
ify the practices-actions to be taken or actions to be omitted-that can
occur on the farms in the area. The plan should specify the circumstances
under which the practices are to take place, the form they will take, and
the dates on which they will occur."2 8 The practices vary and include such
items as maintaining present water levels, refraining from using chemical
pesticides, limiting the number of grazing animals per hectare during cer-
tain periods, delaying mowing until bird-breeding season is over, and lim-
iting the amount of manure applied during certain periods. 2 9 The desired
practices are often grouped into different "packets" of several practices,
designed to achieve different levels of protection. The farmer then may
122. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 18.
123. Id. art. 5.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 139-156.
125. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 5, lid a.
126. E.g., COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, BEHEERSPLAN WESTZAAN, supra note
116, at 2. The Westzaan region includes both management and reserve area. The plan for
the region describes the species of meadow birds and rare plants that thrive in the area,
with its geography influenced by digging of peat in earlier centuries. A general goal of main-
taining the rich, characteristic landscape is accompanied by specific goals of maintaining
and restoring the varied and rich bird and flora populations.
127. See, e.g., Toelichting, in COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, BEHEERSPLAN
WESTZAAN, supra note 116.
128. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 5, lid b.
129. COMMISSIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, BEHEERSPLAN WESTZAAN, supra note 116,
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choose the packet most appropriate and adaptable to his business. Of
course, the compensation the farmer receives is related to the severity of
the packet of practices chosen.
Compensation promised to the farmer is based in part on the effect
of the desired management practices on the farmer's income and ex-
penses. If practices designed to protect natural values will mean lower
production (and thus less income), more working hours (for example, for
mechanical rather than chemical weeding), or fewer expenses, these re-
sults are reflected in the compensation. To ensure that these determina-
tions can be made rationally, especially in the future, a standard of com-
parison is necessary. Therefore, an important part of the management
plan is identification of a so-called reference or comparison area, which
can be used to establish normal agricultural management, expenses, and
income. 8 " The area chosen must be similar in nature and types of agri-
cultural practices, but production in the comparison area occurs without
the constraints of management agreements.
Further, the management plan must describe the design and practice
of farms in both the Relatienota area and the reference area. 3 ' This
description includes characteristics of the farms in the regions (for exam-
ple, size, use of the land, number of animals, production levels, mowing
dates, and application of artificial and natural fertilizer) and identifica-
tion of external production circumstances (for example, parcel size, num-
ber of parcels per farm, and presence of ditches).
The compensation to be awarded to individual farmers is established
on the basis of foundations articulated in the management plan."3 2 These
foundations reflect the differences in production levels, increases in labor
requirements, and changes in work costs that flow from the various man-
agement practices required for nature and landscape protection.' 3 These
differences vary with the restrictiveness of the management practices.
Thus, the difference in production level must be calculated for each of
the possible management packets available to farmers in the area. Also,
the various packets will not be identical in the amount of extra labor re-
quired or the savings in work costs. A monetary value is eventually at-
tached to each of these various effects of management practices.' These
monetary amounts are adjusted annually, on the basis of price develop-
ments in agriculture.3 5 Hence, the actual compensation payable to the
farmer, determined on the basis of foundations set out in the plan, will
depend on the packet chosen by each farmer and the current financial
situation in agriculture. The management plan must also include an ap-
130. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 5, lid d.
131. Id. art. 5, lid c.
132. Id. art. 5, lid e.
133. Id. art. 6.
134. Beschikking, supra note 71, Bijlage.
135. Interview with W. de Boer and P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3
June 1987).
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pendix that lists the actual compensation, usually in guilders per hectare,
to be received by farmers who follow the management practices required
in each of the various packets. " 6
C. Management Agreements
Only after the management plan has been established can the Rela-
tienota policy actually begin to operate effectively. For management areas
(and for reserve areas, too, before the land is acquired by the Bureau
Beheer Landbouwgronden),5 7 implementation of the policy on individual
parcels of land occurs when beheersovereenkomsten (management agree-
ments) 8  are signed for those parcels.
1. Entering the Contract
Management agreements are private-law contracts, entered between
individual farmers and the Bureau, which acts as the contracting party
for the government.1 3 9 The Beschikking Beheersovereenkomsten specifies
the procedure for entering these voluntary agreements. When a land user
indicates his willingness to sign a contract, he must indicate what parcels
of land he offers for the agreement, which of the possible packets of man-
agement obligations he is willing to follow, and what (if any) ownership of
the land he enjoys."1 0 The farmer need not commit to an agreement all
the land within a management area that belongs to his farm; instead, he
is free, within the framework of the management plan, to limit the size of
the area he encumbers with a contract.14 1 In addition, by choosing the
nature preservation obligations he will follow, the farmer can tailor the
agreement to the needs of his own farm. Thus, not all farmers within a
single management area will be obligated to carry out the same manage-
136. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 5, lid f.
137. In some situations, the use of beheersovereenkomsten in reserve areas is limited.
When the land is owned by a public law body or a nature protection organization that man-
ages ground, certain users who began their activities after 1 December 1977 cannot enter
contracts. Id. art. 24, lid 2.
138. The beheersovereenkomst is one of a number of extra-legal, financial instruments,
which have proved to be popular during times of economic boom. For such instruments, the
government makes money available to the citizen who is willing to perform or refrain from
certain activities that fit desired governmental policy. Brussaard & van Wijmen, supra note
9, at 175.
139. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 24, lid 1.
140. Id. art. 26, lid 1.
141. This increased flexibility is the result of a 1983 amendment to the Beschikking.
Earlier, the farmer had to enter a management agreement for all his land lying within the
Relatienota area. See Toelichting bij de wijziging van 21-4-1983, Nr. J. 1578 (Stcrt 80). In
addition, the amendment made it possible for the farmer to choose between different combi-
nations of management obligations.
In 1985, statistics indicated that on 40 percent of farms with contracts, 30 percent of
the surface or less was obligated under the contract. For 15 percent of farms, the surface
was 30 to 50 percent; and for the remaining 45 percent, 50 to 100 percent of the ground
surface. See Boelen, supra note 93, at 273.
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ment activities. Each farmer who signs a contract will be committed to
some basic management requirements, but other supplementary obliga-
tions may vary."4 2 If the farmer who wants to enter the contract is not the
owner of the land, there must be an indication that the lessor or other
owner is also willing to enter the contract; that owner must eventually
also sign the management agreement.14
After the farmer has asked to conclude a contract, the Bureau con-
siders the request. The Bureau must ensure that the farmer is actually
operator of a farm located completely or partly in the Relatienota
area.4"In addition, the Bureau must be certain that the management ob-
ligations the farmer is willing to assume are consistent with the possibili-
ties created by the management plan for the area."" The Bureau need not
conclude contracts for parcels on which no contribution would be made to
the management goals articulated in the plan. 4 s Moreover, the Beschik-
king makes clear that no contract need be entered if, under an agreement
in an earlier management period, the acts or omissions of the operator
seriously hindered realization of the goals of nature and landscape de-
scribed in the management plan. 4" If the farmer's request for an agree-
ment is rejected, however, he may appeal to the Minister of Agriculture
and Fisheries. 48
When the Bureau decides that an agreement is desirable, it must be
offered in writing to the farmer. 4 s The contract consists of several parts.
The first part establishes the identity of the parties, describes the land
both in cadastral terms and on a map. It states that the farmer is to man-
age the described land from the viewpoint of nature and landscape, and
that the Bureau is obligated to pay compensation of a specific amount,
subject to annual adjustment. Attached to these specific provisions are a
number of general conditions that incorporate relevant provisions of the
Beschikking Beheersovereenkomst. Finally, the contract lists the specific
management treatments-measures to be taken or activities to be
avoided-to which the farmer is obligated. The treatments regulate activ-
142. Wind, supra note 24, at 116.
143. The Beschikking refers to signing by the lessor or by the "blooteigenaar" (that is
the owner of land which is subject, for example, to a hereditary lease). Because of the own-
ership changes involved in land development, some variation from the requirement of signa-
ture by the present owner is specified. Beschikking, supra note 71, art 25, lid 2; art 26, lid 3.
In practice, the requirement that the owner sign the management agreement has meant
that contracts on a considerable surface area have failed. The ground user was willing to
sign, but the land owner would not cooperate. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1985, supra note 89, at 30.
144. In practice, the head of the provincial bureau office performs this task on behalf of
the central Bureau Beheer Landbouwgronden. See DIREcTi BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN,
BEHEERSOVEREENKOMSTEN OP HET AGRARISCHE BEDRIJF, 12 (1985).
145. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 27, lid 1.
146. Id. art. 27, lid 2, le.
147. Id. art. 27, lid 2, 2e. This provision was added in 1986 Stcrt. 139.
148. Id. art. 28. The rejection must be accompanied by reasons, and appeal must be
submitted in writing within 30 days of the rejection.
149. Id. art. 29, lid 1.
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ities like maintenance of water levels; protection of special landscape ele-
ments; date of mowing grass, application of fertilizers, pesticides, and
other chemicals; and numbers of grazing animals permitted. These mea-
sures, tailored to each area and to each parcel, are intended primarily to
protect breeding birds, as well as to preserve valuable and vulnerable
vegetation.
A management contract will usually then be entered for the duration
of the six-year management period. If the contract is entered after a man-
agement period has already begun, that contract will be in effect for the
remaining duration of the management period. Although the normal con-
tract is intended to last for the entire management period, some flexibil-
ity is available so that the farmer who is unsure of the acceptability of a
contract may try out the management practices. The farmer has an op-
portunity to operate his farm under the contract for a one-year trial pe-
riod; the contract may be terminated if the farmer gives notice at least 30
days before the end of the year."5
When a contract has been in effect during a management period, it is
presumed to be renewed for the next six-year period, unless a party gives
notice at least one month before the end of the period."' To ensure that
the farmer enjoys some certainty in adapting his farm operation to the
required management, the Bureau's right to end the agreement is limited,
when one or more of the other parties prefer to continue. 5 Moreover, the
Bureau is also prohibited from seeking to end the agreement if nature
and landscape protection requirements, established through law or ad-
ministrative provisions, mean that the farmer will be unable to follow
management that is available in the comparison area.153 Management
agreements may also be ended if, by decision of the Central Committee,
the land involved is no longer part of a Relatienota area.'"
Despite the presumption of continuation and some restrictions on
ending management agreements, the Beschikking allows some flexibility
in changing the management obligations required of the farmers. The
management plan itself may be amended, following procedures similar to
150. Id. art 56. The one-year trial period was introduced in the regulation in 1983 Stcrt.
80.
151. Id. art 56, lid 3. If a party to a contract dies, the rights and obligations under that
management agreement pass on to his heirs. Id. art. 73.
152. Id. art. 57, lid 1.
153. Id. art. 57, lid 2.
154. Id. art. 58, lid 1. In this case, the agreement ends on the first day of the fourth
month after written notice from the bureau to the other parties.
Originally, the Beschikking provided that the Committee could not decide to remove
land from the area if legal or administrative provisions focusing on goals of nature and land-
scape preservation made it impossible for the farmer to carry out management available in
the comparison area. See Beschikking 1982 at art. 58, lid 2 (This provision was eliminated
by 1986 Stcrt. 139).
Article 59 of the Beschikking makes special provision for beheersovereenkomsten con-
nected with land in land development areas.
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those required for establishing the plan.' 56 Moreover, if the Committee
changes the obligations to which farmers in an area are bound, the man-
agement agreements terminate at the end of the management period, un-
less the parties agree to replace the contract with a new one that includes
the new obligations.156
2. Sale of Land in a Relatienota Region
Land in Relatienota areas is marked for special management. Sale of
that land, especially after a contract has been entered to ensure the re-
quired management, may constitute a threat to the continued protection
of the land. Thus, special requirements operate to ensure that manage-
ment will not cease at the sale of the land. These requirements also are
designed to maintain the value of the farmers' land, despite its dedication
to nature protection.15 7 The obligations connected with sale are different
for management and reserve areas.
Transitional management agreements may be entered for land in re-
serve areas, before the reserve land is acquired by the Bureau. As soon as
a farmer on a parcel of contracted reserve ground stops using the land,
the owner of the land is obligated to offer the Bureau the first opportu-
nity to purchase the land, a duty referred to as the optierecht.5 8 This
obligation, however, is limited; it does not apply if the farm is used by
specific successors (family members) who agree to follow the provisions of
the management agreement.159 In addition, the duty to offer the land to
the Bureau also applies when the owner of the land, usually the lessor,
decides to sell it, even though the farmer-tenant or a successor plans to
continue to farm under the terms of the management agreement."'0
When the owner of reserve land that is operated under a manage-
155. Beschikking, supra note 71, arts. 19-23.
156. Id. art. 60, lid 1. The agreement can end at the conclusion of the next following
management period, if the farmer gives one month notice to the other parties. The Bureau
must give prompt notice of changes to the other parties. Id. art. 60, lid 2. There are special
provisions for revised management agreements when an area is changed from a reserve area
to a management area and vice versa. Id. art. 61.
157. See generally de Boer, De positie van landeigenaren in beheers- en reservaat-
sgebieden, 28 DE LANDEIGENAAR 94 (1982).
158. The provisions regarding sale of land, like other requirements set out in the
Beschikking, are incorporated in the general provisions that form part of every contract.
Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 62.
159. Id. art. 62, leden 1, 2. The successor (or successors) may be a spouse, certain blood
relatives, foster children, or other parties to the contract. The duty to sell can be lifted if the
involved party is a public law body or a nature protection organization that manages
ground, provided that the Bureau judges the body to act consonantly with the management
plan. Id. art. 62, lid 3.
160. Id. art 63, lid 1. The obligation does not exist if the owner gives the tenant the
opportunity to purchase, as required by farm tenancy laws (Pachtwet, arts. 56a-56h, Ned.
Staats. 123 (1985)); if the owner mortgages the land; or in other limited circumstances.
Also the Bureau can lift the obligation where an easement is involved, if that easement
is consonant with the management plan. Beschikking, art. 63, leden 2, 3.
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ment agreement offers to sell the land to the Bureau, as required by the
Beschikking Beheersovereenkomst, the Bureau may exercise its option to
purchase the land, or it may decline to purchase and leave the land avail-
able for sale to third parties. If the owner can find no one to purchase the
property, however, the Bureau is obligated, under the duty to purchase
established in the Beschikking, to buy the land. 6 1 This duty applies to all
land in a reserve area, regardless of whether it is subject to a management
agreement. 62 The selling price is established by an appraisal requested
by the Bureau. But that appraisal determines the price without consider-
ation of the facts that agricultural practices on the land are restricted by
a management agreement or that laws or regulations enacted to protect
nature and landscape limit the activities that can be carried out on the
land."6" This requirement avoids the risk that land in a Relatienota area
will decline in value. When an owner finds the appraised price unaccept-
able, another evaluation conducted by three persons may be carried out,
and will bind the parties. 6 4
In management areas, unlike reserves, the Bureau does not seek to
acquire the land. Nonetheless, once a management agreement has been
signed for land in a management area, the Bureau must ensure that the
agreement stays in effect. Thus, the owner of land who wants to sell the
property is obligated to satisfy the Bureau that his successor will also
agree to the terms of the management agreement. 6 5 Of course, at the end
of the contract term, the successor may choose not to continue the agree-
ment. The Bureau has a duty to purchase in management areas also, if
the owner is unable to find a purchaser who is willing to take over the
management agreement. The same appraisal requirements as in reserve
areas apply to establish the price in management areas. 6
3. Violation of the Contract
Like any other contract, the management agreement imposes duties
and obligations on the parties. The farmer must cooperate in permitting
inspections to ensure that he is fulfilling the obligations of the agree-
ment.6 7 In practice, each Relatienota area is under the supervision of an
employee of Government Service for Land Management, who makes in-
spections of the land parcels under contract. Inspection seeks to deter-
161. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 66. This duty is called the koopplicht, or duty to
purchase. See DIRECTIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, supra note 62, at 10. On the duty to
purchase, see also Wet agrarisch grondverkeer, arts. 53-56, Ned. Staats. 175 (1984).
162. de Boer, supra note 157, at 96.
163. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 68.
164. Id. art. 69. One member of the appraisal team is chosen by the objecting owner,
one by the Bureau, and the third by the first two members of the team. The decision of the
appraising team is made by majority vote.
165. Id. art. 65. This obligation does not apply if the owner grants a mortgage on the
land or (in certain instances) allows an easement. Id., art. 66.
166. Id. arts. 67-69.
167. Id. art. 75.
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mine, for example, that a farmer who has contracted not to mow before a
certain date has not mowed earlier. Regular inspections and surprise vis-
its help to ensure that farmers actually earn their management
compensation.16
A party who believes that another party has not observed the terms
of the contract may serve notice of that belief on the offending party.89 If
the parties do not reach agreement about contract provisions concerning
management obligations and payment of compensation within a month
after the notice, the dispute can be submitted to a special dispute com-
mittee for a binding recommendation.1 70 Each province has such a com-
mittee, which decides cases submitted to it on the basis of reasonableness
and fairness.' 7' The committee has the authority to assess a fine against a
breaching party, with a maximum amount of twice the management com-
pensation per hectare per year as specified in the agreement. In addition,
if the farmer has failed to carry out management duties, the committee
can require full or partial repayment of the management compensation
for (at most) the past six years.172
4. Compensation
The availability of compensation for carrying out specified manage-
ment practices helps to induce farmers to enter beheersovereenkomsten.
This compensation has assumed increasing importance in a time when an
additional levy has been imposed to limit milk production178 and regula-
tions have been issued to limit the production and use of manure. 7 Com-
pensation from management agreements offers farmers the opportunity
to make nature conservation a profitable enterprise that supplements
other income from farming.
The Beschikking indicates that four types of compensation are avail-
able: management compensation, adaptation compensation, payment to
the lessor, and payment at the termination of a management agree-
168. Interview with W. de Boer, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July 1987).
169. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 70. Notice must be sent by registered mail.
170. Id. art. 77, lid 1.
171. The dispute committees (geschillencommissies) are established and regulated by
articles 77-79 of the Beschikking. Each province has a committee, consisting of three mem-
bers who are not members of the provincial committee for land management. The secretary
of the committee is the head of the provincial Bureau for Agricultural Land Management.
172. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 71, leden 2, 3. Article 72 requires payment of the
amounts ordered, on demand and without further legal intervention.
173. See Beschikking superheffing, Beschikking van de Minister van Landbouw en Vis-
serij van 18 april 1984, Nr. J. 1731 (Stcrt. 79), as amended, reprinted in Ned. Staats. l10S
(1987).
174. On the recent regulation concerning manure, see Brussaard, De nieuwe regelgeving
betreffende de produktie van dierlijke meststoffen, 47 AGRARISCH RECHT 402 (1987); Brus-
saard, Mest als nieuw terrein van Milieurecht, chapter 6 in ONTWIKKELINGEN IN HET
MILIEURECHT (M. Aalders & N. Koeman eds. 1987). See also The Manure Action Program in
the Netherlands, 4 Conservation Focus (Aug. 1987) (NASDA Research Foundation Farm-
land Project).
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ment. 75 The compensation available to participating farmers is estab-
lished in conjunction with the management plan for each Relatienota
area, on the basis of factors established in the Beschikking.176
a. Payment under the management agreement
The management compensation is intended to pay the farmer for
losses in production and extra expenses encountered in connection with
performance of the special nature-protection obligations required by the
management agreement. It consists of an amount of money paid per cal-
endar year per hectare, for carrying out the practices required by the
beheersovereenkomst.'7 Each management plan specifies the compensa-
tion available for adapting the various possible packets of management
obligations. Therefore, every farmer in the same area who adopts a spe-
cific packet will receive the same per-hectare annual compensation.
It is intended that the farmer who enters a management agreement
will suffer no loss of income. Hence, the reference area17 8 serves as the
standard by which the effects of the special management on the farmers'
income and required labor are measured. These effects are quantified in
the management plan for each Relatienota area. Management compensa-
tion, then, consists of payments for decline in returns from the land'
7
and extra labor requirements, such as extra time spent in mechanical
weeding. Adjustments are also made for differences in expenses, such as
savings from postponement of work or nonuse of fertilizers, and costs for
manure storage. Compensation is adapted annually, on the basis of price
developments in agriculture.'80
The farmer who adapts his management to the requirements of na-
ture and landscape may no longer be able to use his facilities to capacity.
For example, if the management practices limit the production of grass,
the farmer will be able to feed fewer cows and will have empty stalls in
the barn. To compensate the farmer for this "slack" in the operation and
for the structural changes needed to adjust, adaptation payments are
available.' The amount depends both on the decline in production rela-
tive to the initial situation as a result of implementation of management
175. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 30, lid 2.
176. Id. art. 30, leden 1, 3; arts. 5 & 6.
177. Id. art. 31, leden 1, 2.
178. See supra, text accompanying notes 130-131.
179. Declines in returns are calculated in units called Dutch feed units lactation per
kilogram feed (kilo voedereenheid melk or kVEM) per hectare. The kVEM refers to the
amount of feed needed for the cow to produce one kilogram of milk. The value of this unit is
established annually (for 1987, for example, 0.47 guilders per kVEM). Thus if a manage-
ment packet resulted in a decline of 2,100 kVEM per hectare, the decline in returns element
of the management compensation would be valued at 987 guilders per hectare (2,100 x 0.47).
See DIRECTIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS IN DUTCH AGRICUL-
TURE 17-18 (1987).
180. Beschikking, supra note 71, art 31, lid 3; art 32, lid 2.
181. Id. arts. 35-49.
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measures and on the intensity of farming (in livestock units per hectare)
in the initial situation.'8 2 The management plan establishes the circum-
stances under which adaptation compensation is available. 1s3 The plan fo-
cuses, for example, on the number of animals on a farm before the man-
agement agreement was entered, and the number permitted under the
terms of the agreement."8
Unlike management compensation, adaptation compensation is cal-
culated for each farm, based on the farmer's operation (for example, the
stocking density) in the original situation and the adaptations he must
make to comply with the management agreement. The Beschikking pro-
vides rather complicated formulas for making the calculations." 5 Adapta-
tion compensation may continue for up to eighteen years. At the end of
the first and second management periods, the farmer's situation is reeval-
uated. Then, if necessary, the compensation will be extended for subse-
quent periods, but at a lower rate.8 "
The management and adaptation compensations are usually paid to
the farmer whose business is operated on the land subject to the agree-
ment. In some instances when that farmer is not owner of the land, com-
pensation may also be available for the lessor.' s This compensation con-
sists of a sum per calendar year, per hectare of land used under a
management agreement and leased for at least six years. The sum paya-
ble is based on the amount by which the rent in the Relatienota area lags
behind rent for similar land in the reference area.8 8 When the lessor re-
ceives compensation, the farmer's payment is reduced accordingly. 88
Sometimes a management agreement may end because the land in-
volved no longer forms part of a Relatienota area 90 or because the par-
ties agree to end it. In such a case, the farmer may be entitled to payment
intended to help adapt the farm business to the type of management pos-
sible in the reference area. The payment continues for the number of
years determined by the Central Committee to be required for the adap-
tation.1' In the first calendar year, the payment is identical to the
182. DIRECTIE BEHEER LANDBOUWGRONDEN, supra note 62, at 15-16.
183. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 35, lid 2.
184. See, e.g., Toelichting, COMMISSIE BEHEER LANBOUWGRONDEN, BEHEERSPLAN VOOR
DE RESERVAATSGEBIEDEN LUTJEGAST-DOEZUM 18-19 (1985).
185. Beschikking, supra note 71, arts. 36-49. Article 49 allows some flexibility for in-
stances in which the formulas do not reasonably compensate farmers for their adaptations.
186. E.g., Toelichting, supra note 184, at 19. In the second period, the farmer will re-
ceive 70 percent, and in the third period 40 percent, of the original adaptation
compensation.
187. Beschikking, supra note 71, art 50, lid 1. If the lessor is a public-law body or a
nature protection organization that manages land, the compensation is not available. Id. art.
50, lid 2.
188. Id. art. 51. The sum is reconsidered annually.
189. Id. art. 34.
190. Id. art. 58. See supra note 154.
191. Id. art. 52.
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amount the farmer would have received under the management agree-
ment; in succeeding years, the payment is reduced.1 92 The lessor may also
be entitled to payment for ending the agreement. 193
b. Payment under the EC less-favored areas directive
Part of the compensation received by farmers in Relatienota areas
may be paid under the Bergboerenregeling-the so-called mountain
farmer rules or, more accurately, the less-favored areas directive.9 These
regulations are the Dutch implementation of the European Community
program designed for farmers in areas with important nature and land-
scape values. 9 5 Indeed, the program serves two interrelated goals: to pro-
vide financial support to farmers hindered by unfavorable physical cir-
cumstances, and to preserve valuable features of the natural
environment.'9 6 Accordingly, regions eligible for less-favored areas sup-
port often suffer from natural handicaps that hinder efficient farming. An
important condition for receiving payment under this program is mainte-
nance of existing external production circumstances; thus, the handicaps
with importance for nature (for example, high water levels), must not be
altered. The program requires the passive management often essential in
management areas.
Although European Community policy permits a maximum of
190,000 hectares in The Netherlands to qualify for compensation under
192. Id. art. 53.
193. Id. art. 54. Lessors who receive compensation pursuant to article 50 of the
Beschikking are entitled to this payment.
194. This program intended to help farmers in marginal agricultural regions is referred
to as mountain-farmer regulations because it was originally intended for farmers in the hilly
regions of France, West Germany, and Italy.
195. These are based on Directive 75/268/EEC of 28 April 1975 on mountain and hill
farming and farming in less favored areas. See also Council Regulation 797/85 of 12 March
1985, Title III, arts. 13-17 (Special measures to assist mountain and hill farming and farm-
ing in certain less favoured areas). Revisions to this rule were expected. Council Regulation
1760/87 (15 June 1987) has amended 797/85, in part to encourage conversion and extensifi-
cation of production. For Dutch implementation, see Beschikking bijdragen probleem-
gebieden, Nr. J. 7398, 1982 Stcrt. 251 (December 22, 1982). For general information on the
Dutch implementation of this program, see G. BENNETT, APPLICATION OF THE LFA DIRECTIVE
IN THE NETHERLANDS, Countryside Commission, CCP 167 (April 1984). Coordination of pro-
visions of the Dutch implementation of the less-favored areas directive with management
agreements is simplified by the fact that the BBL (Bureau for Agricultural Land Manage-
ment) administers both programs.
The Directive, article 3, specifies that the program is applicable in mountain regions,
areas in danger of depopulation, or areas with specific natural handicaps. In The Nether-
lands only the third is applicable, and four broad categories of natural handicaps are recog-
nized. These handicaps include unfavorable hydraulic conditions (e.g., high water table),
fragmented field or landownership patterns, isolated location, and poor ground conditions
(e.g., infertile soil). Normally the handicaps that qualify for compensation must be perma-
nent and "external"-that is, not caused by the farmer's own agricultural practices. "Inter-
nal" practices (e.g., mowing and use of fertilizers) are regulated by management agreements,
instead of through the less-favored areas directive program. G. BENNEr, supra, at 6, 8-9.
196. See G. BENNETT, supra note 195, at 10.
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bergboeren rules, the Dutch government has not made full use of this
opportunity. Initially the government tied the measure to Relatienota im-
plementation; only in Relatienota areas (and, of these, only in manage-
ment areas) could farmers qualify for payment. 9 ' Recently, applicability
has been broadened somewhat to include reserve areas with no short-term
prospect of acquisition by central authorities. In addition, the bergboeren
rules may also appply in selected regions with parcels of farmland that
cannot be reached by road, but only by water.' 8 Compensation for pas-
sive management under the Netherlands version of. the mountain-farmer
regulation is limited to a maximum of 180 guilders per hectare, of which
the EC reimburses 25 percent to the Dutch government. Actual compen-
sation is calculated on the basis of the intensity of farming, measured by
the number of livestock, expressed in large animal units per hectare.
Farmers who receive this compensation must include it as part of their
total management payment. Because the two types of payments are based
on different systems, such farmers actually enter two separate contracts,
one for the bergboeren compensation' and one for the
beheersovereenkomst.
200
197. Of the 100,000 hectares designated as Relatienota areas, only 40,000 are manage-
ment areas. Thus the mountain-farmer rules could apply'to a maximum of only 40,000 hec-
tares. Interview with Drs. P. Slot, Director, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July
1987).
In actual practice, far fewer hectares have been declared eligible. By the end of 1986, a
surface area of 18,000 hectares in Holland had been placed on the EC list of agricultural
problem areas. A further 30,000 hectares have been submitted to the EC for inclusion on the
list. By the end of 1986, the Beschikking bijdragen probleemgebieden had been declared
applicable to 47 areas with a total surface of about 11,500 hectares. Five hundred twenty-
eight operators had entered agreements on a total of 3991 hectares. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986,
supra note 99, at 33.
198. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986, supra note 99, at 32.
199. Contracts entered under these rules run for five years. They specify the land area
(by cadastral description and a map) for which the subsidy is being paid, prescribe the
amount of the subsidy, and list the natural handicaps that the farmer must not destroy or
try to eliminate. In exchange for the annual subsidy, the farmer promises to follow the re-
quirements of the Beschikking and to maintain the natural handicaps.
200. It has been speculated that the designation of an area under the LFA program acts
to speed up the often-slow process of establishing a management plan. The availability of
LFA compensation could encourage farmers also to enter a management agreement. G. BEN-
NErr, supra note 195, at 9.
Although all Relatienota areas do suffer natural handicaps, the Dutch approach has
received criticism. The underuse of the potential number of hectares permitted by the EC
means that many Dutch farmers cannot take advantage of the supporting measure provided
and subsidized by the EC. This measure was intended, critics say, to support agriculture
and not the Relatienota. This financial support is needed by farmers in many areas of the
Netherlands, for example, where water levels are high. Moreover, if the two programs can be
separated so that the bergboeren rules are used to pay for passive management, manage-
ment agreements can assume a more clear role in compensating active management.
Hermans & Hazenbosch, De Relatienota op de heiling, 11 NATUUR EN MILEu 4, 8 (1987).
Government officials have recognized the need to expand the applicability of the
bergboeren rules to regions other than management areas. These include reserve land that
has not yet been acquired (and for which there is no short-term prospect of acquisition) and
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Calculation of compensation for the various aspects of the Relatie-
nota program is complicated. In practice, the payments that farmers ac-
tually receive under management agreements vary, depending on the pro-
visions of the management plan for the area and, within each area, on the
severity of the restraints in the packet chosen by each farmer. An individ-
ual farmer may receive between 300 and 1600 guilders per hectare per
year, With the average payment per hectare being about 750 guilders20 '
Annual compensation is divided and paid in four installments. °2
IV. CONCLUSION
The Relatienota policy articulated in the mid 1970s has led to a
thoughtful program designed to encourage and reward the maintenance
of valuable natural elements. Where it has been implemented, the pro-
gram has proved effective in adapting agriculture to nature values in es-
pecially vulnerable areas of The Netherlands. Yet, after more than a dec-
ade, relatively little of the ground eligible for protection is actually
operated under management agreements or purchased as part of a re-
serve. When the program was initiated, it was expected that after two
years, 10,000 hectares would be operated under management agree-
ments. 0 3 By March 1987, however, twelve years after the Relatienota ap-
peared, only about 7000 hectares were being farmed under beheersover-
eenkomsten,20 4 and about 7300 hectares had been purchased as
reserves.
20 5
A. Problems with the Program
1. A Slow Beginning
Several factors help to explain the relatively slow beginnings of the
program. 20 6 In part, the complicated nature of the designation procedure
itself is to blame.2 0 7 A number of steps are involved in identifying Rela-
tienota areas, and establishing definite borders was a time-consuming
the so-called vaargebieden-regions where the farmer cannot reach his land by road from
the homestead, but can only get there by water. Further changes in the Dutch program may
occur in connection with revisions in EC Council Regulation 797/85. BBL, JAARVERSLAG
1985, supra note 89, at 7-8.
201. Interview with P. Scheele and W. de Boer, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3
June 1987). These sums include both management and adaptation compensation, as well as
payment under the bergboeren provisions. The Bureau spends about 8 million guilders an-
nually for compensation.
202. Beschikking, supra note 71, art. 74.
203. Interview with Drs. P. Slot, Director, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July
1987).
204. Interview with W. de Boer & P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3
June 1987).
205. Hermans & Hazenbosch, supra note 200, at 4.
206. For an explanation in English of some of the initial reactions to the Relatienota
policy, see Fornier, supra note 25, 172-78. See also Joustra, supra note 64.
207. For an explanation of this procedure, see supra, text accompanying notes 92-109.
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process.'" Also, the requirement that formal management plans be estab-
lished prior to conclusion of contracts, although necessary, meant that
considerable time would elapse before farmers could be offered the oppor-
tunity to participate.2 0 9
Even when management agreements were available, however, farmers
resisted, perhaps from some type of psychological opposition. 2 0 The spe-
cial management dictated for Relatienota areas demands extensification
of agricultural methods, an approach that contradicts the usual produc-
tion orientation of the farmer. To extensify, the farmer must abandon
some of the technical and scientific developments that have led to more
intensive land use and efficient production. Adopting lower production
standards in the interest of nature and landscape interferes with the
farmer's normal management practices and expectations of himself, and
can lead to stress. 2
11
This psychological opposition included a further element: farmers
doubted the expertise, dependability, and credibility of the government.
For years government policy had favored intensification, and the Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries had encouraged farmers to intensify their op-
erations. The new emphasis on extensification gave farmers reason to fear
208. van de Klundert & van Huis, Verweving van landbouw en natuur, in VERWEVING
IN HET LANDELIJK GEBIED at 37 (Rijksplanologische Dienst, publikatie 85-4 (1985)). Part of
the problem also stemmed from the inability of farmers and nature protection representa-
tives to communicate. This failure resulted in significant delays at the beginning of the pro-
cess. The developing ability of farmers and nature protectors to communicate has been an
important by-product of Relatienota policy. Interview with Drs. P. Slot, Director, Directie
Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July 1987). This same observation has been made by Ben-
nett, Annex 3, at 175, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 92:
the instrument's most important achievement may well be political rather than
environmental. Prior to the introduction of management agreements, farmers
and conservationists saw their interests as irreconcilable. Now, for the first
time, an area of common ground has been found. Farming and conservation
can only be reconciled if farmers and conservationists learn to negotiate with
each other. At least in the Netherlands they are now on speaking terms.
209. This problem is not unique to management agreements in the Netherlands. Cum-
bersome procedures exist elsewhere, especially when compensation schemes are complicated.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 32.
210. Resistance has not been unique to the Netherlands. A multi-national study noted
that:
[flarmers who resist or are critical of management agreements often are most
concerned about the long-term restrictions which may be placed on their
farms, fearing that they will be left behind technically, may be deprived of a
valuable business, may be placing a major burden on their successors, may be
severely reducing the value of their own assets, may be becoming "park keep-
ers" rather than independent farmers etc.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 26.
211. Wind, supra note 24, at 109-110. The farmer who must avoid mowing, for example,
while his neighbors carry out their usual Spring practices, may experience considerable frus-
tration. Farmers dislike agreements because they see them as "curbing their independence,
limiting their incomes or even degrading their status toward that of park keepers." COMMIS-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 32.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
that eventually the government would scale back the promised manage-
ment compensation.2 12 It was difficult for land users to believe that, de-
spite the vagaries of the budget in ensuing years, the government would
honor its commitment to pay.21 s Moreover, farmers also believed that
their government often acted coercively and consulted too little with the
individuals involved.21" Another fear experienced by farmers was that
their efforts to carry out the promised management obligations would be
criticized.21 8 Still others feared that the value of their land would de-
crease as a result of limitations on land use in favor of nature.2"6
Furthermore, farmers have expressed opposition on technical
grounds. The uniformity and lack of flexibility in the initial stages of the
program discouraged participation. Amendments in 1983, however, have
led to increasing flexibility and the possibility of a trial year.2"7 Some op-
position, even to the more flexible system, remains, especially on the part
of young farmers who operate intensively. These farmers object to the
fact that each farmer who adopts a specific packet of obligations will re-
ceive the same compensation, despite the fact that meeting those obliga-
tions may be less burdensome for farmers with less intensive
operations.2 18
Much of the initial opposition of farmers to the program has dimin-
ished. The willingness of some to enter agreements has encouraged others
to participate.21 9 In addition, nationwide limitations on production of
milk and manure have reduced income possibilities for some farmers.22 0
Thus, the beheersovereenkomst may offer farmers the opportunity to
maintain a reasonable income level and to get paid for a new farm prod-
uct, the conservation of nature.22 Nonetheless, even with increasing ac-
ceptance by farmers, the Relatienota program itself raises some un-
resolved issues that focus in part on effective accomplishment of the
212. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 38.
213. Wind, supra note 24, at 110.
214. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 38.
215. Wind, supra note 24, at 110.
216. de Boer, supra note 157, at 94.
217. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 38.
218. See Wind, supra note 24, at 116. This objection may be misdirected. Management
compensation is intended to pay for the realization of specific goals. The more flexible adap-
tation compensation is designed to recognize individual farmers' difficulties in meeting those
goals. Id.
219. By May 1987, this encouragement was widespread. A management agreement was
entered by the thousandth farmer. The government attributed the increasing interest to
more farmer involvement in establishing management plans, the possibility of a trial year,
and the problems of agricultural surpluses. Nonetheless, further study is planned to simplify
both decisionmaking about identification and definite bordering of areas and regulation of
the management agreements. Ministerie van Landbouw en Visserij, Persbericht, nr. 154, 8
mei 1987.
220. See supra notes 173-74.
221. Interview with W. de Boer and P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3
June 1987).
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nature conservation goals of the Relatienota.
2. Accomplishing Nature Protection Goals
One practical problem relates to the design and implementation of
the desired management practices. It is often difficult to identify a level
of management that will make a real contribution to the maintenance of
landscape and nature values, and at the same time realistically fit within
the framework of farming in the Relatienota area. Stringent require-
ments, which would really protect nature values, may well be unaccept-
able to farmers and result in no participation and thus no protection.
Even when acceptable management packets are designed, some element
of compromise remains. The fact that each farmer may choose to imple-
ment practices that fit in his business means that no real integrated man-
agement for the whole area is likely.22
The fact that participation in the Relatienota program is voluntary
remains a significant issue because it makes beheersovereenkomsten par-
ticularly vulnerable. The desired nature protection will occur only when
individuals are willing to enter contracts.2 2 3 One may question whether it
is wise to tie essential nature protection efforts to private contracts with
individuals, when those individuals are free to reject participation. A pos-
itive aspect of this voluntary approach, however, is that the individuals
who decide to enter management contracts are likely to be particularly
careful in carrying out their responsibilities.2 24 Moreover, there may be a
subtle element of coercion even in the voluntary program. Insufficient co-
operation with Relatienota efforts may well result eventually in the impo-
sition of protection on especially vulnerable land through another, invol-
125untary program.
Closely connected with the problem of voluntary management agree-
ments is the difficulty of forming reserve areas when land can be pur-
chased for reserves only when the owner is willing to sell.2 2 6 Under this
system, reserve areas (especially large ones) may take a considerable
number of years to purchase. Moreover, the transition period poses diffi-
culties for both the land user and for nature interests. Given the charac-
teristics of areas designated as reserves, production circumstances are
likely to be inefficient, with little prospect of adopting new technology.
222. Wind, supra note 24, at 115-117.
223. See Brussaard & van Wijmen, supra note 9, at 176. Indeed, this aspect may mean
that areas farmed by young dynamic farmers, who will be reluctant to restrict activities, will
lack protection, even if those areas are particularly sensitive. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 32.
224. Heida, Scheiding en verweving. De boer en het landschapsbeheer, 35 ARS AEQUI
99, 101 (1986).
225. Wolff, De toepassing van de Natuurbeschermingswet op landbouwgronden, 45
AGRARISCH RECHT 451, 459 (1985). For example, particularly valuable land could be identi-
fied and protected as a natural monument. Id.
226. The situation is somewhat different in land development projects under the
Landinrichtingswet.
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But at the same time, even with the possibility of transitional manage-
ment agreements, it may be difficult to ask landowners to carry out intru-
sive nature protection measures in an area designated as a reserve, espe-
cially when those measures do not adapt well to the business
management. 2 7
A related problem is the issue of continuity of nature protection, es-
pecially in management areas. Normally beheersovereenkomsten are en-
tered for six-year management periods. Although it is difficult for the
government to end an agreement, the land user can ask to terminate the
contract. Thus, after any contract period, the needed management can
again be lost. Moreover, although the buyer of land must agree to con-
tinue an existing contract, he too is free to terminate at the end of the
contract period. One can well ask what purpose there is in protecting a
vulnerable area only temporarily.2 2 A partial answer to that question
may be that a more permanent commitment to nature protection de-
mands far more than most farmers are willing to risk. This unrealistic
expectation would diminish confidence in the Relatienota instrument.2 29
The cost of implementation of Relatienota policy is high. Both man-
agement areas and reserves involve significant government expenditures.
Management contracts require annually-adjusted payments of the agreed
compensation to farmers.2 s0 The creation of reserves requires an initial
payment to purchase the land, plus continual expenditures to exploit and
manage ground that is purchased and retained by the government. Be-
cause reserves form a majority of Relatienota areas, these costs are
burdensome.2
31
227. Wind, supra note 24, at 114.
228. See Heida, supra note 224, at 103.
229. Wind, supra note 24, at 110.
A further problem, identified by some, is the lack of legal support for Relatienota pol-
icy. That is, the policy is implemented through the Beschikking, rather than through a law
(wet) enacted after parliamentary treatment. See e.g., Joustra, supra note 64, at 120. A
draft of the Wet beheer landbouwgronden, designed to provide this legal basis, was circu-
lated in 1984, and later revisions were made. In 1986 a draft was sent to the Council of State
for advice. BBL, JAARVERSLAG 1986, supra note 99, at 25. Although such a law could offer a
foundation for management of valuable agricultural cultural landscapes, Brussaard & van
Wijmen, supra note 9, at 177, in the current situation, it is not entirely clear that the bill
will be enacted in the near future. Nor is it entirely clear that such a law will contribute
much more to implementation of the policy, given the fact that operation under the
Beschikking is now working rather well. It is likely, however, that the Beschikking will be
amended to some extent, even if a law is not enacted.
230. For information on proposed changes, see Bruil, Wetgeving en literatuur, 48
AGRARISCH RECHT 124, 126 (1988). The proposed changes would simplify the process of es-
tablishing Relatienota areas, reduce the number of management obligations, and standard-
ize the compensation system. These payments currently amount to about 8 million guilders
per year, but are expected to be over 12 1/2 million in the early 1990s. Interview with W. de
Boer & P. Scheele, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (3 June 1987).
231. Interview with Drs. P. Slot, Director, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July
1987). Land purchased for reserves has cost an average of about 25,000 guilders per hectare,
with the most expensive costing Hfl 57,000. About half of the reserve land is retained by the
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B. Management Agreements and Physical Planning
One of the most difficult problems connected with the system of
beheersovereenkomsten is their relationship with the bestemmingsplan,
the municipal land-use plan that forms an integral part of the physical
planning system. The Physical Planning Act 22 authorizes a comprehen-
sive system of planning, carried out in a decentralized, but coordinated,
manner by the central government, provinces, and municipalities. Central
government policy normally influences provincial regional plans (streek-
plannen), which outline in general terms the future spatial development
for each province. Municipalities 283 may issue stucture plans to outline
the expected development of the area. In addition, allocation or land-use
plans (bestemmingsplannen) establish the prescribed use of land within
the plan areas. Land-use plans are directly binding on citizens, who are
forbidden to change the use of their land to a function inconsistent with
the plan designation.
Municipalities include rural areas, and for these areas a land-use
plan, similar to a zoning plan, is mandatory.3 4 The plan normally speci-
fies a destination or use (bestemming) for each land parcel. There must
be pressing justification for a use designation that limits the most effec-
tive use of the land, and the plan can make no demands in connection
with the structure of agricultural businesses.2 11 Several different use des-
ignations are possible in rural areas. Among these are agricultural, agri-
cultural with natural-scientific and/or landscape values, or nature ar-
eas. 236 To maintain these values, the plan can impose use restrictions and
require permits before specific activities can be carried out. For example,
it is possible to restrict activities like converting grassland to cropland,
cutting valuable stands of trees, or lowering the groundwater level. In a
nature area, a permit can be required for the use of pesticides and
fertilizers."
Thus, although land-use plans cannot enforce a specific agricultural
management directly, their provisions can influence that management in-
directly. For example, a provision that grassland cannot be plowed with-
out a permit will help to ensure that the land remains as grassland.
22 8
government (for example, the Staatsbosbeheer-Forestry Service) for exploitation.
232. Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 5 juli 1962, Stb. 286, effective 1 August 1965;
current version, 21 nov. 1985, Stb. 623, 624, 625 (Ned. Staats. 64 (1986)).
233. There are about 800 municipalities (each called a gemeente), which include built
up areas and also contiguous rural areas.
234. Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, art. 10, Ned. Staats. 64 (1986). In principle, thus,
the whole countryside should be subject to land-use plans; in practice, however, all munici-
palities have not yet developed their plans. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at
38-39.
235. See Enter, Relatienota en Bestemmingsplan, 41 DE PACHT 99, 99 (1981).
236. See van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 39.
237. See van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 40-41; Enter, supra note 235,
at 104-05.
238. Enter, supra note 235, at 100.
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Often the restrictions that are possible through the land-use plan focus
on the maintenance of existing external production circumstances. They
require the farmer to forego developments that could enhance farm pro-
ductivity, and thus to give up the possibility of higher income.239 In the
vast majority of instances, the farmer receives no compensation when
these restrictions are imposed. Although the Physical Planning Act in-
cludes an article that authorizes payment of compensation in cases in
which a landowner sustains damage that he cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to bear,24 these provisions are rarely used.241 Moreover, it proba-
bly is not their intention to legitimize compensation for passive measures
that merely maintain the status quo.242
The fact that the bestemmingsplan, like the beheersovereenkomst,
can require the maintenance of existing production circumstances (that
is, passive management) is the source of some difficulties and possible
confusion.2 " Inconsistent treatment of land users in similar situations is
one problem. A type of passive management may be required in one local-
ity by the terms of the bestemmingsplan, while in an adjoining area (a
Relatienota area) similar management limitations may be carried out vol-
untarily under management agreements.24 The type of management limi-
tations permissible under the land-use plan may vary with the type of
area, with more restrictions possible, for example, in a nature area.24
Even so, however, the farmer in the first area is entitled to no compensa-
tion, while the other farmer receives management compensation. Another
difficulty may occur when a specific Relatienota area is also subject to
limitations imposed through a land-use destination in a bestem-
mingsplan. Such a situation poses the risk of overlapping requirements or
239. For the view that land-use plans offer little real protection in rural areas, see van
Schaik & Wingens, Bestemmingsplannen bieden buitengebied geen bescherming, 11
NATUUR EN Mnaxu 10 (1987).
240. See Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, art. 49, Ned. Staats. 64 (1986). See generally
van Wijmen, Beheersvergoeding en schadevergoeding, 42 AGRARISCH RECHT 128, 131-32
(1982).
241. Interview with Drs. P. Slot, Director, Directie Beheer Landbouwgronden (22 July
1987).
242. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 39-40.
243. Enter, supra note 235, at 100, raises several questio,3: to what extent can special
management conditions in connection with the presence of natural-scientific and landscape
values be imposed in the bestemmingsplan? what rules belong in the bestemmingsplan and
what in the beheersovereenkomst? is it possible to put rules in the bestemmingsplan that
belong in the beheersovereenkomst (and vice versa), and if so, is it possible to choose be-
tween management compensation and payment for damages under the Physical Planning
Law?
To suggest answers to these questions is beyond the scope of this article.
244. There may be a question about what bestemming or destination is appropriate for
land in a Relatienota area. Enter, supra note 235, at 107, suggests that management areas
should be called "agricultural regions with (high) natural-scientific and/or landscape value".
Reserves, after purchase, should be called "nature areas".
245. See Heida, supra note 224, at 102.
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perhaps inconsistent rules.2 6
One result of these problems is the "no pay-no cure" phenomenon: a
tendency of provincial regional plans not to require protection of nature
and landscape if there is no opportunity for land users to enter manage-
ment agreements and receive compensation for their efforts. Some prov-
inces have adopted the attitude that outside Relatienota areas, there is
no possibility or necessity to protect nature values by the system of con-
struction permits made possible by physical planning law.2 4 7 In other in-
stances, it was felt that limitations imposed through physical planning
will be accepted only if citizens have the opportunity to receive compen-
sation for unreasonable harm, including the harm imposed by the re-
quirement to maintain the present situation.2 4 These attitudes are incon-
sistent with the intentions of physical planning law.
In fact, both physical planning law and Relatienota policy are needed
to protect vulnerable natural areas. The number of hectares of valuable
cultural ground in The Netherlands is far greater than the Relatienota
alone can protect.2 4' Therefore, most of these areas can only be protected
through limitations imposed in land-use plans. Moreover, the nature of
land-use plans and management agreements is different. Land-use plans
are public-law instruments that bind all citizens, whereas management
agreements are private-law contracts. It was never intended that manage-
ment agreements take over the normal role of land-use plans, 50 or that
their implementation should cause confusion. Instead, they should pro-
vide primarily for activities that go beyond the passive management nor-
mally imposed by the bestemmingsplan, thus avoiding a situation in
which land can be subject to identical or conflicting regulation from two
different legal regimes. "
C. Concluding Remarks
The designation of Relatienota areas, combined with the conclusion
of management agreements and eventual purchase of land to form
reserves, must be seen as one component of the many efforts in The
Netherlands to protect and preserve valuable natural areas. The compre-
hensive system of physical planning and the equally complex process of
land development, plus a number of other laws and administrative pro-
grams, also play significant roles in these efforts.252 The careful manage-
246. Heida, supra note 224, at 102. When a Relatienota area is proposed, it must be
tested against the provisions of the provincial streekplan. Municipalities and other govern-
mental bodies are also informed. Id. Thus, some coordination can be expected.
247. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 40.
248. Id. See generally Bos, Ervaringen in het grensvlak van bestemmingsplan en
natuurbeheer, 42 AGRARISCH RECHT 142 (1982).
249. van de Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208, at 41.
250. See Enter, supra note 235, at 100.
251. Enter, supra note 235 , at 108.
252. For information about aspects of other laws designed in part to protect nature and
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ment of a small percentage of the valuable agricultural landscapes in The
Netherlands will not preserve the whole natural environment. Nor will
the financial compensation offered through management agreements suf-
fice to solve all the problems of farmers whose land suffers from special
and therefore valuable geographic handicaps.
Nonetheless, the Dutch implementation of Relatienota policy, espe-
cially through conclusion of private-law contracts with committed land-
owners, can be viewed as a model of cooperation between government,
farmers, and nature protection interests. And it is expected that height-
ened concern about the environmental consequences of agriculture, along
with other factors, will lead to increased use of these instruments in The
Netherlands, as in other nations. 53 The use of beheersovereenkomsten,
voluntarily entered by land users, is an effective example of the flexibility
that private contracts can offer in achieving societal goals. These con-
tracts provide a means of guaranteeing profits to farmers in less than op-
timal circumstances, while at the same time maintaining the values of
nature and rural landscape.25 It is to be hoped that continued coopera-
tion by farmers and government will increase participation in the Relatie-
nota program and ensure the survival of the most valuable natural areas
in The Netherlands for future generations. Moreover, the lessons of Rela-
tienota policy and its careful implementation in The Netherlands may
well serve as a catalyst and model for other member states of the Euro-
pean Community.
landscape, see e.g., Brussaard & van Wijmen, supra note 9; Wolff, supra note 225; van de
Klundert & van Huis, supra note 208.
253. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 13, at 36-37.
254. See Fornier, supra note 25, at 178.
VOL. 16:1
CRITICAL ESSAY
A Survey of the International Law of
Rivers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The oldest legal theories for acquiring rights in international rivers
are absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity and prior
use. Absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity are based on the "arbi-
trary" consideration of the states' boundaries to determine respective
rights in the use of the river. Prior use is premised on the notion that first
in time is first in right. These three principles have become controversial
in the international community as river use has increased because they
primarily focus on the effect of the river use in only one state, disregard-
ing injurious effects to other riparians.
The increased interaction and interdependency of nations has forced
international river law to be more responsive to the conflicting interests
of co-riparians. The initial response to conflicting claims was to resort to
the theory of no substantial harm and its related principles. These princi-
ples are significant because they address possible harmful effects upon
non-riparian water users. As these principles became more established,
they led to the principle of equitable utilization.
Equitable utilization evaluates all relevant factors in determining the
legality of a particular use. Because all factors are considered, disputes
can be resolved more effectively. As an emerging factor in equitable utili-
zation, optimal use seeks the most economically rational solution and use,
rather than the most equitable result. However, optimal use is usually
consistent with the most equitable use. If the river's most efficient use is
employed there will be increased benefits to share equitably.
This article surveys the legal theories applicable to the resolution of
international river' disputes. The article's scope is limited to examining
* The authors wish to dedicate this article to William White, Esq., who coached the
1987 Jessup Moot Court Team, and to Professor John A. Carver, Jr., who will be retiring at
the end of the 1987-88 academic year after years of service at the College of Law.
1. "An international river is one either flowing through the territory of more than one
state, sometimes referred to as a successive river, or one separating the territories of two
states from one another, sometimes referred to as a boundary or contiguous river ....
While there is little authority on the point, international law does not draw legal distinc-
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non-navigational issues of river usage such as damming and drainage for
irrigation. Issues of international water pollution will not be addressed.2
The principles of international river law that will be surveyed are abso-
lute state sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, prior use, no substan-
tial harm, equitable utilization and optimal use.3 The article will begin
with a discussion of the historical development of international river law
including absolute state sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity and
prior appropriation. Part III will address the principles which prohibit
harmful use of a watercourse. Parts IV and V will examine equitable utili-
zation and optimal use. Finally, this article will conclude with a practical
comparison of equitable utilization and optimal use.
II. HISTORCAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVER LAW
A. The Principle of Absolute State Sovereignty
Historically, the exercise of state sovereignty permitted the un-
restricted use of natural resources within a sovereign state.4 For example,
suppose State A is upstream of State B. State A may lawfully deplete a
river's flow within it's territory. Any resulting reduction or elimination of
a river's flow into State B is irrelevant to a determination of the legality
of State A's conduct. Even if a river used by a state within its territory
substantially injures a neighbor, it is legal under the principle of absolute
territorial sovereignty.
The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty is referred to as the
Harmon doctrine. In 1895, United States Attorney-General Harmon ap-
plied the concept of state sovereignty in connection with a river dispute
between the United States and Mexico concerning the utilization of the
tions between contiguous rivers and successive rivers. Such authority as has been found
supports the view that the same rules of international law apply to both types of rivers." J.
Lipper Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 16-17 (Gar-
retson, Hayton, Olnstead eds. 1967); 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616 (2d. ed.
1970).
2. For the purposes of this article, detrimental changes in a river's flow, though not
pollution in the common sense of the word, will be considered as a form of environmental
harm. Therefore, certain works on international water pollution are cited in that context.
3. Principles or concepts that have been proposed by the >:,ternational legal community
concerning international watercourses include: absolute territorial sovereignty/integrity, co-
herence, community interest of riparian States, community of States, equality of right, equi-
table apportionment (utilization), equitable participation, good faith, good neighbourship,
mitigated-no-substantial-harm, non-discrimination, no specific substantive law, no substan-
tial harm, optimal use, peaceful co-existence, permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
prior appropriation or use, res communis, restricted territorial integrity/sovereignty, sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedus, solidarity, state responsibility, prohibition of abuse of
rights, and requirement of integrated approach, etc. J.G. Lammers, 1 Balancing the Equi-
ties in International Environmental Law in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 154 (Dupey ed. 1984).
4. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 274 (2d. ed. 1952); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAw; 464-65 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
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Rio Grande." In giving advice to the Secretary of State, Attorney-General
Harmon declared;
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances make it
possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity is
a question which does not pertain to this Department; but this ques-
tion should be decided as one of policy only, because in my opinion,
the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no
liability or obligation upon the United States.'
This classical formulation of the principle of absolute state sovereignty,
has since become known as the Harmon doctrine.7
The Harmon doctrine has been espoused by many international pub-
licists,' and support can be found in the pronouncements of several na-
tions. Austria and India9 have acknowledged the Harmon doctrine in
disputes with down stream neighbors." However, Bourne does note "like
the United States, both countries have settled the waters disputes with
their neighbors by treaties based on other principles but expressly provid-
ing that the treaty provisions did not establish any general principle of
law or precedent.""1
Despite some support for the Harmon Doctrine, 2 it has been nearly
universally rejected. A 1958 memorandum of the United States State De-
partment stated that:
Well over 100 treaties which have governed or today govern systems
of international waters have been entered into all over the world.
These treaties indicate that there are principles limiting the power of
states to use systems of international waters without regard to injuri-
ous effects on neighboring states. These treaties restrict the freedom
of action of at least one, and usually of both or all, of the signatories
with regard to waters within their respective jurisdictions. The num-
ber of states parties to these treaties, their spread over both time and
geography, and the fact that in these treaties similar problems are re-
solved in similar ways, make of these treaties persuasive evidence of
law-creating international customs.
13
More recently, professor Bourne writes:
Not only do the vast number of water treaties bear witness against it:
5. Treaty Between The United States and Mexico, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S.
No. 455, 9 Bevans 924.
6. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895); see also 1 Moore International law Digest 653-54
(1906).
7. See J. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 268 (1984).
8. See Id. at 531-533; see also F. BERBER, Rrmvas IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-19 (1959).
9. See also Bains, The Diversion of International Rivers, 1 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 38 (1960).
10. Bourne, The Right to Utilize the Waters of International River, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
187, 205 (1965).
11. Id.
12. Supra note 9.
13. U.S. DEP'T STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS 63 (1958).
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all of the international and federal judicial tribunals that have experi-
ence with interstate water problems have rejected it; all of the learned
associations, institutes, and other bodies which have studied these
problems have rejected it in their statements of principles; and a large
majority of the authors, among them some of the most respected and
influential jurists, have found it, in professor H. A. Smith's phrase, an
"intolerable" doctrine that is radically unsound."'
J. Lipper suggests that the Harmon Doctrine is an empty concept
and not a principle of law:
. . . the Harmon Doctrine was not an expression of international law.
Rather, it was an assertion that, there being no rules of international
law which governed, states were free to do as wished. No subsequent
development of the principle supports its inclusion as a part of the
law of international rivers.15
From a theoretical perspective, J. G. Lammers attacks the Harmon
doctrine for being highly egotistic and also, from a legal point of view,
self-contradictory.
It is clear that the unrestricted disposal by State A of the waters of an
international watercourse flowing from that State into State B based
on the idea of State A's absolute territorial sovereignty is incompati-
ble with the unrestricted disposal of those waters to which State B
would be likewise entitled on the basis of its absolute territorial sover-
eignty over the natural resources which nature would ordinarily bring
into its territory . . . . Unlimited disposal by State A of its territory
will make the unlimited disposal by State B of its territory impossible
and vice versa. Thus, if not already untenable because of the social
and economic injustice to which the application of the principle of
absolute territorial sovereignty would lead, such application would al-
ready seem impossible because of the legal contradiction inherent in
the principle itself.1 "
B. The Principle of Absolute Territorial Integrity
The antithesis of the Harmon doctrine is the principle of absolute
territorial integrity. Under this principle, the exercise of territorial sover-
eignty is permitted only in so far as it does not cause damage or injury in
the territory of other states, as such an exercise would lead to an infringe-
ment of the territorial sovereignty of those other states.' To illustrate,
assume State B is downstream of State A. State A would be prohibited
from using the waters within its boundaries in a manner detrimental to
State B. Likewise, State B would be prohibited from using the waters
within its boundaries in a manner detrimental to a state downstream of
14. Bourne, supra note 10, at 209.
15. Lipper, supra note 1, at 22-23.
16. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 557-558.
17. Id. at 562.
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State B. A detrimental use is any diversion of water that increases or
diminishes a river's flow.18
The Institute of International Law in its 1979 Athens Resolution 9
and some international publicists adhere to the principle of absolute ter-
ritorial integrity.2 0 However, treaties and state practice do not indicate
acceptance of the principle.2 1 The absence of the principle of absolute
territorial integrity in state practice might be explained by its unjust re-
sult. Another, explanation might be the natural inclination of upstream
states to take advantage of their upstream location.
C. The Principle of Prior Use (Appropriation)
The principle of prior use protects fully the use which existed prior
in time.2 No other considerations are relevant under the principle of
prior use in international law.2 3 The state that first makes use of a certain
quantity of a river's waters has a right to the continued use of that quan-
tity of water. Like the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and
absolute territorial integrity, the principle of prior use often results in
unjust uses. Consequently, it is not surprising that there is little support
in the international community for the principle of prior use.2 ' However,
many publicists indicate that international law demands compensation
for injury to an existing use. 5
III. PRINCIPLES PROHIBITING A RIPARIAN'S USE OF A
WATERCOURSE THAT CAUSES
SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO OTHER RIPARIANS
The principles of neighbourship law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, and restricted territorial sovereignty and restricted territorial in-
18. BERBER, supra note 8, at 20-22.
19. The Preamble of the 1979 Institute of International Law (I.I.L.) Athens Resolution
recalls "the obligation to respect the sovereignty of every State over its territory, as a result
of which each State has the obligation to avoid any use of its own territory that causes
injury in the territory of another state," in 1979 I.I.L. Y.B. Vol. 58, Part II at 196-203.
20. See BERBER, supra note 8, at 19-22.
21. See Lipper, supra note 1, at 20.
22. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 364.
23. The principle of prior use in international law is different from the principle of
prior use in United States law, which emphasizes the elements of intent to use, a diversion
with due diligence, application to a beneficial use, and, of course, priority. See generally,
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 40 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
24. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 366; Lipper, supra note 1, at 57; but cf. "Historic uses
and priority of appropriation have, in many cases, come to have almost sacred significance,
irrespective of the actual benefits derived, or whether the water is being put to the best
use." Integrated River Basin Development 38, U.N. Doc. No. E/3066 (1958).
25. See R. ZACKLIN & L. CAFLISH, THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND
LAKES 311 (1984). Additionally, prior use is a significant factor in the settlement of a river
dispute under the principle of equitable utilization. See infra note 65 and accompanying
text; see also Lipper, supra note 1, at 30.
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tegrity prohibit a riparian's use of a river that causes substantial harm to
a co-riparian.
A. The Principle of Neighbourship Law
The principle of neighbourship law obliges a state to abstain from
conduct that causes physical harm to another state.2" In order to enable
states to coexist while at the same time use transboundary natural re-
sources within their boundaries, the principle of neighbourship law also
involves a duty to tolerate, to a certain extent, harmful effects caused by
activities not in themselves unlawful, undertaken in neighboring states.
However, under this principle no state may inflict substantial damage on
another2 7 The principle of neighbourship law is solemnly anchored to the
Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations," which states: "And for
these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace as good
neighbors."29
B. The Principle of Sic Utere Tuo ut Alienum Non Laedas
The principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your prop-
erty so as not to injure your neighbor) limits a state's actions to the de-
gree such actions injure another state. There is a divergence in academic
views as to the point at which an injury becomes unlawful under sic
utere.3 0 Most commentators agree that it prohibits river use that causes
substantial harm.8 ' The obligation of sic utere is inherent in the concept
of territorial sovereignty, a duty correlative to the right of sovereignty
jurisdiction.8 2 The principle of sic utere has been accepted as a basis for
establishing state liability by the International Law Association's Helsinki
Rules,23 by many eminent publicists,3 " by at least two International Arbi-
26. See generally FAUCHILLE, TRArTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, pt. 2 (8th ed.
1925).
27. VERDROSS, VOELKERRECHT 292-94 (Vienna; Springer Verlag 5th ed. 1964);
THALMANN, GRUNDPRINZIPIEN DES MODRIEVEN ZWISCHENSTAATTLICHEN ZWISCHENSTAATLICHEN
NACHBARRECHTS, 151-52 (Zurich; Polygraphyscher Verlag 1959); cf. Huber, "Ein Beitrag Zur
Lehre Von der Gebietshoheit an Grenzflussen", see 1 ZVB 1907 163-164, 175-194 (1907), for
the view that any detrimental interference with the physical conditions in a neighboring
state is unlawful unless it is insignificant and does not affect important interests.
28. VERDEOSS, supra note 27.
29. U.N. Charter, done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, entered into force for the
United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N.
1043, reproduced in Basic Documents in International Law and World Order 6-7 (Weston,
Falk and D'Amato ed. 1980).
30. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 571.
31. See id.
32. Mannes, Water Pollution in International law, U.N. Doc. Water Po/llConf./ 12,
1521 (1960).
33. International Law Association, Report of the 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 1966,
[hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules] Comment on art. 10, at 496 (1967).
34. E.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 474-475 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955); B.
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
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tration Tribunals, 5 and by the International Court of Justice on at least
one occasion.36 Further support for the principle is evidenced by the In-
ternational Law Commission of the United Nations studying "interna-
tional law for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by
international law," who's work had been based on sic utere.
37
C. The Principle of Restricted Territorial Sovereignty and of Re-
stricted Territorial Integrity
The principle of restricted territorial sovereignty and of restricted
territorial integrity is a hybrid of the principles of absolute territorial sov-
ereignty and absolute territorial integrity, that achieves a middle ground
between the extremes of the latter two principles.
This practice of states as evidenced in the controversies which have
arisen about this matter, seems now to admit that each state con-
cerned has a right to have the river system considered as a whole, and
to have its own interests weighted in the balance against those of
other states; and that no other state may claim to use the waters in
such a way as to cause material injury to the interest of another, or to
oppose their use by another state unless this causes material injury to
itself.38
B. Winiarski,39 former judge on the International Court of Justice,
writes:
Let us take the matter further. If a river, whether or not navigable,
traverses or separates two or more states, each of the riparian states
sovereignty on the section of the river which within its territory; but
in using this section it must respect the rights of its neighbors: it is
one of the general principles of law elaborated by Roman jurists for
the praedia vicina the reception of which by international law was
equally entirely natural.0
The principles of restricted territorial sovereignty and of restricted
territorial integrity are considered by many eminent publicists to be a
generally adopted rules of international law governing the rights of co-
riparians to international rivers." '
121 (1953).
35. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.) 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941), see
also Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) 53 Am. J. Irr'L L. 156 (1959).
36. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J. 9, 23, 43 AM. J. INT'L
L. 558 (1959).
37. Margraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of
"International Liability." 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1986).
38. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 204-206 (1955).
39. From Poland, Justice B. Winiarski was a member of the I.C.J. from 1946-1967, and
served as its President from 1961-1964.
40. BERBER, supra note 8, at 30-31, quoting B. Winiarski, Principes Generaux du Droit
Fluvial International, (Reccueil des Cours, III, P.81 (1933).
41. See id. at 25; Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under
Customary International Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 50, 77-79 (1959); L. TECLAFF, THE RIvER
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D. The Relationship Between the Principles of Neighbourship Law, Sic
Utere Tuo ut Alienum Non Laedas and Restricted Territorial Sov-
ereignty and Restricted Territorial Integrity
The principles of neighbourship law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas and restricted territorial sovereignty and restricted territorial in-
tegrity share the basic concept that a riparian may not use a river so as to
substantially injure a co-riparian. Although the three principles have dis-
tinct rationales, upon application, the ultimate result of each is similar. A
river use that causes substantial harm to a co-riparian is unlawful under
all three principles,'4 2 the harm outweighs equitable reasons in favor of
that use. Whether a river use is lawful under these three principles is
decided by a determination of the degree of the harm caused to a riparian
state.
These three principles are related to one another by the basic con-
cept that a riparian should not injure a co-riparian. Given this relation-
ship, these principles can be coupled to provide a broader rationale for
the duty not to injure a co-riparian.
[v]arious writers have based their arguments both on the infringement
of the territorial integrity of the victim State as well as on the breach
of an obligation imposed by good neighbourship. [cite omitted] The
first approach appears to lay the emphasis on the infringement of a
subjective international right of the victim State - i.e., the territorial
sovereignty of that State over its territory - while the second approach
appears to assume the existence of rule and principles of objective in-
ternational law which by imposing restrictions on the exercise and en-
joyment of the territorial sovereignty of neighbouring States purport
to enable their coexistence. 4 [cite omitted]
A similar analogy can be made of the relationship between the prin-
ciple of restricted territorial sovereignty and neighbourship law. The
principle of restricted sovereignty lays emphasis on the exercise of a sub-
jective international right of the state using the waters - i.e., the territo-
rial sovereignty of that state over its territory - while the principle of
neighbourship law assumes the existence of rules and principles of objec-
tive international law which impose a duty on neighboring states to toler-
ate a certain degree of use by a riparian.
The above principles are in turn related to the principle sic utere.
"The principle of sic utere is anchored to the principle of good
neighbourship."" Since the principle of restricted territorial sovereignty
and restricted territorial integrity are related to the principle of
neighbourship law, the principles of restricted territorial sovereignty and
BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967); Utton, International Streams and Lakes, in 2 Waters
and Water Rights 402 (Clark ed. 1967).
42. LAMMEaS, supra note 7, at.562-72.
43. Id. at 563.
44. VERDROSS, supra note 27, at 132.
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restricted territorial integrity are in turn related to the principle of sic
utere. The three principles can be applied in unison to judge a river use.
The result of such an application of these principles would be to treat any
use of a river that substantially harmed a co-riparian as unlawful.
There appears to be much support among publicists for the proposi-
tion that a riparian should not use a river so as to injure a co-riparian and
much support as an accepted principle of international law. The general
rules for the utilization of international rivers "are to be found among the
rules of international customary laws . . . ." The basic rule may be said
to express the duty to use river waters in a manner which is not detri-
mental to the interest of other riparian states."4
There is ample authority for the proposition that a state can utilize
the waters in its territory if its doing so will cause no injury to co-
riparians .... This view is echoed in the 1961 Salzburg Resolution
of the Institute of International Law, . . .; in the 1933 Declaration of
Montevideo; and in the 1957 Buenos Aires Resolution. It is also con-
sistent with the basic assumptions underlying the 1958 New York
Resolution of the International Law Association. In fact, it is explicit
or implicit in most recent writing on international rivers, and it has
recently been strongly supported in the Lake Lanoux 7 case between
France and Spain 8 in 1957."9 [cites omitted]
Further support is evidenced by United Nations declarations and
conferences. At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment held in Stockholm,"0 attended by most nations of the world, 51 they
found that "the principle of responsibility of one State for damage caused
45. F. SORENSON, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 329 (1968).
46. Id. at 301.
47. France v. Spain, 24 I.L.R. 88 (1957). Although the issue before the Lake Lanoux
Tribunal was one governed by treaty law, the Tribunal made statements concerning the
substantive law of water courses. The Lake Lanoux case is the leading case on the develop-
ment of international river law. See LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 508-517.
48. "It should be noted... that even though Spain was claiming a right of veto over
French projects, she admitted in her Counter-Memorandum that 'A state has the right to
utilize unilaterally that part of a river which runs through it so far as such utilization is of a
nature which will effect on the territory of another State only a limited amount of damage, a
minimum of inconvenience, such as falls within what is implied by good neighbourliness.'"
Bourne, supra note 10, at 210.
49. Id. at 188-89.
50. U.N. Doc. A/Conf./48 C.R.P. 26, 1972.
51. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 112 to 0, with 10 abstentions. "It has been
approved by the General Assembly's Second Committee by a vote of 111 to 0, with 11 ab-
stentions. Abstaining votes were cast by Eastern bloc countries. A probably representative
explanation of the non-substantive grounds for abstention by these countries may be that of
the Cuban delegate to the Second Committee, who stated that 'his delegation ha[d] ab-
stained from the vote because it had not participated in the Stockholm conference; however
the draft [resolution] contained elements that it unreservedly approved.' "U.N. Doc. A/C.2/
SR.1479, para. 39." Handl, State Liability For Accidental Transnational Environmental
Damage By Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 528 N. 10 (1980).
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in another is generally recognized. ' 52 Principle 21 declared:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
Furthermore, an extensive examination of water treaties reveals that
such treaties often include articles forbidding river usage that injures a
riparian. 54 Such treaties are further evidence of the acceptance of the
principle that a river use that injures a co-riparian is unlawful.
Unfortunately, the principle that a river use that injures a co-ripa-
rian is unlawful is of limited utility. Even if the principle is accepted as
international law between riparians, it provides little guidance for resolv-
ing river disputes. The principles of neighbourship law, sic utere and re-
stricted territorial sovereignty and restricted territorial integrity do not
define what constitutes an unlawful injury. The principle sic utere has
been criticized as mere verbiage.
It is repeatedly said in nuisance cases that the rule is sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, but the maxim is unhelpful and misleading. If it
means that no man is ever allowed to use his property so as to injure
another, it is palpably false. If it means that a man in using his prop-
erty may injure his neighbor, but not if he does so unlawfully, it is not
worth stating, as it leaves unanswered the critical question of when
the interference becomes unlawful.
55
The principle of neighbourship law has received similar criticism.56
Likewise, the principles of restricted territorial sovereignty and of re-
stricted territorial integrity seem plagued by the same lack of applicable
standards as to what is an injury. Moreover, even if riparians are able to
agree as to what degree of injury is unlawful, the riparians may not be
satisfied with a rule that only allows them to use a river to the extent that
no substantial injury is caused.
[Tihe no substantial harm principle works out favorable for the victim
State which is, in the case of successive watercourse, usually the
downstream State. Its interests are protected as soon as they become
substantially affected, even though the water use in the State of origin
was a prior existing use, or after weighing all the relevant factors, a
more important use compared to that made by the victim State. It is
clear that in this form the principle may, under certain circumstances,
52. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 423, 492-93 (1973).
53. Id. at 485; reproduced in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972).
54. See, e.g., S. SALMA, THE JORDAN RIVER DIsPuTE 49 (1968).
55. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 318 (London: Sweet and
Maxwell 10th ed. 1975).
56. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 569.
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lead to inequitable results.57
IV. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION (APPORTIONMENT)
Under the principle of equitable utilization, each riparian is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial
uses of the waters of a river." An equitable share is determined by weigh-
ing factors in favor of one riparian's use of a river against factors in favor
of another riparian's use of a river.59 These factors include, inter alia,
geographic, hydrologic or climatic conditions, the existing or prior use
made of the waters, the feasibility of alternative means - including the
availability of other resources - to satisfy those needs and the possibility
of compensation to one or more riparian states as a means of adjusting
conflicts among uses.60 A determination in favor of one riparian does not
entitle that riparian to exclusive use of the waters in its territory. A ripa-
rian is entitled to use a river only to the degree to which equitable factors
support its use.
To illustrate, suppose that State A, a lower riparian, has, for many
years used a river for irrigation. State B, upstream, now wishes to utilize
the river for hydro-electric power production. The uses of the river for
hydro-electric power and irrigation purposes are in conflict. If State B is
underdeveloped and will be able to industrialize when supplied with elec-
tricity and State A, is more developed, but continues to use an inefficient
method of irrigation, then the following factors are relevant to a determi-
nation of an equitable usage: existing reasonable use; dependence upon
the waters; population; geographic, climatic and weather conditions; the
existence of alternative sources of food supply; inefficient utilization; and
the financial status of the respective co-basin states.
If State A can continue to achieve the same agricultural productivity
by employing efficient irrigation methods, then those methods may be
demanded of State A in order to provide State B with its equitable
share. Under the principle of equitable utilization State B will likely
be required to compensate State A for the cost of changing irrigation
methods."
"The principle of equitable utilization, which is prescribed by inter-
national law, requires. . . no more no less than delimitation of each ripa-
rian State's rights and duties in respect of a natural resource divided be-
tween two or more riparian states.""2
The 1966 Helsinki Rules concerning the utilization of the waters of
international drainage basins, although not universally recognized as the
57. Id. at 363-64.
58. Id. at 364.
59. Id.
60. Id., See also Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 488-91.
61. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
62. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 371.
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statement of the principle of equitable utilization," provides a specific
elaboration of that principle." The Helsinki Rules read in part:
Art. 4. Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a rea-
sonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin.
Art. 5.(l) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the
meaning of Article IV is to be determined in light of all the relevant
factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not
limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of
the drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution
of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particu-
lar existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent of the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the eco-
nomic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of
the basin;
(j) the practicality of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State;
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In de-
termining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant fac-
tors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the
basis of the whole.
Art. 6. A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent
preference over any other use or category of uses.
Art. 7. A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable
use of the waters of an international drainage basin to reserve for a
co-basin State a future use of such waters.
Art. 8. 1. An existing reasonable use may continue in operation
unless the factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other
factors leading to the conclusion that it be modified or terminated so
as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.
2.(a) A use that is in fact operational is deemed to have been an ex-
isting use from the time of the initiation of construction directly re-
63. Id. at 368.
64. Bovine, Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 21 U. TORONTo L. J. 193, 201
(1971); LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 364.
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lated to the use or, where such construction is not required, the un-
dertaking of comparable acts of actual implementation.
(b) Such a use continues to be an existing use until such time as it is
discontinued with the intention that it be abandoned.
3. A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming
operational it is incompatible with an already existing reasonable
use."
Comment (b) to Art. IV states that a "beneficial" use is one that is
economically or socially valuable. However, the comment further states:
A "beneficial use" need not be the most productive use to which the
water may be put, nor need it utilize the most efficient methods
known in order to avoid waste and insure maximum utilization. As to
the former, to provide otherwise would dislocate numerous productive
and, indeed, essential portions of national economies; the latter, while
a patently imperfect solution, reflects the financial limitations of
many States; in its application, the present rule is not designed to
foster waste but to hold States to a duty of efficiency which is com-
mensurate with their financial resources.
6
The comments to Art. V elaborate on how the factors are to
be weighed.
In short, no factor has a fixed weight nor will all factors be relevant in
all cases. Each factor is given such weight as it merits relative to all
the other factors. And no factor occupies a position of preeminence
per se with respect to any other factor. Further, to be relevant, a fac-
tor must aid in the determination or satisfaction of the social and eco-
nomic needs of the co-basin states."
However, the comment seems to place some special weight on existing
uses.8 8 "An existing reasonable use is entitled to significant weight as a
factor and, as indicated in Article V, consideration must be given to pro-
tecting it. However, it is but one factor."" The comment to Art. VIII
explains when a use is an existing use.
The rule stated in Paragraph 3 of this Article [VIII] precludes the
status of existing use to a use which, when it becomes operational,
conflicts with another use already in operation. If the use conflicts
with the already existing use only in part, it is denied that status only
to the extent of the conflict. Thus, a use may be an existing use with
respect to a portion of the water which it appropriates but not with
respect to the remainder.70
65. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 484-494.
66. Id. at 487.
67. Id. at 489.
68. "Furthermore... many of the general statements of the principles strongly favor
prior uses and, generally speaking, the advocates of the doctrine of equitable apportionment
tend to have the same bias." BOURNE, supra note 10, at 490.
69. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 490.
70. Id. at 494.
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The comment to Article VIII also states that a use may still be ex-
isting when not currently being used. In order for an existing use to ter-
minate, it must be abandoned. Abandonment results from the discontinu-
ance of the use coupled with intention to relinquish it. The intention may
be expressed or it may be implied from conduct."
The 1958 New York Resolution of the International Law Association
provides that a co-riparian only has a right "to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of waters."' Publicists have stated that the
principle is indicative of current trends in the development of interna-
tional river law.7 3 International and domestic decisions have relied upon
the principle of equitable utilization for resolving international river dis-
putes. 74 The majority of international river treaties are consistent with
the principle of equitable utilization 5 The River Platte Basin Treaty calls
for "[R]easonable" and "equitable uses,"'7 6 and the Amazon Cooperation
Treaty seeks "equitable and mutually beneficially results. '77 The vast
support for the principle of equitable utilization has lead publicists to
state that of the principles of international river law, the principle of eq-
uitable utilization comes the closest to being a general principle of inter-
national law.78
The weight of the authorities in support of the principle of equitable
utilization is not necessarily diminished by the support for the principle
of no substantial harm. As indicated there is much support for the princi-
ple of no substantial harm in the international community.79 "[T]he ex-
71. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 493-94.
72. Resolution on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, in Report of the
Forty-Eighth conference of the International Law Association Held at New York, Septem-
ber 1-7, 1958, Agreed Principles No. 2 and 3 (1959).
73. See BERBER, supra note 8, at 209; Bourne, supra note 10, at 221; Lipper, supra,
note 1, at 41-62.
74. "This community of interests becomes the basis of a common legal right...the per-
fect equality of all riparian states the user of the whole or the course of the river .. "
River Oder Case 1929 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 23, 27; Zarumilla River Arbitration (Ecuador v.
Peru); Report of the Helmand Delta Commission (Afghanistan v. Iran), Feb. 1951, para. 208;
see also Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957); Nebraska v. Wyo-
ming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 46 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907); see R. Scott, Kansas v. Colorado Revisited, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 432 (1958).
75. E.g., Treaty between Egypt, Sudan and Great Britain: The Nile, Gr. Brit. T. S. No.
17, p. 33 (1929); Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Turkey (1927)
(cited in Legal Aspects of Hydroelectric Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common In-
terest, at 138, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136 (1952)); Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Arbitra-
tion between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti, 105 L.N.T.S. 216 (1930).
76. The Treaty on the River Platte Basin, signed April 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 905, 906, art.
1(b).
77. Treaty for Amazon Cooperation, [Bolivia-Brazil-Colombia-Equador-Guyana-Peru-
Surinam-Venequela], done at Brasilia, July 3, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1045, 1046, art.l.
78. Bovine, supra note 64, at 201; SMITH, THE ECONOMICAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIv-
ERS 148 (1931); Hirsh, Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 81 (1956); Lipper, supra note 1, at 41-62 (1967).
79. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
VOL. 16:1
SURVEY OF THE INT'L LAW OF RIVERS
tent of harm inflicted to the victim State will always remain a very impor-
tant factor in determining whether a certain use can be regarded as
equitable so that in many cases application of the no substantial harm
principle may lead to the same result as the principle of equitable
utilization." '
V. OPTIMAL USE
"The principle of optimal use of the waters of an international water-
course . . . implies that riparian States must together strive at making
the optimal use which could be made of the waters as if they were not
intersected by state frontiers."8 ' Optimal use seeks the most economically
beneficial use of the river and does not necessarily pursue the most equi-
table use. To distinguish optimal use from beneficial use, as used in Arti-
cle IV of the Helsinki Rules, the Commentators characterized an optimal
use as "the most productive use to which the water may be put . . . the
most efficient methods known in order to avoid waste and insure maxi-
mum utilization."8 " Significantly, to qualify as a beneficial use under Arti-
cle IV, the use does not have to be the optimal use, merely, "it must be
economically or socially valuable."8 3 While the optimal use of interna-
tional watercourses may be "a laudable goal for states to pursue, it is not
yet required by general international law." (Emphasis added.)8 '
Although "highly desirable from an overall hydroeconomic point of
view, it cannot be said that general international law has already so far
developed that basin states are legally obliged to strive at the optimum
rational development of common water resources on a basin-wide scale."8 5
The Lake Lanoux Arbitral Tribunal stated that an upstream State "is not
obliged to associate the downstream state in the elaboration of its
schemes."8 6 It has been inferred from the Tribunal's opinion that "there
is no duty to attempt to arrive at forms of water utilization which would
lead to an optimal use of the waters considering all the interests involved
"87
The current absence of a duty to achieve the optimal use of a water-
course may not be indicative of the development of optimal use. While
the Helsinki Rules do not expressly require or impose a duty of optimal
use on states,8 8 the comment to Article II states that "the drainage basin
is an indivisible hydrologic unit which requires comprehensive considera-
tion in order to effect maximum utilization and development of any por-
80. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 368.
81. Id. at 371.
82. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 487.
83. Id.
84. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 371.
85. Id. at 560.
86. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) 24 I.L.R. 101, at 140 (1957).
87. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 517.
88. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 487.
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tion of its waters." 9 The Helsinki Rule's failure to require the optimal
use of a watercourse by co-basin states "is not designed to foster waste
but to hold states to a duty of efficiency which is commensurate with
their financial resources. Of course, the ability of a state to obtain inter-
national financing will be considered in this context." (Emphasis
added).9 0 Viewed in this light, it may be said that the Helsinki Rule's do
impose a duty of optimal use, limited by the financial resources of the co-
basin states involved.
Despite the fact that optimal use is not required by international
law; "[i]f the rapidly progressing needs of the expanding human race for
water are to be met, there is an urgent demand for carefully planned
multi-state action." ' "[I]n recognition of their common interest, increas-
ingly such cc-basin states will voluntarily enter into joint planning and
development agreements governing international drainage basins." '9 2 Olin-
stead refers to this as a "promising trend."9
A good example of such a joint effort is the United States-Canada
Treaty relating to the Columbia River Basin.9 The Treaty" . . . repre-
sents an important step in achieving optimum development . . . of the
Columbia River Basin as a whole, from which the United States and Ca-
nada will each receive benefits materially larger than either could obtain
independently.9 5
The Columbia River Basin Treaty allowed the United States to con-
struct a hydroelectric dam in Canadian territory for the purposes of en-
ergy production" and flood control. 7 The United States agreed to com-
pensate Canada for the use of its territory with both electric power and
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 487.
91. C. Olmstead, Introduction in The Law of International Drainage Basins 7 (Garret-
son, Hayton, Olmstead eds. 1967).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Treaty between the United States of America and Canada relating to cooperative
development of water resources of the Columbia River Basin and annexes, signed at Wash-
ington, Jan 17, 1961, ST/LEG/SER. B/12 at 206, T.I.A.S. No. 5638 (1964) (hereinafter cited
Columbia River Basin Treaty); other treaties seeking the optimal use of a river basin in-
clude: Bangladesh-India: Agreement on Sharing the Ganges' Waters, 17 I.L.M. 1045, "BE-
ING desirous . . of making the optimal utilisation of the water resources of their region
. ... "; U.A.R. and Sudan, 453 U.N.T.S. at 64 (1963), seeks "the full utilization of it's [the
Nile's] waters."; Syria and Jordon, 184 U.N.T.S. 15, at 36, art. 11, shall undertake "mea-
sures to facilitate the maximum use of the capacity of the reservoir"; Argentina-Brazil-Para-
guay: Agreement on Parana River Project, done at President Stroessner City, Paraguay,
Oct, 19, 1979. Diplomatic Note sent by Paraguay's Foreign Minister to the Argentine For-
eign Minister on Oct. 19, 1979. Diplomatic Note sent by Paraguay's Foreign Minister to the
Argentine Foreign Minister on Oct. 19, 1979, "Italpu may be operated with the flexibility
required for it's optimum utilization, up to the maximum of it's potential."
95. Canada and United States: Exchange of Notes on the Columbia River Basin Treaty,
3 I.L.M. 318, 319, reproduced from 50 Dep't of State Bull. 200-206 (Feb. 10, 1964).
96. Columbia River Basin Treaty, supra note 94, art. 3.
97. Id. at art. 4.
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dollars." In 1961, when the treaty was signed, Canada was concerned that
it would not be able to use all of the power it was entitled to under the
treaty, so a provision was added to the effect that the United States
would buy Canada's "excess" energy.9 9 While Canada, in Article 8 retains
a right of refusal with regard to further sales of "excess" energy to the
United States, the Treaty has been criticized "on the ground that such a
power, usually cheaper in Canada, is required for the development of Ca-
nadian industry and that once sold it is very difficult to recapture it be-
cause the American users develop a vested need which would be very dif-
ficult to later disregard."'0 0 There was also some debate in Canada as to
the legality of exporting power under Canadian law,101 and "some ques-
tion as to whether the technical arrangements represent a program for
the optimum utilization of the river's power potential."'0 2 However, it is
important to note that Cohen characterized the Columbia River Basin
Treaty as an "important and successful bi-national approach to the de-
velopment of a common river basin." (Emphasis added.) 0 3
The success of the Columbian River Basin Treaty should not be viti-
ated because of the good relations between the United States and Ca-
nada. This Treaty, significantly and effectively, dealt with the problem of
basin development between nations of different technological and finan-
cial levels. In the absence of an international duty to achieve the optimal
use of a river basin, this Treaty may serve as an example of international
cooperation aimed at developing water resources to their fullest.
VI. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION AND OPTIMAL USE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT
The principle of equitable utilization is gaining acceptance as the law
of international rivers. 0 " The principle of optimal use arguably creates no
duties for co-basin states to develop a watercourse to the maximum ex-
tent feasible. The doctrine of equitable apportionment (utilization) was
applied in the United States as early as 1907 to resolve an interstate river
dispute in Kansas v. Colorado.0° While the decisions of domestic courts
are not binding upon international tribunals, Article 38(1)(d) of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice does allow them to be considered
as a "subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law."'" The
98. Id. at art. 6.
99. Id. at art. 8.
100. Cohen, The Columbia River Treaty - A Comment, 8 McGiLL L. J. 212, at 214
(1962).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 213, expressing some disagreement between U.S. and Canadian engineers
with regard to the optimum method of development.
103. Id. at 215.
104. See notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
105. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907).
106. Statute of the International Court of Justice, done at San Fransisco, June 26,
1945, entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
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United States Supreme Court, in discussing the applicable law stated that
".. . as an international, as well as domestic tribunal, we apply Federal
law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular
case may demand .... "107 "International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appro-
priate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.'0 "
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the court said that "apportionment calls
for the exercise of an informed judgment on consideration of many fac-
tors." '09 The Court identified several factors in addition to priority of ap-
propriation (prior appropriation was adhered to by both parties involved)
including: physical and climatic conditions, consumption uses, rate of re-
turn flows, existing uses, availability of storage water or alternative
sources, and the comparative benefits and injuries to the states resulting
from the use.110 "These are all relevant factors." '1 In 1966, the Interna-
tional Law Association identified these factors as they apply to the inter-
national community in their Helsinki Rules, at Art. 5." ' The principle of
equitable utilization for rivers among the different states of the United
States preceded its general application in the international arena, al-
though the degree of any causal connection may be debated.
Interestingly, the Helsinki Rule's definition of equitable utilization
holds "States to a duty of efficiency . . . commensurate with their finan-
cial resources. '"1 3 In other words, the optimal use that the states can af-
ford to make of the watercourse. The common theme of the factors in
Art. 5 of the Helsinki Rules is the avoidance of waste or undue injury to
other basin states. " 4 Previously, the United States Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Colorado,"5 acknowledged that the appropriation by Colorado
"has worked some detriment to .. .Kansas,"16 but compared the pro-
portionately "great benefit"'1 7 that Colorado had received from the ap-
propriation. The Court determined that to force Colorado to give up their
use would work a greater economic hardship than allowing it to continue
and would have a subsequent deleterious effect on the economy of the
nation as a whole. Moreover, it would be inequitable not to allow Colo-
Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052, reproduced in Basic Documents in International Law and
World Order 23, 27 (Weston, Falk and D'Amato ed. 1980).
107. 206 U.S. 46, 48.
108. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, at 700 (1899).
109. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 1351, 89 L.Ed. 1815
(1945).
110. Id. at 618.
111. Id.
112. Helsinki Rules, supra note 33, at 488.
113. Id. at 487.
114. Id. at 488.
115. 206 U.S. 46.
116. Id. at 113-114.
117. Id.
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rado's exiting use to continue. In other words, the Court sought the avoid-
ance of waste.
The United States' and international applications of the doctrine of
equitable utilization have been done so as to avoid the greatest harm or
to obtain the optimal use of a river, in an equitable manner. Reflecting
this promising trend Schewbel and Everson, both Special Rapporteurs of
the International Law Commission on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourse, have articulated the principle of equi-
table participation, which is closely related to and stems from the princi-
ple of equitable utilization. Schwebel states that: "[i]t may be main-
tained that there now exists a duty under general international law to
participate affirmatively to effect more rational development, use and
protection of shared water resources. To the extent that state practice
does not establish that duty, it is believed that the progressive develop-
ment of international law should establish it."' 18 Everson is of the opinion
that the principle of equitable participation, with its inclusion of a duty
to achieve the optimal use of a watercourse is already an established prin-
ciple of international law. '19
If the principle of equitable utilization is interpreted and applied to
foster the least waste and optimum development, as limited by financial
resources, then the principle of equitable participation, with its duty of
optimal use, may already be an established principle of international law.
"The talents of experts, including water engineers and economists, may
be widely utilized . . . as a reservoir of knowledge and know-how which,
when applied, would greatly enhance the opportunity of achieving opti-
mum basin development and equitable utilization for all." (Emphasis
added.)120
VII. CONCLUSION
The principles that appear to be followed by the international com-
munity are no substantial harm and equitable utilization, and possibly
optimum use.12 ' Although the principle of no substantial harm provides a
118. S.M. Schwebel, Special Rapporteur [ILCI Third Report on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/348, Dec. 11, 1981, at
57. If rational development is considered to be the optimal development, then it is interest-
ing to compare the language of several treaties like the River Platte Basin Treaty which
calls for the "best" and "rational utilization" 8 I.L.M. 905; or the Amazon Cooperation
Treaty which also calls for the "rational utilization of the natural resources" 17 I.L.M. 1046,
art.1; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
119. J. Evensen, Special Rapporteur [ILC] First Report on the Law of Non-Naviga-
tional Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/367, Apr. 19, 1983, at 33-34.
120. Lipper, supra note 1, at 60.
121. While it cannot be said that optimal use is required by international law, State
practice may be indicative of customary international law, despite the fact that many trea-
ties do not claim to be establishing precedent in this area. See generally supra notes 80-101
and accompanying text; M.E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 4-5
(1985); OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 25-27; VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUC-
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definition of what is a legal river use, the principle does not provide stan-
dards for judging the legality of a river use or for reaching an equitable
resolution of a river dispute.
The principle of equitable utilization, on the other hand, does pro-
vide usable standards for resolving a river dispute. This is not to say the
principle of no substantial harm is of no significance. The principle of
equitable utilization embodies the no substantial harm principle along
with many other factors.'2 2 In some cases the harm caused to a riparian
by the river use of another riparian may be so great that under either the
principle of equitable utilization or the principle of no substantial harm
the use may be prohibited.'23 However, it is when the degree of harm is
not so severe that the principle of equitable utilization is clearly more
useful to resolving disputes. This is because the principle of equitable
utilization, unlike the principle of no substantial harm, provides equitable
standards by which all river disputes may be resolved.
The principle of equitable utilization has been applied in many river
disputes, however, its acceptance is not universal.'2 The reason why the
international community has been cautious to accept the principle of eq-
uitable utilization or any other principle for that matter, is explained by
Olmstead:
This reservation probably stems in part from traditional notions of
national sovereignty as embracing every aspect of a nation's physical
territory, and in part from a reluctance of states to submit competing
claims to such an important resource as water to state negotiation
much less to determination by an international tribunal applying in-
ternational law. The comparatively recent and rapidly accelerating use
of water resources for consumption, as distinguished from navigation,
a factor which greatly increases the value of control over water flowing
through the state, has intensified this reluctance. 2 5
Nevertheless, the trend of international river law as manifested by
state conduct appears t 9 be in a direction of raising the principle of equi-
table utilization to the status of an accepted principle of international
law.'2 ' This is probably because the principle of equatable utilization al-
lows the States involved to consider the factors that are important to
their own, individual drainage basin, emphasizing the factors that are im-
portant to the people of that particular drainage basin. "One cannot but
TION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (3d ed. 1976).
122. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
123. Id. There is no doubt that in determining an equitable apportionment of benefits,
a minor injury will be ignored whereas a serious one will probably be considered as a
weighty factor.
124. See C. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION, 528 (1964); F. BER-
BER, supra note 8, at 40-42; Utton, Sporhase, El Paso, and the Unilateral Allocation of
Water Resources; Some Reflections on International and Interstate Groundwater Law, 57
U. COLO. L. REV. 551 (1986).
125. OLMSTEAD, supra note 91, at 3.
126. LIPPER, supra note 1, at 66.
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conclude that the principle of equitable apportionment remains a princi-
ple with an extremely flexible content."' 27 In the words of Trelease:
A good water law should be based on a proper value system; it should
have an underlying bias that elicits general support . . . Law is man's
creation; law should serve man, not things or governments. If the law
is to be comprehensive it must, of course, protect the resource and
promote the public good, but it is people who want to preserve the
natural features of lakes and streams; it is people whose farms and
factories contribute not only profit to them but prosperity to the
State, and it is people who make up the population of cities." 8
James 0. Moermond III
Erickson Shirley
127. LAMMERS, supra note 7, at 420.
128. Trelease, A Water Management Law for Arkansas, 6 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. J.
369, 371-72 (1983).
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STUDENT COMMENT
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Inching Toward a
Determinable Standard of Proof in Political
Asylum Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
US_,107 S.Ct 1207 (1987), recently decided that the standard of "clear
probability" from section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
does not apply to section 208(a) asylum claims.
This article discusses both the holding and the scope of the Cardoza-
Fonseca decision and identifies the issues left open for further resolution.
This analysis reveals pertinent prior lower and Supreme Court cases as
well as applicable legislative history from the U.S. Congress and the
United Nations. Finally, the article discusses the need for a alternative
standard in asylum determination and the implications of the Cardoza-
Fonseca case in providing such a standard.
II. FACTS OF INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA
On June 25, 1979 the Respondent, Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, ille-
gally entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor. After exceed-
ing the permitted stay, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
commenced deportation procedures against her. Respondent requested
withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h)1 and asylum as a
refugee pursuant to section 208(a).2 The Board On Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denied her claim for withholding of deportation under section
243(h) and political asylum under section 208(a). s The Respondent ap-
1. The Immigration & Nationality Act sec.243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) provides
withholding of deportation if an alien can show that "it is more likely than not that the
alien would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he would be returned.
2. The Immigration & Nationality Act sec.208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) permits a
discretionary grant of asylum by the Attorney General to an alien who has demonstrated
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(4).
3. In re Cardoza-Fonseca, File No. A24 420 980 San Francisco at 3 (BIA Sept. 1983).
The BIA converged the standards for withholding of deportation and political asylum by
maintaining the immigration judge's holding that the Respondent had not established a
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pealed the BIA decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which reversed and remanded for reconsideration. 4 The
case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and decided on March 9,
1987. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision.5
III. STATUTORY HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Contemporary asylum law can find its roots within U.S. assention to
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees'
("1967 Refugee Protocol" or "Protocol") Prior to this Protocol, relief was
available to any alien who was within the United States if the deportable
alien was subject to persecution upon deportation and could demonstrate
a "clear probability of persecution" or a "likelihood of persecution."7
Relief was generally unavailable at U.S. borders to aliens seeking ref-
uge due to persecution. Conditional entry was established in 1965 to ad-
dress the admission of refugees outside U.S. boundaries.8 Additionally,
the Attorney General was authorized to "parole aliens temporarily into
the country" for "emergency reasons" or for "reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest."9
Conditional entry was restricted by a numerical ceiling placed on ad-
mission and, as with the parole power, it was severely limited by the ide-
ology and geographic location of the applicant.0 It was the 1967 United
"clear probability of persecution." This was based on finding no difference between the clear
probability and withholding of deportation standards.
4. The court in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), found that the
Immigration Judge and the BIA erred in applying the clear probability standard of proof of
§ 243(h) to her § 208(a) asylum claim. Additionally, the court agreed with the Respondent's
assertion that the well-founded fear standard of 208(a) is more generous than the clear
probability standard of 243(h). The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and de-
cided March 9, 1987.
5. For a more comprehensive examination of the facts, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
6. The United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was opened for sig-
nature on January 31, 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6233, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. It was
ratified by the United States on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REc. 29,607 (1968). The Proto-
col incorporated the pertinent aspects of the "refugee" definition in article 1 and articles 2-
34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No.
6577 (hereinafter cited as the 1967 Protocol).
7. The Attorney General was authorized to withhold deportation of a deportable alien
under § 243(h) of the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964 ed.)
e.g. Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (CA 7 1967); In re Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866,
873 (BIA 1968); In re Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. 215, 220 (BIA 1967).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-236 § 3, 79 Stat. at 913, repealed by 94 Stat. 107.
9. 1952 Act, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. at 188 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
(1976)).
10. Both remedies for overseas refugees had gross favoritism to those fleeing communist
countries. See World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response, Report to
the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979). This report shows a pre-
1968 use of parole power favoring total authorized Communist refugees, at 232, 711 to the
non-communist refugees at 925.
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Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," that set the stage
for contemporary asylum law. Assention to the Protocol bound each party
to the adopted provisions of the Protocol, including the definition of "ref-
ugee" as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. ' '1 2
The sponsors of the Protocol, as well as the Senate and the Presi-
dent, were certain that assention to the Protocol would not interfere with
existing immigration law."3 Ratification of the Protocol brought a recogni-
tion by Congress that INS lacked conformity to the standards set out in
the Protocol. It became increasingly apparent to Congress that the INS
was not properly implementing practices and procedures of the Protocol,
but was using practices and procedures which were frustrating the imple-
mentation of the Protocol. Despite considerable flexibility permitted
under the withholding of deportation provision, the BIA retained the
clear probability standard. 4 Additionally, the courts lacked conformity in
a refugee eligibility standard. As Justice Stevens noted in INS v. Stevic,'6
the courts that reviewed withholding of deportation determinations after
the U.S. became a party to the Protocol differed in their application of an
appropriate refugee eligibility standard. Some courts used the well-
founded fear standard. 6 Other courts used the clear probability stan-
dard,1 7 while other formulations were conceived by other courts. 8 The
need for legislation to conform INS standards and practices to those of
the 1967 Protocol was not met until the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act
("Refugee Act" or "Act").' 9
11. See supra note 6.
12. 1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 6, art. 1(2) (directly incorporating the definition
of "refugee" contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2)).
13. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report shows experts and Protocol spon-
sors were unequivocal in their assurances that ratification of the document "would not im-
pinge adversely upon the federal and state laws of this country." S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
14. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 72.
15. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
16. Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d
1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United States, 547
F.2d 1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962
(1977); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976);
Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971).
18. Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d 1276, 1277 n.3 (9th Cir. 1972) ("would be perse-
cuted"); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable persecution"); Daniel v.
INS, 528 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 920 (1971); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) ("likely"
persecution); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) ("probability of persecution").
19. Prior to the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, bills were considered by the House of
Representatives to contain the "wellfounded fear" language. See Western Hemisphere Im-
migration Hearings on H.R. 367, H.R. 981, and H.R. 10323, before the House Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong.,
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A. The 1980 Refugee Act
The Refugee Act was designed to bring the United States into con-
formity with the Protocol. This created significant changes in existing im-
migration law. First, the Act established a new standard of uniform and
non-ideological refugee eligibility. This was accomplished by incorporat-
ing the Protocol's definition of "refugee" into U.S. immigration law20 and
adding the asylum provision of section 208(a) to the INA.2 Additionally,
the Act amended section 243(h),22 eliminating the discretionary power of
the Attorney General by requiring that all aliens who meet the standard
for eligibility be granted withholding of deportation.2 The requirement
that an alien be subjected to persecution was substituted for the require-
1st & 2nd Sess. (1976).
20. Compare the definition included in the Refugee Act of 1980 which reads: The term
"refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwill-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion....
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982), with the definition embodied in the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who... owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(July 28, 1951) [hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Convention], art. 1(A), as amended by
1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 6 at art. 1(2).
The joint explanatory statement of the Conference Committee on the bill which became
the Refugee Act observed that both the House and Senate versions of the bill incorporated
the Protocol's definition of refugee. H.R. conf. Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160. The conference report adopted the
House provision which "incorporated the U.N. definition, as well as Presidentially-specified
persons within their own country who are being persecuted or who fear persecution" and
excluded "persons who themselves have engaged in persecution." Id.
21. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160. The asylum provision provides as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the
United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to
apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney
General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning
of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
22. 8 U.S.C.§ 1253(h) (1982).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). Prior to 1980, section 243(h) provided that: "The At-
torney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States
to any country in which, in his opinion, the alien would be subject to persecution on account
of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems necessary for
such reason." Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976)
(amended 1980).
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ment that an alien just show that his life or freedom is threatened.2 4 Un-
fortunately, Congress failed to establish a definite standard for section
243(h) claims and this omission of an applicable standard has created nu-
merous disputes over the degree of proof an alien needs to present for
withholding of deportation. 5
Given the multifarious results of the Refugee Act in approaching a
refugee standard,2" it was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court
would hear a case on the withholding of deportation standard.
B. INS v. Stevic
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic27 was
whether Congress had intended to liberalize the standard of proof re-
quired to obtain withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the
Refugee Act. The case was brought up from the Second Circuit, which
ruled that the Refugee Act had adopted a more liberal "well-founded fear
of persecution" test in section 243(h) cases consistent with the interna-
tional standards in the 1967 Protocol.2
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an alien must establish
a "clear probability of persecution" to avoid deportation under section
24. Id. As amended by the Refugee Act, section 243(h)(1) of the INA provides that:
"The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
25. For a discussion on the different interpretations over whether the statutory revi-
sions of the Refugee Act had changed the degree of proof an alien needs for § 243(h) claims,
see Helton, Political Asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act, An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 252-53 (1984).
26. The well-founded fear standard as set forth in § 101(a); definition of refugee con-
tributed to the inter-circuit dissension over the standard of proof applicable to § 243(h),
withholding claims, and § 208(a), asylum claims.
The Second and Sixth Circuits took the position that the well-founded fear standard
was more lenient than the clear probability standard. These courts applied the well-founded
fear standard to both withholding of deportation and asylum claims. See, e.g., Stevic v.
Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 1982) ("asylum may be granted, and under Section 243(h),
deportation must be withheld, upon a showing far short of a 'clear probability' that an indi-
vidual will be singled out for persecution"), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984); Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1982) (following Stevic v. Sava), vacated,
747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2173 (1985). In contrast, the Third
Circuit found no difference between the two standards and applied clear probability to both
withholding and asylum claims. See, e.g., Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982)
("We read 'well-founded fear' within the circumstances of its use and hold that it equates
with 'clear probability.' "). The Board of Immigration Appeals also equated the well-
founded fear standard with the clear probability standard following passage of the 1980
Refugee Act. See, In Re Lain, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 17-18 (BIA 1981); In re Salim, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 311, 314 (BIA 1982). This view was xejected by the Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
27. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
28. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982).
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243(h)29 thus maintaining the BIA practice of construing the clear
probability standard to mean that it was "more likely than not that the
alien would be persecuted in the country to which he was being de-
ported.""0 In Stevic, equal deference should be given to what the Court
did not hold. It did not hold that the clear probability and well-founded
fear standards are synonymous.3 " It did not define the meaning of the
phrase "well-founded fear" of persecution. However, it did say that the
"well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear probability
of persecution standard .. ."2
Failing to define the well-founded fear standard in asylum cases per-
petuated the incongruity between the circuit courts on the issue of
whether there is any difference between the clear probability standard for
withholding of deportation, and the well-founded fear standard for asy-
lum eligibility.33
29. Id. at 430.
30. Id. at 429.
31. Id. at 430.
32. Id. at 425. The court in Stevic seemed to lace this opinion with language of compro-
mise in a very controversial case. The New York Times, in its analysis of the court's may
shed some light into the court decision when it surmised:
The Court's failure to reach the asylum issue may indicate that the case was
more difficult than it appeared to be from the unanimous opinion. The narrow
treatment may have been the result of a behind-the-scenes compromise
designed to break a six-month deadlock. The case, I.N.S. v. Stevic [sic], No.
82-973, was argued Dec. 6, making it one of the oldest cases on the Court's
docket. The Court does not ordinarily take that long on a case it decides unan-
imously. New York Times, June 6, 1984.
33. The Third Circuit singularly contended that there is no difference between the
well-founded fear and clear probability standards. See Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir.
1984). The court was reaffirming its position in Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Sixth Circuit noted that the well-founded fear standard required a lesser showing than
the clear probability standard. See Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984). The
court in Youkhanna found that neither standard had been satisfied in that case. In contrast
to the Sixth Circuit's silence on the issue, the Seventh Circuit addressed the difference in
the evidence required for asylum and withholding of deportation. The court in Caravajal-
Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1985) indicated that the "clear probability" standard
requires objective evidence to corroborate the applicant's testimony, while "sometimes" the
applicant's testimony alone will be sufficient to meet the well-founded fear standard. See
Carava-jal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 562.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the well-
founded fear standard for asylum adjudication was easier to fulfill than the clear probability
standard for withholding of deportation. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282-83
(9th Cir. 1985). In Bolanos-Hernandez the court held that there was a clear probability that
the petitioner would be subject to political persecution if he returned to El Salvador. Id. at
1287-88. Specific threats against Bolanos-Hernandez were sufficient to establish a threat of
persecution, even though they were representative of the general level of violence in El Sal-
vador. Id. at 1284-85. Bolanos-Hernandez's neutrality constituted a political opinion. Id. at
1286-87. The court held that he had met the clear probability standard for withholding of
deportation and reversed the denial of his section 243(h) claim. Id. at 1287-88. Holding that
"an alien who has met the clear probability standard has, a fortiori, demonstrated a well-
founded fear of persecution," the court reversed and remanded the denial of Bolanos-Her-
nandez's section 208(a) claim. Id. at 1288.
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Additionally, Stevic's failure to instruct on the differences between
the "clear probability" standard for withholding of deportation and the
"well-founded fear" standard for asylum eligibility, preserved the BIA's
interpretation that the two standards converge.8 '
C. In Matter of Acosta
After years of inconsistency on the part of the BIA in interpreting
the standards of proof for section 208 and section 243,35 the Board In
Matter of Acosta"6 attempted to clarify its understanding of the well-
founded fear standard. In Acosta, the Board maintained its practice of
converging section 208 asylum claims and section 243 withholding of de-
portation standard when it concluded that in practical applications the
standards "converge. '3 7 The BIA based its determination of "well-
founded fear of persecution" on its understanding of congressional intent
when passing the Refugee Act.38 The BIA also methodically selected
favorable language from the UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Cri-
teria for Determining Refugee Status 39  ("UNHCR Handbook" or
"Handbook").
Acosta provided the BIA with a comprehensible opinion to base its
understanding and application of well-founded fear by merging the stan-
dard with the clear probability standard and requiring refugees to satisfy
the clear probability standard for their asylum claims. This burden of
proof was placed on Cardoza-Fonseca by the BIA in her claim for asy-
lum.40 The BIA, after ignoring Cardoza-Fonseca's argument that the clear
34. The BIA first converged the well-founded fear and clear probability standards of
§ 208 and § 243, respectively, in In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973) when the
Board announced that it believed that the clear probability of persecution standard was not
different from the well-founded fear of persecution standard found in the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.
35. The Board's interpretation of section 208(a) regarding the standard of well-founded
fear has been far from consistent. Compare Matter of McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, rev'd
on other grounds, McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring proof of actual
persecution), with Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (requiring "objective
evidence that [the applicant] has a well-founded fear that he is likely to be singled out for
persecution. . ."), and Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 358 (BIA 1983) (requiring that
the alien ". . . demonstrate a likelihood that he individually will be singled out and sub-
jected to persecution.")
36. Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (Mar. 1, 1985).
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 24. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979) [hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK]. To the extent that the Handbook does not require an asylum seeker
to show that he is more likely than not to be persecuted, the Board rejects the Handbook as
inconsistent "with Congress' intention and with the meaning of the Protocol." In re Acosta,
Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 19, 25 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
40. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, File No. A24 420 980, San Francisco at 3
(BIA Sept. 1983).
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probabllity standard was the wrong standard to apply to the asylum re-
quest,4' ruled that its conclusion would be the same whether it applied "a
standard of clear probability," "good reason," or "realistic likelihood" of
persecution." '
D. The Ninth Circuit In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS
In reversing the BIA decision,' the Ninth Circuit, in Cardoza-Fon-
seca, embraced a well-founded fear standard that was contrasted with the
clear probability standard by drawing a distinction between "probability"
and "possibility" of persecution.4 The court endorsed a formulation de-
rived from Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, an earlier Ninth Circuit case.45
The Bolanos court noted that an evaluation of "well founded fear"
includes an inquiry into the subjective element of the applicant's state of
mind, as well as objective elements like the conditions, the law and exper-
iences of others in the country of origin.4'The court's determination that
"well-founded fear '47 must be supported by objective evidence 48 must not
be coalesced with the BIA construction of "well-founded fear." The BIA
required that an individual's fear of persecution have a basis in objective
facts that shows a "realistic likelihood" of persecution. 49 The applicable
difference between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit's "well-founded fear"
language is the BIA's interpretation of "realistic likelihood" to mean a
clear probability of persecution,"0 whereas the Ninth Circuit interpreted
"realistic likelihood" to mean a reasonable existence of persecution.1
IV. INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA OPINION
In Cardoza-Fonseca,"2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "clear
probability" standard of proof for section 243(h), "withholding of depor-
tation," does not govern asylum applications under section 208(a).5 3 Jus-
41. Id. at 11.
42. Id. at 13.
43. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1450.
45. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 1282. The Bolanos court went on to say that one who has qualified for asylum
as opposed to withholding of deportation, may have established only the existence of a valid
reason to fear. Id. at 1285.
47. The court in Cardoza-Fonseca notes that the well-founded fear standard requires
that "the alien have a subjective fear." Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d at 1452.
48. The court requires that objective facts "support an inference of past or risk of fu-
ture persecution. That the objective facts are established through the credible and persua-
sive testimony of the applicant does not make those facts less objective." Id. at 1452-53.
49. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 at 21 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
50. See id. at 25. See also Rozell Asylum Eligibility. The Proper Standard For Asylum
Eligibility Is A Well-Founded Fear Of Persecution, 26 VA. INT'L L.J. 1039, note 68 and ac-
companying text.
51. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452.
52. See generally, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
53. Id. at 1212-1215.
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tice Stevens, in a 6 - 3 majority, delivered the opinion of the court. After
an exhaustive examination of the legislative history surrounding the stan-
dards under sections 208(a) and 243(h), the majority concluded that the
statutory language of the 1980 Refugee Act indicates a congressional in-
tent that the two standards should differ. 4 The court based this conclu-
sion on the statutory language of sections 208(a) and 243(h). In section
243(h) the court notes that the "would be threatened" language "has no
subjective component." However, it requires that the alien "establish by
objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he... will be subject
to persecution."5 5 The court contrasted the section 208 standard by con-
cluding that the relevance to "fear" in the standard requires a subjective
mental state in the alien and this is the foundation for eligibility.56
Congressional intent to have separate standards for section 208 and
section 243, the court noted, was evident in the simultaneous drafting of
the section 208 standard while leaving the standard of section 243(h)
intact.5 7
The court, in its examination of the Refugee Act and its language,
found it necessary to look at legislative history for support, despite its
conclusions that the plain language of the Act appeared to settle the
question before them." It found influential precedent which was coactive
with the Refugee Act in a historical interpretation in various bodies of
law.
A. Section 203(a)(7)
The first was the link between pre-1980 section 203(a) (7)9, and sec-
tion 207 standards 0 of admission. The court found that Congress was sat-
isfied with the procedural methods by which they dealt with refugees
outside the United States6 1 and they adopted the "well-founded" lan-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1213-1214. The court explained its examination of the legislative history with,
"In this case, far from causing us to question the conclusion that flows from the statutory
language, the legislative history adds compelling support to our holding that Congress never
intended to restrict eligibility for asylum to aliens who can satisfy § 243(h)'s strict, objective
standard." Id. at 1213-1214. See note 12 and accompanying text.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1151. This statute authorized "conditional entry" to a regulated arrival
of refugees fleeing from communistdominated areas of the Middle East based on "persecu-
tion or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion."
60. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 207 - 8 U.S.C. § 1157, regulates the admis-
sion of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries. Compare section 207 with sec-
tion 208, which applies to refugees currently in the U.S. See supra note 2. Both look to
section 101(a)(42) for the statutory definition of "refugee." See also supra note 20.
61. The procedure was considered acceptable under the U.N. Protocol. However, the
court found that the geographical and political distinctions were unacceptable under the
Protocol. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1215.
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guage to be in conformance with the 1967 U.N. Protocol.12 The court con-
cluded that the requirements of clear probability of persecution "to show
a well-founded fear" would be an abrogation of congressional intent, and
that the standard for admission under section 207 is the same as the one
previously applied under section 203(a)(7).
The U.N. Protocol6 3 was, as the court concluded, the primary pur-
pose for the 1980 Refugee Act."4 The court traced back the Protocol's
definition of "refugees" and found that it was incorporated into the 1951
U.N. Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees,6 and eventually in-
corporated into the 1967 Protocol.
The court concluded that the standard of "well-founded fear" has
been consistently understood as not requiring an alien "to show that it is
more likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as
a refugee. 66
B. The UNHCR Handbook And U.N. Protocol
The court found additional assistance in separating the two sections,
208 and 243 respectively, in the UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.6 7 It concluded that the Hand-
book is consistent with the court's examination of the standard to be con-
sidered for "well-founded fear." The court noted that the applicant's fear
is well-founded when it is proven that staying in the country of origin has
become intolerable for reasons stated in the definition, or that it would be
intolerable if he/she returned, for the same reasons, and if this can be
established by a reasonable degree.6 "
The Handbook provides guidance in construing the Protocol and has
been widely used for establishing the obligations of the Protocol, the
court noted. 9 However, it was not suggested by the court that the Hand-
book binds the BIA to its reference with section 208."0
62. Id. at 1216-1217.
63. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
64. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __, 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
65. The court found that the definition of "refugee" is found in the 1916 Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which defined a "refugee" as a person who
had a valid objection to returning to his country of nationality, and specified that "fear,
based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, rtl:gion, nationality, or political
opinions..." constituted a valid objection. See IRO Constitution 1 § C annex 1 art. l(a)(i),
as cited in Cardoza-Fonseca, at 1216.
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951). The court noted that the Committee that drafted the
provision explained that "[t]he expression 'well-founded fear of being the victim of persecu-
tion . . .' means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show
good reason why he fears persecution." U.N. Rep. 39 as cited in Cardoza-Fonseca at 1216.
See also supra note 20.
66. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1215.
67. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39.
68. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1217-1218.
69. Id. at 1217, and supra note 22.
70. Id. at 1217, and supra note 22. The suggestion of using the Handbook as guidance
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The court analogized the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees,71 articles 33.1 and 34, with sections 208 and
243, respectively, and concluded that section 243's and section 208's dis-
cretionary mechanism is "precatory" and, like article 33, does not require
the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are
eligible. 7" The court concluded that the Protocol's article 33.1 requests a
discretionary benefit for those aliens who qualify as refugees, while article
34 is an entitlement for the subcategory of those who "would be
threatened." This distinction between the broad class of refugees and the
subcategory entitled to section 243(h) relief is plainly revealed in the 1980
Act.73
C. Rejection Of The Senate Bill
The court's exhaustive examination of pertinent legislative history
ended with a conclusion that congressional rejection of the Senate Bill"
under consideration preceding the passage of the 1980 Act in favor of the
House Bill;7 5 "demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict
eligibility," for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standards.7
D. Government's Arguments Rejected
The government asserted two primary arguments for converging the
section 208 and section 243 standards; both arguments were rejected by
the Court.7 7 The court found that the government's contention, that it is
anomalous for section 208 to have a less stringent standard than section
243, when section 208 provides greater benefits than section 243, is non-
sensical. The Court firmly rejected this argument when it said:
We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of
for construing a "well founded fear" standard may have considerable consequences for fu-
ture interpretation and application of "well-founded fear." This is discussed in text and
accompanying notes 88-100.
71. 1961 Convention, supra at note 6. The court found that section 243(h) corresponds
with article 33.1 in that section 243(h)'s imposition of a "would be threatened if deported"
stems from article 33.1. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __, 107 S. Ct. at 1218-1219, is compa-
rable to article 33.1's requiring an applicant to satisfy the burden of proving that he/she has
a well-founded fear of persecution, i.e. he/she is a refugee and that the refugee can show
that his/her life or freedom would be threatened. See id. at 1218.
72. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
73. Id. at 1218.
74. Senate Bill, S.643, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
75. House Bill, H.R. 2816, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
76. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. at 1218-1219.
The Senate Bill contained a provision which included the additional burden on a refu-
gee that he could not obtain asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited
under section 243(h)" S.Rep. 26. Thus, the court reasoned that the Senate's inclusion of this
additional requirement for section 208 relief indicates that the Senate recognized a differ-
ence between the "well-founded fear" standard of section 208 and the "clear probability"
standard of section 243. Id. at 1218.
77. Id. at 1219-1222.
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'refugees,' those who can show a clear probability of persecution are
entitled to mandatory suspension of deportation and are eligible for
discretionary asylum, while those who can show a well-founded fear of
persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the dis-
cretionary relief of asylum.
7 8
The court also rejected the government's second argument, that substan-
tial deference should be accorded the BIA's position of converging the
"clear probability standard" and "well-founded fear" standard. The court
reasoned that the issue of congressional intent to draft the standards as
identical is subject to statutory construction.7 9 This is not a question of
case-by-case interpretation left to administrative agencies, but an issue of
statutory construction of which the courts are the final authority.80
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell, in writing the dissenting opinion,8 found the BIA in-
terpretation of sections 208 and 243, respectively, "reasonable.""2
The dissenting opinion was drafted around three objections to the
Cardoza-Fonseca decision. The first was the view that legislative history
seems to indicate that congressional intent authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to apply their interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard
prior to 1980, and that this standard should carry over in adjudicating
asylum applications."
The dissent, in its second objection, found the majority's reliance on
the materials interpreting the U.N. Protocol, "marginally relevant.
8 4
Concluding that the materials encouraged a mathematical approach to
the likelihood of persecution, the dissent asserted that the BIA's rejection
of such an approach is consistent with the drafters of the Protocol. 5
Finally, the dissent objected to the majority's reliance on the Confer-
ence Committee's rejection of the Senate bill in favor of the House bill.8"
The difference between the two bills is insignificant, thus the Conference
Committee's choice of the language of the House bill is equally insignifi-
cant, the dissent concluded.
V. CONCURRING OPINIONS
A. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, provided an interesting
78. Id. at 1219.
79. Id. at 1220-1221.
80. Id.
81. Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White. Id. at 1225.
82. Id. at 1228-1229.
83. Id. at 1229.
84. Id. at 1229-1230.
85. Id. at 1230.
86. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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summation of the majority's downfalls in reaching a judgment, of which
the Justice concurs; but he objected to methods of reaching this conclu-
sion: "Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the INS's interpreta-
tion [of "well-founded fear"] is clearly inconsistent with the plain mean-
ing of that phrase and the structure of the Act, . . . there is simply no
need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the interpreta-
tion is entitled to deference.""7
Justice Scalia further noted that the majority's excessively gratuitous
examination of legislative history raises the potential for misuse in the
principles of administrative law as well as the betrayal of the majority's
assurance that they were not setting forth a detailed standard for "well-
founded fear." '
One can only hope that Justice Scalia's conjecture becomes opera-
tional, thus providing the court with a detailed interpretation of the well-
founded fear standard, based on the UNHCR Handbook. The Handbook
has been widely circulated and approved by governments.8" Additionally,
the Handbook has been used in many judicial decisions in the interpreta-
tion of the 1967 Protocol,90 and since the 1980 Refugee Act was designed
to bring the U.S. into conformity with the 1967 Protocol, the use of the
Handbook for interpretation of "well-founded fear" is a consistent choice.
The need for the Handbook's guidance after the Cardoza- Fonseca
opinion is certain. Even though the majority clearly endorsed the Hand-
book as a legitimate interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard,
the court fell short in breathing substantive life into the standard, "but
instead left the task to the INS in a process of case-by-case
adjudication."01
87. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. at 1224. Justice Scalia is concerned
about what he views as an "unjustifiable" use of the majority's "superfluous discussion to
express controversial, and I believe erroneous, views." Id. at 1222 on refashioning important
principles of administrative law in cases in which such "questions are completely unneces-
sary to the decision." Id. at 1225.
88. See supra note 71 and Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1224, note 31.
Justice Scalia referred to the majority's endorsement of the UNHCR Handbook, which ex-
plains "well-founded fear" as:
In general, the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can
establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of ori-
gin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or
would for the same reason be intolerable if he returned there.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39 at Ch. II B(2)(a) § 42. See also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
89. Report of the 30th Session, U.N. Doc A/AC.96/572 (1979) at paras. 68, 72 (1)(h);
Report of the 31st Session U.N. Doc. A/AC. 96/5878 (1980).
90. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d
562 (7th Cir. 1984); Ananoh-Firempory v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (Ist Cir. 1985). Matter of Rodri-
guez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 965 (BIA 1980); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA
1982).
91. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. at 1221.
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, noted this eschewal of a
substantive attachment to the well-founded fear standard by the court,
and noted that he understood "the court has directed the INS to the ap-
propriate sources from which the agency should derive the meaning of the
well-founded fear standard.2 The need for a well-founded fear analysis
that examines the "subjective feelings of an applicant coupled with an
inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear," '93
was noted by Justice Blackmun. He found the necessity of such formula
based on INS' previous interpretation of the well-founded fear standard,
which was strikingly contrary to the plain language of the Refugee Act
and legislative history.
Justice Blackmun concluded that "while the INS need not ignore
other sources of guidance," the integration of the previously mentioned
well-founded fear formula "should be significant in the agency's formula-
tion...
VI. CONCLUSION
The Handbook's interpretation of "well-founded fear" provides satis-
factory guidance for such a formula. Expanding on the previously men-
tioned explanation of "well-founded fear" as construed by the UNHCR
Handbook, the definition of "well-founded fear" has been explicated in
the Handbook as follows:
Since fear is subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in
the person applying for recognition as a refugee. Determination of ref-
ugee status will therefore primarily require an evaluation of the appli-
cant's statements rather than a judgment of the situation prevailing in
his country of origin.9'
The Handbook recognizes that this element of fear is the added qualifica-
tion of "well-founded." It is a state of mind that encompasses not only
the frame of mind of the person in question that determines refugee sta-
tus, "but this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situa-
tion.""0 As mentioned above, the Handbook recognizes the importance of
the objective element in evaluating the statement made by the applicant.
However, the Handbook emphasizes that the ferr of the applicant, and
not the hypothetical likelihood of future events, is the central element of
the "refugee definition." 97 This evaluation sharply contrasts with conven-
tional forms of evidence which the INS expected to substantiate well-
92. Id. at 1223.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39 at para. 38.
96. Id. at para. 40.
97. Id. at para. 41.
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founded fear claims."
Thus, when INS converged the "well-founded fear" and "clear
probability" standards, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, its evaluation of the re-
spondent's political asylum claim sharply contrasted with the Handbook's
interpretation of "well-founded fear." Clearly, an applicant for asylum
might have a "wellfounded fear" of persecution long before "all or virtu-
ally all" of the members of his group had actually become victims of
persecution.0 9
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca fell short of a
precise determination of the necessary standard for asylum claims. The
effects of the Supreme Court's failure to specify what is a minimum likeli-
hood of persecution necessary to establish a well-founded fear are un-
clear. However, it is evident by the BIA's action in the Matter of Sanchez
and Escobar,100 decided subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Car-
doza- Fonseca,"1 ' that an inequitable denial of asylum can exist under the
standards laid out in Cardoza-Fonseca, based on a failure to satisfy the
objective element in the evaluating statement. 2
Additionally, the BIA can effectively close the gap between the two
standards by requiring evidence of selective persecution, i.e. that an indi-
vidual must show that he or she has been selected for persecution based
on specific facts,1 3 in order to satisfy the well-founded fear standard.
This BIA requirement of objective evidence falls short of the neces-
sary evidence to take into account what is "well-founded fear." The court
should not only take into account the general history of persecution in
the home country and the applicant's personal experience and that of his
or her family, (i.e. persecution based on race, religion, nationality, etc.)
but also the intensity of fear, the nature of the projected harm (i.e.death,
98. Id. at para 42. See also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
99. The use of "clear probability" or a comparable standard for determining refugee
status would require almost certainty of persecution. As noted by the petitioner in Stevic,
467 U.S. at note 26 and accompanying text, evidence to substantiate the "clear probability"
of persecution is "evidence of persecution of all or virtually all members of a group or class
to which the alien belonged..." Petitioner's Brief in INS v. Stevic at 9, 23 and notes 25 and
32.
100. Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. No. 2996 at 5. (BIA Oct. 1985).
101. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. The BIA found that the standard delineated by the court did not change the out-
come in the Sanchez and Escobar Interim Dec. No. 2996 at 5 (BIA Oct. 1985). The BIA
denied Sanchez and Escobar's claim because they failed to establish "a clear probability of
persecution under section 243(h) or a well-founded fear of persecution under section 208(a)
of the Act, as that standard is described in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS." Id. at 14.
The BIA's denial of asylum and withholding was based on the objective limitations of
the applicant's fear of persecution. They failed to establish that their persecution was based
on or on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion as required by the Act. See Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. at 12.
103. As noted above, the BIA requires that specific facts that show a selective persecu-
tion based on, or on account of, race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. See Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. at 5.
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imprisonment, torture, detention, serious discrimination, etc.) and all
other surrounding circumstances.'" One can only hope, with the Supreme
Court's reliance on and endorsement of the UNHCR Handbook coupled
with the Supreme Court's conclusion that "well-founded fear" focuses on
the reasonableness of fear and not on the likelihood of events, that future
courts will apply the appropriate standard.
The need for a humanitarian standard is unequivocal. The harm
done by an erroneous decision, excluding a refugee from asylum status, is
often worse than that caused by a wrongful conviction. 10 5 The likelihood
of an erroneous decision transpiring is increased by an unrealistic stan-
dard of proof.106
An approach to an asylum determination which recognizes the grav-
ity of harm subsequent to an erroneous decision, and the special situation
of the applicant, would place the U.S. in accordance with its long history
of rhetoric'07 in welcoming the "huddled masses yearning to breathe
free."s
Jeff Jones
104. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d at note 45. This approach is illustrated by a
recent decision of the Higher Administrative Court, Hamburg, decision of April 11, 1983 -
OVG Bf. V 30182, InfAuslR 1983, p. 137, also published in Marx, 1 Asylrecht (1984) at 237-
8: "In case of serious sanctions such as death penalty or long-term imprisonment or severe
torture, it can be sufficient that the possibility of these sanctions being applied is not re-
mote." (Translation by UNHCR) (emphasis supplied). See also Benipal v. Ministers of For-
eign Affairs and Immigration, Action No. 878/83, 1016/83 (High Court of New Zealand, Nov.
29, 1985):
Clearly there are subjective and objective considerations in the application of
the definition to the facts. While as a matter of convenience it is useful to
distinguish between the two ingredients, it can lead to error to regard them as
separate and independent elements which can be considered in isolation. If
fear exists, the issue whether that fear is well-founded cannot be divorced from
the fear itself: it is in relation to the fear that the issue of 'well-founded' must
be decided, not in relation to anything else.... (at 228)
105. See supra notes 89, 95 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 30 (1986) at 33-
57.
107. The history of refugees and U.S. governmental rhetoric have their origins at the
foundation of the republic up to the present time. In 1783, George Washington proclaimed
America a land whose "bosom is open to receive the persecuted and oppressed of all na-
tions." George Washington's "Address to the Members of the Volunteer Association and
Other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ireland Who Lately Arrived in the City of New York,"
Dec.7, 1973, in The Writings of George Washington, XXCII (GPA, Washington, D.C., 1983),
P. 244. More recently, President Ronald Reagan, in his acceptance speech for the Republi-
can nomination for President, said: "Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed
this land , this island of freedom here as a refuge for all those people who yearn to breathe
free? Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the iron curtain; the boat people of
southeast Asia,Cuba, and of Haiti; the victims of drought and famine in Africa; the freedom
fighters in Afghanistan." Ronald W. Reagan, "acceptance Speech, " Detroit, Michigan, July
17, 1980, p.8 . Unfortunately, President Reagan's speech was nothing more than rhetoric as
displayed by his Executive Order directing the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept boats laden
with Haitians sailing in the direction of the U.S. and tow them back to Port-au-Prince. See
President Ronald W. Reagan, "High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens,"Exec. Order No.
12324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48109 (1981).
108. E. LAZARUS, "THE NEW COLOSSUS," POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS, 202 (The Riverside
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1982).
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DEVELOPMENT
Soviet Human Rights Under Gorbachev: Old
Wine in a New Bottle?
In times of crisis, nearly everything may depend on the regard and
confidence placed in some man who possesses the experience and
qualities of a leader.1
Plutarch
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet government has through its seventy year history fre-
quently been criticized by Western governments for its unfavorable rec-
ord on human rights. Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and
Lenin's short rule, the Soviet people endured twenty-four years of hegem-
ony under Joseph Stalin. As a result of Stalin's intentions to create an
industrial and military power, numerous hard-line policies were formed,
some of which still remain today.
Gorbachev's ascent to power has brought the area of human rights
into an evolving and dynamic period. He has introduced "glasnost," a
policy where through the devices of criticism and monitoring by the
masses, the Soviets can be assured of a more healthy and prosperous soci-
ety. In order to achieve this there has been a relaxation in government
policy towards censorship, demonstrations, and prisoners. Most academi-
cians have found it premature to voice a decisive opinion on whether
human rights have in fact improved, mainly because the Gorbachev ad-
ministration is so new at coping with these issues.
The strained issue of human rights, which has been a major obstacle
in East-West relations has been somewhat diminished. Developments wit-
nessed in freedom of expression and movement might not completely sat-
isfy Western demands, however the steps which have been taken by the
Soviets do not appear to be mere token gestures. This article will begin
with a historical background of human rights in the Soviet Union tracing
the developments from Stalin to Krushchev to Gorbachev.2 The central
part of this article will discuss recent developments in five primary areas
of Soviet human rights: political prisoners; minority and religious prison-
1. PLUTARCH, MORALIA, COLLECTED WORKS OF PLUTARCH 340 (3d ed. 1951).
2. For studies on Gorbachev, see CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 85-858F; and
Simis, The Gorbachev Generation, 59 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1985).
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ers; demonstrations; censorship; and emigration. Finally, this article will
inspect the effectiveness of glasnost and whether Gorbachev's policies will
persevere.
II. BACKGROUND
Upon reading the Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republics, one
is struck by the remarkable likeness of its articles regarding individual
rights and liberties to the United States' Bill of Rights. The most signifi-
cant article in this respect is Article 50, which states: "In accordance with
the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the
socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech,
of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demon-
strations."8 Despite the similarity in language, the judicial interpretation
by Soviet courts has clearly not been as generous as their U.S. counter-
parts. Since 1918, the value of Art. 50 has been comparable to a lead
statue leafed in gold. It gives a striking and majestic first impression,
however, merely scraping the exterior reveals its true worth. It is also
astonishing that individual liberties were stressed by the most ruthless of
all Soviet leaders, Joseph Stalin, who once wrote:
Real liberty can be had only where exploitation is destroyed, where
there is no oppression of one people by another, where there is no
unemployment, and pauperism, where a person does not shiver in fear
of losing tomorrow his job, home, or bread. Only in such a society is it
possible to have real, and not paper, liberty, personal and otherwise."
Despite this hypocritical statement by Stalin, many rights formally
affirmed by the Supreme Law of the Soviet remained "dead letters" for
over two decades after 1936. Freedom of speech, press, assembly and as-
sociation, and inviolability of persons' homes and correspondence were
more often breached than obeyed; something which was acknowledged at
the XXth Party Congress and by succeeding Soviet leaders.'
After the death of Stalin in March 1953, significant progress was
made in the area of personal and social rights. However, the Soviet state
has still remained a totalitarian one party oligarchy in which political ac-
tivity opposing the government on basically any issue is barred, and free-
dom of expression will be permitted only within the limits of the existent
"party-line."'
3. KONST. SSSR, art. 50 (revised and adopted 1977). In comparison, Amendment I of
the Bill of Rights states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or for the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Izvestia, Dec. 8, 1936, at 1 (article by Stalin).
5. F. SCHUMAN, RUSSIA SINCE 1917, at 231-236 (2d ed. 1979).
6. D. BRAHAM, SOVIET POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 392 (2d ed. 1975). See also J. HAZARD,
MANAGING CHANGE IN THE USSR (1983).
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It is justifiable to state that the Communist human rights movement
was initiated by Nikita Krushchev. As a counter-reaction to the harsher
policies of Stalin, Krushchev liberated millions of people from prisons.7
Krushchev's motives were not based on benevolence or deep-felt sympa-
thy, instead, he had three broad motives for liberalizing human rights in
the Soviet Union. First, he sought to set in motion the extensive human
resources of the Soviet Union after a prolonged period of stagnation. Sec-
ond, he wanted to satisfy the West's desire for concessions on human
rights issues. And third, he wished to improve the general atmosphere of
East-West relations in order to facilitate increased trade and arms con-
trol. Gorbachev is motivated by very similar goals. Like Krushchev,
Gorbachev has concluded that in order to restore health to the economy,"
and to narrow the technological deficiency towards the West, it is essen-
tial to mobilize the so-called "creative intelligentsia" on his side. This is a
strong and radical prescription to cure the illness which is plaguing the
Soviet system.'
Human rights issues in the Soviet Union have been influenced by the
United Nations Covenant on Human Rights of 1973, which was ratified
by the Soviet Union. 10 In addition, the Soviets signed the final act of the
"Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975," better
known as the "Helsinki Accord."' 1 Though the Accord is not a treaty, and
is therefore not legally binding, it has been treated almost as a legal com-
mitment by the signatory states. It seems quite probable that both of
these agreements have influenced the current Soviet leadership in its po-
sition on human rights. For example, the Soviet Union has begun to real-
7. V. CHALIDZE, PRAVA CHELOVEKA I SOVETSKI SoIuz (1974). English: To DEFEND THESE
RIGHTS 51 (1974). See also R. MEDVEDEV, KNIGA 0 SOTSIALISTISHESKoI DEMOKRATII (1972).
English: ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY (1975). Both of these experts believe that the Soviet sys-
tem would be acceptable to the rest of the world community if the Soviets would adhere to
their own constitutional rights guarantees.
8. It is important to note the economic developments in the USSR; examples being in
annual rates of growth: Total GNP: [1961-65] 5.0% p.a., [1984] 2.5% p.a.; Consumption:
[1961-65] 3.7% p.a., [1984] 3.0% p.a.; Investment: [1961-65] 7.5% p.a., [1984] 1.7% p.a.
Further statistics can be found in CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics, C.P.A.S. 85-10001
(1985), at 64-65.
9. See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, REP. No. 86-87 F [hereinafter CRS 86]. This is an
excellent report from the XXVIIth Soviet Communist Party Congress.
10. Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR No. 40 item 4564 (1973); ratification on Sept. 18, 1973.
11. Text of the Final Act can be found in 73 Dep't State Bull. 323 (1975), or in 14
I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Pertinent sections concerning human rights are Principle VII and Bas-
ket III. Principle VII deals with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The
most significant section states that: "The participating States will respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Under the section for coopera-
tion in humanitarian and other fields, Basket III covered cooperation regarding family unifi-
cation, travel, sports, activities, and freer and wider dissemination of information. See gen-
erally APPRAISAL OF ITS RAMIFICATIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
HELSINKI ACCORD (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977); Coughlin, Monitoring of the Helsinki Accords:
Belgrade 1977, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 511 (1977).
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ize that a nation state's method of treating its population is not solely a
domestic concern.
2
Socio-economic conditions have reached such a low ebb in the USSR
that outsiders do not hesitate to speak of a crisis in the country's internal
metabolism. This crisis began with Leonid Brezhnev, and accentuated in
the last ten years of that regimes existence, the crisis lingered on into the
paralyzing interregnum of the early 1980's. To the Soviets, this lethargy
would imply a threat to the viability of their political system, together
with prediction of imminent discontinuities. In short, there is a crisis of
effectiveness.
Gorbachev's liberalization of the system has been cloaked in the term
"glasnost," which can be interpreted as greater openness in public life,
candor, and self-criticism. Interestingly enough, this term was also used
by Lenin.'3 Possibly the best interpretation of glasnost is democratization
of the system. Glasnost may be the boldest act by a Soviet leader since
1917. How exactly does glasnost fit into the Gorbachev administration's
overall strategy? The name of the strategy is perestroika, or economic
restructuring. Gorbachev calls perestroika "a revolution,"" one which
most likely will take years to achieve. He reinforces this contention by
stating that: "we need glasnost as we need the air.""' Without it, the So-
viet Union will most likely stagnate, will fail to compete in the world, and
will be vulnerable to outside pressures. Glasnost came first, creating the
freer atmosphere in which the drive for democratization has been
launched in earnest. Glasnost and perestroika now mean two things in
the human rights sector: 1) they are weapons Gorbachev has handed to
the Russian intellectuals meant to destroy inefficiency in the bureaucracy;
and, 2) they are an entrance back into the "normal" life for individuals
who had been wrongly imprisoned."
In his concluding speech to the Central Committee on January 28,
1987, Gorbachev spoke about glasnost: "The Communist Party firmly
holds that the people should know everything. Glasnost, criticism, and
self-criticism, monitoring by the masses - these are the guarantees of the
healthy development of Soviet society. The people must know everything
and consciously make judgments about everything.' 7 While the glasnost
policies of the Gorbachev leadership are essentially identical to the ones
of the Krushchev leadership, they have manifested as more systematic
12. See Henkin, The U.N. and Human Rights, 19 INT'L ORG. 504 (1965), and, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. IB83066, at 15. Previously, whenever a country or organization
criticized the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet government would al-
ways counter with the argument that human rights were domestic and not international
issues. Glasnost appears to be causing greater deference to human rights agreements, which
in turn changes the Soviet stance on issues of international domestic concern.
13. Wash. Post, March 22, 1987, sec. C, at 7, col. c.
14. M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 49 (1987).
15. Id. at 78.
16. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1987, sec. 4, at 2, col. 1.
17. Pravda, Jan. 29, 1987, at 1.
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and calculated, and have surpassed Krushchev's in scope and radicality.
To carry out his strategy, Gorbachev believes that the vast "untap-
ped resources of socialism" must be mobilized. Central planning and the
latest technology are crucial, but the least used resource is the human
factor. The Party must arouse the Soviet people from their apathy and
convince them that they all have a stake in the success of perestroika.
According to Gorbachev, this requires "the serious, deep democratization
of Soviet society . . . which will enable us to involve in reconstruction its
decisive strength - the people . . . . We need democracy like air. If we
don't understand this . .. our policies will founder and reconstruction
will collapse, comrades."' 8 In another speech, Gorbachev states that "we
need such powerful forms of democracy as glasnost, criticism and self-
criticism, to change radically every area of social life." Concluding, he
professed that "the more democracy we have, the faster we shall advance
along the road of reconstruction and social renewal, and the more order
and discipline we shall have in our socialist house. So is it either democ-
racy or social inertia and conservatism. There is no third way, com-
rades."' 9 It has been noted that this democratization process must be
somewhat tempered; a high-ranking editor states that "for Gorbachev to
be too far ahead of the people is not good." 0
Despite these extremely positive remarks by the Soviet leader, the
Westerner must be cautious not to overreact. Regardless of these inten-
tions of democratization, the USSR will continue with its socialist ideol-
ogy."' Glasnost's basic function is not to stimulate democracy, but instead
to encourage efficiency and industrial development. As Gorbachev himself
states in his book Perestroika: "those in the west who expect to give up
socialism will be disappointed." 2 In a July 1987 speech he stressed ex-
actly this point: "We intend to make socialism stronger, not replace it
with another system.
2 3
The issue thus becomes: can Gorbachev hope to succeed where
Krushchev failed? Is there evidence yet of a real shift in the Soviet han-
dling of human rights, or is this another Potemkin's village, what the
18. Pravda, Jan. 30, 1987, at 1. (Gorbachev's concluding speech at the Plenum of the
Central Committee).
19. Pravda, Feb. 26, 1987, at 1.
20. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, sec. 1, at 4, col. 1.
21. Id., sec. 1, at 7, col. 2. (text from Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of the
Russian revolution), which states: ". . . people must be taught in practice to live in the
conditions of deepening democracy, to extend and consolidate human rights, to nurture a
contemporary political culture of the masses; in other words, to teach and to learn democ-
racy ...perestroika will not succeed without a drastic invigoration of the activities of all
party organizations ...and so we must have a more businesslike and a more democratic
attitude, we must improve organization and tighten discipline ...then we will be able to
put perestroika into high gear and impart a new impetus to socialism in its development."
22. M. GORBACHEV supra note 14, at 37.
23. Time, July 27, 1987, at 31. See also Wash. Post, July 15, 1987, sec. A, at 16, col. a.
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Russians call pokazuka, or "just for show"? 2' To put flesh on the bones of
this skeletal conundrum, one must consider the five primary groups of
human rights issues in the Soviet Union: political prisoners; minority and
religious prisoners; demonstrations; censorship and emigration.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
A. Political Prisoners
Gorbachev understands that economic reforms cannot be truly effec-
tive without social reforms. For this reason, professional people in the
Soviet Union can expect better relations with the ruling authorities. In
addition, if concessions were made to dissidents, the reform coalition of
glasnost would most likely be strengthened. Other sections of the intelli-
gentsia are being satisfied with relaxed cultural controls, and increased
glasnost in scholarship, literature, and the arts. Most important is the
recent release from imprisonment of people who have close connections to
the intelligentsia. This should be considered an extremely strong political
gesture by the Kremlin. The United States State Department has an-
nounced that there are approximately 700 prisoners convicted for subver-
sive activities in Soviet prisons and camps.26 In February 1987, 140 pris-
oners who had been serving time for conducting "anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda" were pardoned by a decree from the government.26 In-
cluded in those released were Anatoly Koryagin, Aleksandr Ogorodnikov,
and Iosef Begun.17
In the short term, the release of political prisoners has yielded sub-
stantial gains beyond merely gratifying the liberal intelligentsia. Though
the releases were clearly convincing developments, the unfortunate deaths
in prison of several human rights advocates emphasized the dangerous
position of thousands of Soviet dissidents.2" After his release from exile in
Gorky, 9 Andrei Sakharov has been openly spreading favorable publicity,
without compromising his integrity, calling for support of Gorbachev's
general line.30 Many feel that with each step Gorbachev takes in this en-
terprise, he is coinstantaneously increasing 1) his own open-mindedness,
2) the esteem of a substantial part of the population, and 3) the support
to battle the opponents of glasnost.31
24. See Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1987, sec. A, at 18, col. e.
25. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 6.
26. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2.
27. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 87-551 F, at 12; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, sec.
1, at 1, col. 1. According to an estimate by Amnesty International, the group freed repre-
sented ca. one-third of the so-called "prisoners of conscience."
28. See N.Y. Times, supra note 25.
29. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 87-551 F, at 10 [hereinafter CRS 87].
30. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2; see also, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1987,
sec. 1, at 4, col. 5.
31. Id.
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Another significant development in the area of political prisoners
concerns the laws commonly used to place dissenters in labor camps; the
statutes governing "anti-Soviet propaganda" and "slandering the Soviet
State." These laws still remain on the books, however, there is high level
speculation that they will be tempered or repealed."s If this change be-
comes a reality, it would be significant evidence of the Soviet's desire for
change. According to Gennadi Gerasimov, spokesman for the Soviet for-
eign ministry, many of the pardons granted political prisoners were part
of a review of the Criminal Code "so that we have fewer people behind
bars and behind barbed wire.""3 Other Soviet officials stated that pardons
and related measures reflect a genuine determination by Gorbachev to
expand the limits of acceptable dissent. 4 Most recently, Gerasimov
stated that a general amnesty would be declared, one which would alleg-
edly release hundreds of prisoners. This would be the first amnesty in the
history of the Soviet Union relating only to individuals sentenced for po-
litical crimes.3 5
B. Minority and Religious Prisoners
Since the early 1930's, minorities and strongly religious individuals
have been persecuted and harassed.36 Today, it appears that the govern-
ment is taking a obdurate position regarding the treatment of national
minorities (such as Volga Germans, Armenians, and Ukrainians) and reli-
gious dissidents (primarily Jews, Baptists and Pentecostals). According to
a recent report, there has been a small number of national minority pris-
oners released, but no religious prisoners.3 7 It is important to emphasize
that only a minuscule portion of the several thousands of religious prison-
ers have so far been released, and some freed prisoners have been
threatened with arrests if they do not maintain silence. Also of impor-
32. The criminal law provisions which have been most frequently employed are: 1) Law
on Crimes Against the State Art. 7, and Art. 70 of the UK RSFSR Criminal Code, which
prohibits anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda; Art. 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code,
which makes it a crime to circulate statements known to be false which are defamatory to
the Soviet system; Art. 64 of the UK RSFSR Criminal Code, which provides for the death
penalty or lengthy prison sentences for treason; Art. 209-1 of the UK RSFSR Criminal
Code, which prohibits "malicious evasion of performance of decision concerning arrange-
ment of work and discontinuance of parasitic existence;" and, Art. 206 of the UK RSFSR
Criminal Code, which prohibits "malicious hooliganism," which is defined as any intentional
act violating public order and expressing "clear disrespect for society" which is committed
with "exceptional cynicism or special impudence." For an interesting view of why the dis-
senters should be punished, see article in Pravda, Feb. 12, 1977, at 4, which expressed the
previous Soviet leadership's views.
33. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1987, sec 1, at 1, col. 1.
34. Id.
35. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
36. R. MEDVEDEV ON SOCIALIsT DEMOCRACY 166 (1975); and A. MARCHENKO, MY TESTI-
MONY 71 (1969).
37. Report from the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, June 1987, at 1
[hereinafter Kennan].
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tance is the fact that some of the religious prisoners have come from the
ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church. An interesting, though possibly
insignificant, development occurred during this last summer, when Rev.
Gleb Yakunin was freed from imprisonment, and thereafter reinstated by
the Russian Orthodox Church. 8
C. Demonstrations
During the past year a few demonstrations have occurred in Moscow,
the city which is considered the showcase of liberalism. However, even in
Moscow, some demonstrations are still being dispersed by strong-armed
methods. An example would be the open demonstration by Jews pro-
testing the imprisonment of Jewish dissident Iosif Begun. This demon-
stration was promptly quashed by the authorities, who through plain-
clothes policemen pushed and hit demonstrators. 9 In addition, undesir-
able demonstrations have been preempted by systematic house arrests. 0
An opposite reaction by the authorities occurred at a demonstration by
300 Taters at the Kremlin gate. The demonstration concerned the Taters
desire to return to the Crimea, from where they had been deported in
1944. The police did nothing to stop the noisy demonstration, merely ob-
serving it from a distance." In addition, the Kremlin permitted a meeting
between President Andrei Gromyko and the Taters. However, Gromyko
warned the Taters that to continue to pressure the government would not
be in furtherance of their interests."2 Other demonstrations not disturbed
by the authorities involved Soviet Hare Krishnas, who demonstrated in
public, asking permission to practice their faith more freely,43 and a group
of 400 Russian nationalists from the Pamyat organization, who called for
a return to orthodox Leninism. 4' The latter group was permitted to meet
with the head of the Moscow Communist Party, Boris Yeltsin. Though
the authorities have seemed more inclined to tolerate small, unofficial
demonstrations and dissident news conferences, various Soviet spokes-
men have alluded that the regime will not tolerate very much in the way
of free-spoken dissent.'5
D. Censorship
Gorbachev has commented that "the press must become even more
effective. ' ' "6 In addition, he "wishes to emphasize that the press should
unite and mobilize people rather than disuniting them and generating of-
38. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, sec. 1, at 4, col. 3.
39. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, sec 1, at 1, col. 2.
40. See Kennan, supra note 37.
41. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 4.
42. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 2.
43. Wash. Post, May 2, 1987, sec. A, at 17, col. a.
44. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
45. See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1987, sec. 1, at 14, col. 1.
46. U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 9, 1987, at 74.
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fense and a lack of confidence. Criticism can be an effective instrument of
perestroika only if it is based on absolute truth and scrupulous concern
for justice.""' The most dramatic developments in this area have been
reports in the press discussing economic problems, corruption, and sub-
jects such as suicide, drug use, and rising criminal rates, though these
have been controlled by the leadership. 8 The media has also found itself
engaged in setting forth viewpoints on moral and cultural values.
An additional development is the increased frankness by the media
concerning accidents and natural disasters. Even though glasnost clearly
failed the test in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, due
to the unfortunate failure of swiftly reporting it before Swedish authori-
ties did, it was that failure which seems to have hastened the quick im-
provements that have occurred since the accident. Proof can be found in
the accident between a passenger liner and a cargo vessel, in which 398
people were killed. The reports from the Soviets were not sketchy or
delayed, but were instead quite candid.' 9
Regardless of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, there are limits to the
extent in which censorship can be lifted. Gorbachev conveyed his ap-
proach to such matters at the January plenum, by stating:
If someone tries to use our extensive glasnost and the democratic pro-
cess for his own selfish and anti-social purposes, for the purpose of
blackening everything, will we really - with such a powerful Party,
with such a patriotic people devoted to the ideas of socialism and to
its Motherland - not be able to cope with the situation."'
Here, Gorbachev appears to be stressing that glasnost is not a broad-
sword which the individual may swing as he pleases against the curtain of
freedom. It will be the Soviet society as a whole who shall decide exactly
how far that curtain shall be opened. Individualism is therefore limited.
Furthermore, it seems clear that the press must be subservient to fulfill
the Party's plan.
In discussions of foreign policy matters, glasnost has had less success.
Real Soviet motivations and negotiating positions are still too secret to be
debated by the Soviet public. Nevertheless, western officials, such as Ed-
ward Kennedy, Margaret Thatcher, and George Schultz have been per-
mitted to voice harsh views on Soviet television."' Most recently, the state
publishing company has voiced its desire to publish the autobiography of
super-capitalist Lee Iacocca. 52 Hints of an apparent desire by some ele-
ments in the leadership, possibly Gorbachev, to withdraw from Afghani-
47. Id.; see also Wash. Post, July 1, 1987, sec. A, at 1, col. b. (report on the Soviet
legislature's approval of some of Gorbachev's reforms, including freer speech).
48. See Kennan, supra note 37.
49. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 8.
50. NY. Times, Jan. 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 8, col. 1.
51. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 5. See also Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1987, sec. D, at I,
col. c. This article noted that Pravda began publishing commentary from Western press.
52. Newsweek, Sept. 7, 1987, at 5.
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stan were made when a letter by a prominent emigre was permitted to be
published in a Moscow newspaper. The letter challenged Gorbachev to
withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. As a counter-reaction,
Pravda criticized the letter," but the mere fact that a letter of this type
was published is truly revolutionary.
The increased cultural freedom has led to decisions to publish long-
suppressed works by writers such as Boris Pasternak, author of Doctor
Zhivago.54 Another book which would never have been published two
years ago is Anatoly Rybakov's novel chronicling the terror under Sta-
lin.5 The Soviet cinema is also changing. "Commissar," which is a twenty
year old film on anti-semitism, was shown at the recent Moscow Film
Festival. 6
The fierce ongoing struggle in the Kremlin between the liberal
Gorbachev trend and the conservatives is reflected in the equally fero-
cious conflicts of cultural life. The Kremlin's second in command, Yegor
Ligachev, lashed out on the developments by criticizing that enough focus
is not being directed towards the classics.5 7 Among the literary-political
publications, those controlled by conservatives (e.g. Zvezda and Liter-
aturnaya Rossiya) continue jousting with those edited by the liberals (e.g.
Ogonyok and Novyi Mir).
Numerous new journals have sprouted out of these developments.
One of these journals is named Glasnost, and is written by a group of
dissidents and freed political prisoners." Another journal, edited by the
known dissident Sergei Grigoryants, apparently contained articles of a
sort not seen in the Soviet Union since the 1920's.1 Due to the recent
uncharacteristic use of truth in the press, the population has reacted by
purchasing more magazines and newspapers. 0
For the present, glasnost's prospects in this field seem quite good.
Most of the influential positions are now in the hands of people who favor
it, such as the head of state publishing, Nenasev; the Minister of Culture,
Zakharov; and the editor of the Moscow News, Yakovlev. This group is
clearly empowered to influence the arts by thrusting back the boundaries
of censorship.
53. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, sec. 1, at 10, col. 3.
54. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 7 and 12; N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, sec. 1, at 5,
col. 1; Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1987, sec. A, at 1, col. a; Newsweek, Nov. 9, 1987, at 10. Pasternak
was denounced and expelled from the Soviet Writers Union in 1958 for "anti-Soviet"
writing.
55. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2.
56. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 3. Of plays, "The Brest Peace" by
Mikhail Shatrov, and "Requiem" by Anna Akhmatova have been permitted to be per-
formed. See CRS 87, supra note 29, at 14.
57. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 3.
58. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, sec. 1, at 12, col. 3.
59. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1987, sec. 1, at 27, col. 3.
60. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, sec. 1, at 30, col. 1.
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E. Emigration
The past decades have seen drastic reductions and increases in emi-
gration. During Stalin's years there was virtually no emigration. Brezhnev
reacted quite to the contrary, by permitting 260,000 Jews to leave in the
1970's. During the interregnum between Brezhnev and Gorbachev, per-
mission to emigrate slowed to a trickle. Since entering office, Gorbachev
has hinted that emigration restrictions may be relaxed."' In considering
this issue, Gorbachev must weigh many factors, including the fact that
the Jewish population is the most educated of all the nationalities in the
Soviet Union. Permitting emigration on a grandiose scale may not prove
itself an asset to the Soviet state. Quite contrary, the Soviet Union would
lose not only some of its greatest minds, but also some of its greatest
artists. There are Soviet officials who have stated that there is no political
dividend to be gained by an open policy of emigration." It should be
remembered that emigration has never been considered a right in the So-
viet Union,6s and that the handling of emigration policies has always been
an internal affair. It appears that this position is softening, possibly influ-
enced by the Helsinki Accord."'
According to some estimates, there are 11,000 refusniks in the Soviet
Union who have applied for exit visas,65 and nearly 400,000 who have
shown interest in leaving.6 Other nationalities which have shown interest
in leaving are the Germans and the Armenians. According to official West
German reports there are 100,000 Germans who wish to emigrate, while
German repatriation organizations believe that there are 300,000. There
are reports that possibly 200,000 Armenians would leave if permitted., In
1986, the Soviet government permitted 914 Jews to leave, less than in
1985 when 1140 left the Soviet Union. Currently, emigration of Jews has
risen strongly, as 5,398 people have so far been permitted to emigrate.
German and Armenian emigration has also increased."
Despite these positive developments, a new emigration law has been
introduced, restricting emigration to those who receive invitations from
immediate family members. Under this new emigration law, only 30,000
to 40,000 individuals would be eligible to leave. 9 This law, which went
into effect in January 1987, is a great deal tougher, not liberal, and may
be considered a potential source of foreign and domestic tension. If the
61. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Rep. No. 1B 82080, at 2 [hereinafter CRS IB].
62. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1987, sec. 1, at 5, col. 1.
63. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, sec. 1, at 12, col. 2.
64. See CRS IB supra note 61, at 3.
65. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1987, sec. 1, at 27, col. 2.
66. See CRS 1B supra note 61, at 5.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id. at 9. German emigration: 1986 - 753, 1987 - 3,550; Armenian emigration: 1986 -
247, 1987 - 1,281. 1987 statistics concerning Jews are through Sept. 30, 1987; concerning
Germans, through June 30, 1987; and concerning Armenians, through August 31, 1987.
69. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1987, sec. 1, at 5, col. 1.
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Soviets hold to the general intent and letter of the law, emigration will
once again decline to a trickle. Only a very small proportion of the more
than half million who have indicated their wish to emigrate will qualify to
do so because relatively few potential emigrants have relatives outside of
the Soviet Union. The current trend appears to be away from the liberal
policies of the 1970's, with an effort directed towards encouraging these
individuals to stay, but to allow them a greater freedom of travel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gorbachev, principally through glasnost, has made progress concern-
ing human rights. This progress is evidenced by the release of political
prisoners, relaxed censorship, and allowance of certain public demonstra-
tions. Areas which have shown little or no progress concern minority and
religious prisoners, and emigration. To the Western perception, the So-
viet hard-line position is softening.
Reflecting on the developments regarding the fate of the liberaliza-
tion experienced during the last year, it is reasonable to predict that there
will be more progress on human rights in the coming months. In the
longer term, one should not be euphoric about the prospects of glasnost
in this area. If Gorbachev is trying to square the circle by undertaking the
democratization of the Soviet system, as he shows every sign of doing, it
is unlikely that he will perdure in control for many more years. As destiny
would naturally have it, sooner or later the nomenklatura will most likely
eject him. The result would be that glasnost would find itself bound to
suffer in the unavoidable conservative response. What is crucial is that
the longer term future depends overwhelmingly on Gorbachev's fate. If
Gorbachev succeeds in promoting democratization and revitalizing the
economy smoothly, without threatening the party's control, he will en-
dure. Dissidents, believing that deception is the key word, claim that: 1)
these changes were directed towards enticing Westerners to participate in
a Moscow human rights conference, which would be furthered by the So-
viet government; 2) the surfacing of good will by the Soviets will demate-
rialize as soon as an arms-control agreement has been completed; and, 3)
the changes have been a skillful method of dealing with the dissidents,
since these changes were directed more at pacifying than bolstering the
dissent." Andrei Sakharov believes otherwise, stating that "objectively
something real is happening. How far it is going to go is a complicated
question. But I myself have decided that the situation has changed. '72
Western experts on the Soviet political scene feel that Gorbachev's
striking courage, forceful personality, skills of persuasion, and unceasing
70. Among those who have been permitted to leave during the last year are: losif Be-
gun, David Goldfarb, Vladimir Feltsman, Georgi Mikhailov, and Lev Blitschtein.
71. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 1.
72. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, April 3, 1987, sec.
1, at 1, col. 1.
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aggressiveness in keeping his opponents off balance, make him not only a
awe-inspiring politician, but also the type individual who can pull the
USSR out of a massive national crisis. In November 1987, Rozanne Ridg-
way, an assistant secretary of state, commented that Gorbachev has a
"very firm grip" on the Soviet Union."" Others reporting on the last Party
Congress feel that Gorbachev is a strong, long term leader, who will pro-
vide order and innovation.7 4 On the other side of the prophesying coin,
one finds Richard Owen, who is skeptical about the success of
Gorbachev's reforms 7 5 and Martin Walker who feels that Gorbachev will
succeed only partially7 Standing in the forefront of successors to
Gorbachev should he fail, is Yegor Ligachev, who has voiced serious reser-
vations about glasnost, stressing the necessity for restraint.77 Of course,
these are merely predictions, but what is strongly evident is that if
Gorbachev fails in his efforts and is subsequently ousted, his human
rights policies will not only be swiftly, but also drastically reversed by his
successors. One can only quote a cynical dissident when asked how far
Gorbachev will go: "we shall see, we shall see."
7 8
D. Mauritz Gustafson
73. Denver Post, Nov. 1, 1987, sec I, at 3.
74. See CRS 86, supra note 9 (report on the 27th Soviet Party Congress in February
and March 1986).
75. See R. OWEN, COMRADE CHAIRMAN: SOVIET SUCCESSION AND THE RISE OF GORBACHEV
(1987).
76. See M. WALKER, THE WALKING GIANT: GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA (1986).
77. Time, Oct. 5, 1987, at 40.
78. N.Y. Times, supra note 33.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Right to Life in International Law
Reviewed by W. Paul Gormley*
RAMCHARAN, B. G. (editor), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, (1985);
$57.50 ISBN 90-247-3074-0, xii, 371 pp.
The most grievous violations of the fundamental rights of individuals
- indeed of all mankind - become the focus of this excellent volume. The
distinguished editor guided a group of contributors during an in-depth
evaluation of the right to life as it currently exists in customary interna-
tional law, and continues to be codified in major multinational conven-
tions.' Nonetheless, the focus of this series of essays is placed on the fu-
ture developments that will assure effective implementation of the right
to life. Accordingly, this book reflects the philosophy of the editor, who
seeks to enlarge the effective protection of human rights by means of an
expanded and open-ended interpretation of existing treaty texts, as op-
posed to the traditional approach which tended to apply a restrictive in-
terpretation toward human rights provisions that restrict absolute state
sovereignty.
One of the book's main contributions is that a dynamic approach has
been adopted for the purpose of expanding human rights protection. Ad-
mittedly, the question can be asked: "Has the tone of the volume become
excessively dynamic or overly far-reaching in terms of current state prac-
tice"? Beyond question, the issues raised in this challenging text will be
controversial throughout the remainder of this century, as dictatorships
of the left and the right continue to arbitrarily deprive their citizens of
fundamental rights and even their mere physical existence. "[W]hile
maintaining a legal orientation in general, an effort has also been made to
be dynamic, to view the right to life from all of its possible areas of appli-
* W. Paul Gormley is a member of the District of Columbia and United States Su-
preme Court Bars. Formerly Leverhulme and Simon Fellows, University of Manchester.
A.B. San Jose State University; M.A. University of Southern California; Ph.D. University of
Denver; J.D. (hons), LL.M. George Washington University; M. Int.-Comp. L., D. Jur. Free
University of Brussels (VUB); LL.D. Victoria University of Manchester.
1. THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (B. Ramcharan ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as RIGHT TO LIFE]. The applicable treaty texts are reproduced in the Annexes, id. at
317 ff. See generally, B. Ramcharan, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FAcT FINDING IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
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cation, to examine the complex problems which this right encounters in
practice, and to address existing or future needs."2
The influence, in fact leadership, of the editor is considerable; how-
ever, it would be incorrect to assume that the contributors have been un-
duly influenced. There are, accordingly, points of disagreement that ap-
pear among the various essays. In other words, authors "do their own
thing." For example, the conservative approach is to classify human
rights and fundamental guarantees into three distinct classes: 1) political
and civil; 2) economic, social and cultural; plus 3) the newer solidarity
rights (or human rights of the third cycle), because of the different stan-
dards of implementation and enforcement that have been perfected by
regional and international organizations.3 By way of contrast, the goal
sought by action-oriented human rights lawyers is to abandon these clas-
sifications in order to employ the corpus of existing human guarantees to
precise situations. In practice, the right to life (the primary civil and po-
litical right) incorporates the "right to living" (which consists primarily of
economic guarantees). But as frequently demonstrated in the series of
chapters, such philosophical differences do not hamper the emerging
standards and implementation of human rights norms. Perhaps all per-
sons of goodwill can avoid being entrapped by such philosophical contro-
versies by devoting a greater portion of their efforts toward the practice,
rather than the theory, of human rights law. This position is clarified in
Chapter I, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life,4 which rep-
resents the synthesis, and offers the conclusions and recommendations of
the project. Dr. Ramcharan brings together a number of diverse positions
for the purpose of analysis, and, secondly, provides a workable and uni-
fied scheme of human rights protection. Consequently, Dr. Ramcharan
assumes a law-making role when he advocates that human rights lawyers
"must, therefore, of necessity be in the forefront of the discipline, chart-
ing new courses, breaking new ground, and establishing new models and
methods." He illuminates this approach to the future role that should be
accepted by human rights lawyers by contending that: "If the interna-
tional human rights lawyer is doing his job well, he has to be ahead of his
colleagues in postulating new theories, in advocating the recognition of
new norms and in advancing new forms of action for promotion and pro-
tecting human rights."6
2. Id. at v.
3. Contra, Alston, The Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Develop-
ment or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 N.I.L.R. 307 (1982) (and the
sources cited). While in sympathy with the objectives sought by a number of contributors,
the reviewer feels compelled to concede the validity of the conservative approach by classi-
fying political and social rights as a distinct group of legal rights when contrasted with social
and economic guarantees, because of the different schemes of implementation and methods
of enforcement.
4. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 1-32.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id.
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The position defended by the contributors is that the right to life is
an imperative norm, a peremptory right, that is, jus cogens.7 Precisely,
the "right to life" is a norm of customary international law or a general
principle of international law which transcends particular positions, as
this right is codified in specific international conventions. As a result of
this interpretation of existing customary law, human rights lawyers are
"not necessarily limited by the provisions of particular conventions or
declarations, but must have recourse to the totality of the evidence and
the practice available within the international community."9
The further innovation becomes the scope, or the outer limits, of the
right to life. A restrictive interpretation of treaty texts, such as article 6
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,0 article 2 of
the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms," or article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 2 is
no longer applicable. Yet, two aspects of this right to life must be consid-
ered, as the contributors so aptly demonstrate. The mere physical exis-
tence of mankind must be assured as a norm of jus cogens from which
states may not derogate, even during periods of extreme emergency and
open warfare. Simultaneously, the "right to living" mandates that a mini-
mum quality of life be maintained. Governments have a legal duty to pro-
vide minimum subsistence levels. Obviously, the problem of setting such
levels must, necessarily, be determined in each case; yet the significant
consideration is that governments are required "to pursue policies which
are designed to ensure access to the means of survival for every individual
within its country.'"
Related subject matter areas, such as the right to peace, the right to
survival, and the right to a safe environment are applicable. Environmen-
tal hazards must not be minimized, for the reason that the interrelation-
ship between the right to live and the right to a pure and clean environ-
ment are inseparable. Not only is a strict duty imposed on states, but a
legal obligation - a right erga omnes - is imposed on the international
community. As a result, measures must be taken by international and re-
7. The contributors assume that the imperative norm of jus cogens (and also rights
ergo omnes) exist in customary international law and is applicable to the right to life. E.g.,
RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 14-15, 186-87, & 190. This position is supported by the
reviewer; however, it must be conceded that a significant number of distinguished authors
attempt to refute the existence of imperative norms. See, e.g., Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983), and Schwarzenberger,
International Jus Cogens, 43 TEx. L. REV. 455 (1965).
8. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49 U.N.
Doc. A/6136 (1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976).
11. E.T.S. No. 5 (1950); 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
12. Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica (opened for signature 22 Nov. 1969)(entered into
force July 1978), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 of 7 Jan.
1970; 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
13. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 6.
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gional organizations to prevent those environmental defaults that endan-
ger the lives of human beings. Here, then, one of the newer human rights
becomes an essential phase of the larger safeguard for human life. All too
obviously, uncontrolled pollution has the potential not only of destroying
flora and fauna, but also mankind: it is man who has become the endan-
gered species."
Conversely, the right to life is not absolute: in certain clearly defined
and limited circumstances, the state may legally take human life, and
these "permissible deprivations" are clearly set forth within the texts of
human rights conventions. But Dr. Ramcharan, relying on the text of ar-
ticle 4 of the American Convention, maintains that these "categories of
exceptions are closed and that no derogation of the right to life is permis-
sible outside of the permitted categories"15 as a rule of customary inter-
national law. This restriction on the imposition of the death penalty is
accepted within the orbit of the Organization of American States; how-
ever, is it valid to contend that other sovereigns are precluded from en-
acting legislation to apply the death penalty to additional crimes? As this
review is being written, public pressure is mounting in the United States
for the imposition of the death penalty for acts of espionage committed
during peacetime. Presently, this crime carries the penalty of life impris-
onment. At the moment, it is only possible to speculate as to whether
Protocol Number 6 to the European Convention of Human Rights 6 and
the Draft Second Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights17 will be widely adopted by the High Contracting Parties.
Gross violations of human rights - such as torture, lack of a fair trial,
disappearances of defendants, and executions during periods of emer-
gency - have increased in severity during the past year. It appears that
even graver deprivations of human freedom will occur in the final decade
of this century. Accordingly, the lesson is clear: there is a desperate need
for international cooperation and concerted action by the international
community, within the framework of the United Nations. To achieve this
objective, Dr. Ramcharan presents a thirty-seven point agenda for action,
for example the reinforcement of jus cogens, the enactment of the right
14. Accord generally, Gormley, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (1976).
15. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 21.
16. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty; reproduced
id. at 343 - 45. Article 1 provides: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
condemned to such penalty or executed." And Article 3 stipulates: "No derogation from the
provisions of the Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention." See also,
Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 6 to the Convention For the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty; repro-
duced in RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 345-47.
17. Draft Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/L.75, at 35; reproduced in RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at
348 - 50.
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to life in national constitutions, the imposition of international criminal
liability for' gross violations, the duty to negotiate disarmament issues,
etc.
Dr. F. Menghistu reexamines the basic definition of this concept in
order to come to grips with the main elements comprising the right to
living, i.e. its economic base.18 Not by accident, the Ethiopian author ap-
proaches this problem as one of survival; consequently, he speaks of a
human right to survival, namely the right to live. But this right involves
more than a negative approach that will restrict arbitrary governmental
acts; instead, a duty is placed on the state (and its organs) to provide the
sustenance of life, primarily adequate nutrition and medical treatment.
This economic side of the right to live brings together a number of other
individual rights to deal with the mere survival of mankind, since
800,000,000 of the world's population face starvation. In addition, the
newer rubric of human rights jurisprudence will also encompass some of
the solidarity rights in that the international community has a duty to
lend support. Indeed, one of the themes to emerge in most of the essays is
the duty of the global community - as represented in the United Nations,
its specialized agencies, plus regional institutions - to implement the right
to living.
Yet the difficulty of implementing such a global guarantee will be-
come all too obvious, owing to the package of rights and economic guar-
antees that will become relevant. Nonetheless, human beings will be pro-
tected when governments deal effectively with such matters as under-
development, socio-economic stagnation, and political instability.
It follows that the newer right to development assumes a special im-
portance within the third world. Hence, Professor de Waart, in a thought-
ful chapter,1 9 deals with the very foundation of any "right to survival."
Perhaps this right to development will go further in supporting the right
to living than dealing exclusively with survival, for in his view, "a right to
development may emerge as a right to protection by law against uninten-
tional non-arbitrary creeping or passive deprivation of life resulting from
natural or man-made disasters which endanger the fulfillment of basic
needs."20 Thus, international society will assume an accelerating role in
dealing with natural or man-made disasters that cannot be adequately
dealt with by states.
Professor C.K. Boyle deals directly with one of the book's underlying
themes, The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life." In fact, the con-
18. Ch. III, The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements, RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at
63-83.
19. Ch. IV, The Inter-Relationship Between the Right to Life and the Right to Devel-
opment, id. at 84-96. See also, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
(R. Dupuy ed., 1979); Van Boven, The Right to Development and Human Rights, 28 REV.
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 49 (1982).
20. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 89.
21. Ch. X, id. at 221-83.
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cept of "arbitrary" - to be contrasted with the legal taking of human life
by a state - requires constant interpretation and reevaluation, because the
term "arbitrary" is contained within international conventions. For in-
stance, article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant speaks of "arbitrary
deprivation of life." As such, the issue becomes: "Have governmental au-
thorities acted in an arbitrary fashion?" The issue of the arbitrary taking
of life by state agencies, even if permitted by municipal law, must be re-
examined in terms of regional and international criteria, guaranteeing the
right to life. This is to say, considerable disagreement arose at the time
these human rights conventions were negotiated, and compromises were
required, which had the effect of weakening the original goals of the
treaty drafters. Still, considerable insight is provided by the travaux
preatoires of the treaty articles at issue, for the reason that these provi-
sions have become general principles of international law and are also in-
cluded within customary international law. The primary consideration is
that the right to life is the foremost human right, upon which all other
human rights (and social guarantees) depend. The point at issue becomes:
"Which exceptions to this sacrosanct right are recognized under interna-
tional rights law?" The death penalty, consequently, must be reexamined
in terms of the subsequent evolution of international criteria.
Thus, the specialized topic, which continues to become ever more
controversial, is that of capital punishment. Dr. Sapienza examines the
International Legal Standards on Capital Punishment,2 particularly
from the perspective of future treaty commitments. Those international
norms that ban or restrict the imposition of capital punishment become
the main legal force restricting the right of governments to extinguish
human life. The primary examples are to be found in treaty articles, e.g.
article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant, which does not outlaw, but
restricts the imposition of the death penalty and provides post-sentencing
relief, such as a pardon or commutation. However, the compromises that
were reached during the drafting stage have weakened the commitment
undertaken by states parties. It follows that protocols, when ratified, will
abolish capital punishment, namely the Sixth Optional Protocol to the
European Convention of Human Rights and the Draft Second Optional
Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant. Here, then, is the main
thrust (along with possible changes in domestic legislation) to preserve
human life at the global level, specifically a binding treaty commitment.
The next stage is to provide, first, the machinery for international moni-
toring and, second, a means of enforcement, especially during periods of
emergency or throughout a state of war, at which time governments are
more inclined to disregard their international obligations.
The recommendation offered, which could also be utilized as the pri-
mary conclusion emerging from the series of studies, is that constant at-
tempts to improve standard-setting, accompanied by supervisory struc-
22. Ch. XII, id. at 284-96.
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tures, be intensified, in spite of the hesitancy on the part of states to
restrict their freedom of action against their own nationals.
In looking toward the future, particularly the final decade of this cen-
tury, the right to life, deemed to be jus cogens, peremptory, and a right
erga omnes, must become the focus of United Nations efforts, and indeed
the focal point of the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, as so elo-
quently espoused by Professor van Boven, who contends, and quite prop-
erly, that "The protection of human life and the prevention of killings
could become one priority theme of the Commission in its future pro-
gramme and in taking up concrete situations involving gross and consis-
tent violations of human rights.12 3 Therefore, Professor van Boven offers
a number of precise recommendations, such as the designation of a spe-
cial rapporteur to examine instances of deliberate taking of life. These
far-reaching proposals should be evaluated in future studies that build
upon the foundation laid in this outstanding book.
23. Id., Annex VII, 335, at 340. The right to life becomes a recognized rubric of human
rights law, with the result that the literature continues to expand. See Desch, The Concept
and Dimensions of the Right to Life (as defined.in International Standards and in Inter-
national and Comparative Jurisprudence), 36 OSTERR. Z. OFFENTL RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 77 (1985) for a reexamination of the expanding concept. See Dr. Desch's discussion of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1981 (proclaimed by the Islamic Council to
mark the anniversary of the 15th century of the Islamic era, Paris, 19 Sept. 1981), Id. at 79
& n. 8 at 81-83.
See also van Aggelan, LE R6LE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANS LA PROTEC-
TION DU DROrr A LA VIE (1986).
The evolution of these rights, enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (U.N. GAOR 3rd Sess. (I), U.N. Doc. A/810, 1984), including the right to life, is
discussed in Gormley, The Emerging Dimensions of Human Rights: Protection at the In-
ternational and Regional Levels - The Common Standard of Mankind, 17 BANARES (INDIA)
L.J. 1 (1981). Cf. Okere, The Protection of Human Rights In Africa and the African Char-
ter on Human Rights, European and American Systems, 6 HUMAN RTS. Q. 141 (1984).
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